Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Report 1

File: 120596_aacxh_31.txt
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Total Pages: 53

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5.2.2. (U) CENTAF Execution. Weather support to mission execution at the force- and unit-level came from the TACC weather cell (force) and the weather teams located at base level (unit).

5.2.2.1. (U) CENTAF Force-Level Execution Support. The TACC weather team (one officer, three NCO forecasters) provided force-level execution weather support. The TACC monitored the execution of each ATO from the time it was issued until completion. The TACC weather team developed a process to
update continuously the current observations and 12-hour forecast conditions for all recovery bases in the AOR. The TACC weather team continually updated current cloud conditions over the AOR, as derived from DMSP/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellite imagery, and displayed them in the TACC. Continuous access to the weather support products became so important to the air order of battle that shortly after the start of Operation DESERT STORM, Lt Gen Horner directed TACC weather products be moved from the rear of the TACC "room" to directly under and to the right of the downlinked Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) display of the battlefield. Of two TACC overhead projectors in addition to TV displays, one continuously displayed cloud heights and coverage data. Another wall chart displayed recovery bases below 500-foot ceilings and/or 2-mile visibility just to the right of the AWACS downlink screen. Real-time meteorological satellite transparency imagery was placed on a light table right next to the senior CENTAF staff and commander. Real-time weather became one of the most significant factors affecting air war operations.

5.2.2.2. (U) CENTAF Unit-Level Execution Support. The collocated SWO provided CENTAF unit-level weather support. The degree and type of weather support depended upon the aircraft mission profile and weapon delivery system. Base- level support typically consisted of a standup briefing or "self-brief" weather flimsy. We also include Operation PROVEN FORCE weather support information, provided by a weather cell at Incirlik AB, Turkey. Specific comments on support and forecast accuracy follow.

5.2.2.2.1. (U) Deep Interdiction (F-117s). Since the forecast provided for each F-117 mission flown was recorded and the mission debriefed, we have a more complete picture of execution forecast accuracy throughout the air war than any other weapon system. Figure 12 gives the forecast contingency matrix for F-117 mission for the entire air war. Forecast favorable means ceiling at or above 10,000 feet while observed favorable means the weather was favorable for weapon delivery (either the weapon was successfully delivered or a nonweather factor, caused unsuccessful delivery). There were cases where the F-117 SWO forecast unfavorable conditions and CENTAF directed the missions fly in spite of the forecast. These cases occurred when the target's priority warranted an attempt to hit it in spite of the unfavorable weather forecast. The trend of forecast accuracy in time is very interesting. Figure 13 shows the cumulative percent correct forecast through Operation DESERT STORM. A general upward trend in forecast accuracy over time is evident, although day-to-day fluctuations did occur. The upward trend occurred as forecasters got a better understanding of winter weather in the AOR. Also, the synergistic effect of pilot reports feeding back into the forecast process helped hone forecast skills.

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