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 **** UNCLASSIFIED **** 					22

Prior to take-off, the Intel section provided the pilots with up-to-date information on the target and the threat, including pictures of the factory itself.  Needless to say, such a priority target also contained a heavy concentration of anti-aircraft defenses.  According to Lt Col Hylton there was:  

	"... an awful lot of triple-A, a heck of a lot at both low and high altitude...there were a lot of SAMs shot at us.  All types of SAMs. You had to fight your way in ... avoid the stuff as best as you could. But we didn't have anybody hit and we got through to the target and bombed it. (27)  

	(U) Although the Iraqis sent up numerous SAMs they fired them ballistically to avoid being targeted by the F-4G Weasels, thus significantly decreasing the missile's accuracy. Despite the stiff air defense, the squadron broke through, and as Lt Col Hylton stated earlier,"... put the bombs on target."

	U) Again, as on the previous day, weather proved almost as formid- 
able a deterrent as the SAM.  Although the weather did not stop the attack, tail winds of up to 125 knots did make accurate bombing a bit more difficult.  After making their attacks, the pilots egressed the area and reformed. (29)

    (U) The squadron finally got confirmation that the attack destroyed 85% of the SCUD factory.  Throughout the campaign, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) proved to be one of the most frustrating aspects of the war.  Many of the 69th's missions were flown at night, and when the target could not be visually confirmed as destroyed by another squadron member (usually the wingman), the squadron would not know the exact extent of damage inflicted during the mission for days, if ever. (30)

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