Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Report 1

File: 120596_aacxh_25.txt
Page: 25
Total Pages: 53

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war, the operators determined weather was a major player in the planning process, and the HWDs did not provide planners with enough detail for go/no-go decisions. Consequently, Lt Col Riley worked with Brig Gen Proffit, Electronic Warfare (EW) Air Division Commander, to develop the CENTAF planning support worksheet. These worksheets were institutionalized by 29 Jan 91. Each 3-day package included three separate worksheets covering successive 24-hour periods. Each sheet divided the AOR into four broad regions and gave the cloud conditions by six-hour blocks. The sheets were then color coded (red-green) and posted on the primary target allocation maps in the GAT. Figures 5, 6 and 7 show a typical package, in addition to the target planning weather work sheets, Lt Col Riley and his staff presented a number of formal briefings at different points in the planning process. Fig 8 depicts the schematic planning cycle. The basic planning process began at 2400L with a briefing to Brig Gen Olosson, who
then decided which potential targets would be fragged tomorrow (for execution ATO starting 26 hours later), the next day (for execution in the ATO starting 50 hours out), or held in reserve. The SWO briefed planning weather to the GAT 24 hours later, this time for final scrub of targets released to the fray shop (a 26-hour forecast). At 0800L, the SWO briefed the fraggers who were building the next night's ATO. At 1400L, the SWO briefed weather a final time to Brig Gen Glosson; this was the last chance to change the targets to be hit later that night (from the ATO built the day before) and into the morning hours (primarily for F-117s). In addition to the formal briefing process, the SWO presented numerous "on-call" briefings, and the planners frequently stopped by the CENTAF weather office for specific mission forecasts.

5.2.1.1. (U) CENTAF Planning Forecast Accuracy. The CENTAF planning cycle was fluid to respond quickly to the current operational situation. During the period 29 Jan to 28 Feb 91, the CENTAF SWO issued the structured 3-day planning forecasts for the GAT. The SWO based these forecasts primarily on the SSB (0-72 hours). While all of these forecasts were critical, the planning process made the forecasts issued at 21Z (2400L) the most critical for planning, so they are verified separately.

5.2.1.2. (U) CENTAF 2lZ Planning Forecast Verification. As with the SSB verification data, Figs. 9 and 10 provide the CENTAF planning verification
for Baghdad and the KTO, respectively. The CENTAF SWO planning products forecast the lowest conditions for a specific time period in the area of interest. The CENTAF SWO forecast showed significantly more skill than persistence. "Just fly" expected favorable conditions were 65 (Baghdad)
and 63 (KTO) percent. Once again, the CENTAF SWO forecast of 76, 79, and 75 percent at 24-, 48-, and 72-hour intervals (Baghdad), and 67, 70, and 68 percent (KTO) gave significant value added compared to the control "no-skill" forecast of persistence and "just fly."

5.2.1.3. (U) Aggregate Planning Forecast Verification. The aggregate CENTAF planning forecasts (Fig. 11) show the forecast accuracy exceeded both persistence and "just fly" forecasts by 15.5 percent (tomorrow's forecast vs persistence) to 3 percent (48- to 72-hour forecast vs "just fly"), respectively. In summary, the AWS forecast had significant value when compared to any measure of "no-skill" forecasts from 0-72 hours.

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