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File: 970207_aadbb_002.txt
Page: 002
Total Pages: 5

 [(b)(l) sec 3.4 (b)(5)]
			Primary employment difficulty: only
 seven samplers and-200 ID kits will-be available by mid-Jan. 
 
 Currently fielded protective masks provide adequate protec-
 tion if properly fitted. Host country collective protection
 filter systems are thought to provide adequate protection. Some
 commercially available industrial or disposable masks can filter
 out BW particles and could be made available to the civilian
 populace.

 Emphasis on local orientation/training programs removes
 much of the uncertainty and apprehension about the possibility of
 BW attacks and the efficacy of US protective measures.

 RECOMMENDATIONS

 Initiation of vaccination program should be immediate to
 achieve effectiveness by mid-Jan 91.
 
 The US should pursue the UK offer to share excess vaccine.

 Priority for immunization should be based on protecting -
 personnel in the AOR by 31 Jan 91 at operating locations thought
 to be primary targets, as well as aircrew members at other loca-
 tions with missions likely to penetrate Iraqi airspace.

 Priority One - must be immunized ASAP (30,800 personnel --
 initial estimate of 15,000 didn't take into account additional
 deployment and relocation of existing assets within AOR).

 Area A: All CENTAF personnel in Riyadh area -- Riyadh
 AB, King Khalid Int'l, and A1 Kharj (19,000 personnel).

 This area includes: CENTAF staff; only TACC, all
 AWACS, ABCCC, and RC-135s in AOR; plus some F-15C/Es, F-
 16s and tankers.

 Area B: All CENTAF personnel in Dammam area -- Dhah-
 ran, King Fahd Int'l, Shaikh Isa, and Doha (11,000 personnel).

 This area includes: all A-l0s, AC/HC/MC-130s, F-4Gs,
 Volant Solo, and RF-4Cs in AOR; plus some F-15Cs and F-16s.

 All other aircrew members flying missions fragged to
 penetrate Iraqi airspace -- B-52s, EF-llls, F-16s, F-15C/Es,
 F-lllFs and F-117s (800 personnel).
 
 Recovery of aircraft which may have flown through BW
 contamination presents a minimal hazard to base personnel,
 if units adhere to necessary precautionary measures --
 protective masks, segregation and decontamination of
 aircraft, and antibiotics.

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