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5.2.2.2.2. (U) Other Interdictors (F-111, F-15E).   The change in mission tactics by Day 3 greatly affected the weather support concept.   The profile of a low-level ingress, pop-up for delivery on target heavily relies on EOTDA support.   Once the profile changed to high altitude ingress and delivery, EOTDAs became less relevant to the deep interdictors, except for situational awareness. Even though the pilot did not need to time his "pop-up" to coincide with lock-on range, the EOTDA remained critical for pilot situational awareness. Mission tactics in this war made the most important weather TDA a forecast of ceilings below 10,000 feet, During the first two days of the air war, forecasters provided mission specific EOTDA forecasts for 31 F-111 missions and one F-15E mission. All 32 were forecast to have favorable lock-on ranges (greater than 10,000 meters), and all 32 were accurate. Operation DESERT STORM showed an additional environment factor affected fighter aircraft operations. While the forecast operational threshold was for ceilings at or above 10,000 feet, the actual precision guided munitions POM) support required a cloud-free line of sight from bomb release point to target.  The reason was that the weapons require laser designation for the entire flight of the weapon. If the T laser designator hit a cloud, the weapon lost lock-on and became a "dumb" bomb. 

5.2.2.2.1. (U) Close Air Support (A-l0, F-16). The tactics employed for close  air support (CAS) missions caused the aircrew to use weather forecasts more for situational awareness than actual operational decisions.    The tactics of the A-10 best illustrate why this occurred. In Operation DESERT STORM, A-10s flew I missions in assigned "kill boxes." Each "kill box" was one-half degree latitude by one-half degree longitude (about 900 square miles). The controller in the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) cleared one or two A-10s into the T box for a 30-minute period. Their mission was to shoot any available targets. | CENTAF tasked CAS missions 24 hours a day. for example, at King Fahd, half of the A-10 squadrons were on a daytime schedule, half on a nighttime schedule. Forecasters provided a weather flimsy for aircrew support. If the forecast was no ceiling below 10,000 feet, the entire first wave launched. If weather condi- tion were suspect, CENTAF first launched a weather scout to find a workable area (dependent on situation and command guidance). Once aircraft were launched, real-time weather support worked via an ABCCC voice link exchanging observations (pilot reports) and "now forecasts."  Lt Robison, the A-10 SWO, recalled sev eral occasions when he identified areas that would have ceilings at or above 10,000 feet. On several of these occasions, the aircrews successfully worked the areas identified by the SWO. 

5.2.2.2.4. (U) Operation PROVEN FORCE. Operation PROVEN FORCE had a single | dedicated weather team supporting all operations from Turkey. Since Uni ted I States Air Forces Europe-USAFE) conducted Operation PROVEN FORCE, they had dif - ferent operational thresholds. The Operation PROVEN FORCE SWO divided mission forecasts into favorable-marginal-unfavorable conditions based upon weather throughout the entire route.  Atch 2 gives the actual threshold values. In short, favorable forecasts were for visual flight rules (VFR) conditions at take-off/landing, and ceilings 18,000 feet at target. Marginal conditions existed if either the take-off/landing conditions were marginal visual flying I rules (MVFR) or target ceilings were between 10,000 and 18,00D feet. 1 Unfavorable conditions were either take-off/landing conditions were instrument I flying rules (MVFR) or ceilings below 10,000 feet at target. These guidelines - 
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