Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

File: 120596_aacyf_36.txt
Page: 36
Total Pages: 124


 23 			**** UNCLASSIFIED ****
	(U) In the first 24 hours of the conflict, the 69 TFS, in concert with literally hundreds of other aircraft, rendered the sophisticated Iraqi air defense blind. By specifically targeting the command and control facilities and the early warning radar stations, the Iraqi leadership could neither detect nor respond effectively to the coalition's attacks until too late. Without coordinated air defenses, the Iraqi Army, Supply and Weapons industry were open to the relentless aerial attacks of the coalition forces. (31)

THE FIRST SCUD ATTACKS 
	(U) While the first strikes against Iraq were taking place Saddam Hussein ordered his SCUD missiles launched against Israel and Saudi Arabia. On 17 January 1991, A U.S. Patriot missile intercepted and destroyed the SCUD bound for Saudi Arabia, but the ones launched at neutral Israel impacted in Tel Aviv and Haifa.  Although these missiles caused little physical damage, the political fallout could have changed the course of the war. Saddam Hussein believed if he could provoke Israel into a retaliatory strike for his unprovoked attacks on civilians, then the Arab states aligned with the coalition forces might withdraw their support. (32)

THE 69TH FORWARD DEPLOYS TO KING FAHD AB 

(U) On 19 January 1991, Israel received three more SCUD attacks.  The Allied forces responded by making the Destruction of Saddam's terror weapons a high priority. As a result of the political situation, CENTAF ordered the 69th, because of its LANTIRN capability, to stand anti-SCUD patrols.  Eight aircraft were forward deployed to King Fahd Air Base, Saudi Arabia. At 2100 (local), Capt Scott Bishop and Capt J. D. Harris were scrambled, attacked a SCUD site, and returned to Al Minhad.

Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search