Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search
File: 970207_aadch_016.txt3. The language barrier was the major inhibitor of EH efforts to educate local national foodhandlers about USAF sanitation and hygiene standards. 4. Food delivered to on-base feeding facilities by local national food vendors could not be inscected at destination in most cases because the food was not government owned or purchased and because EH was not kept informed about the deliveries. EH efforts to get involved in destination inspection of foods were effective in a very few cases. This effort was not aggressive in every case. 5. Commander support of EX recommendations for the prevention of foodborne illness was not obtained in some cases. Troop morale sometimes received a higher priority (i.e. hot meals served under less than s-atisfactory conditions preferred over MREs). 6. The inspection reporting system used during peacetime was not employed at all deployed bases. EH did not, in every case, actually assign ratings to inspection reports (i.e. "unsatisfactory") and did not rout inspection reports through Wing Commanders. Commander support and food service officer responses to deficiencies might have been more aggressive if EH had used the standard reporting system which was well established and used during peacetime operations. 7. In many cases, a daily record of menus was not kent by the feeding facilities. Epidemiologic investigations were hampered by the lack of feeding facility menus to refer to during patient interviews. 8. Definitive diagnoses of AGE cases could not be made in some cases because clinical laboratory supcort was not readily available. Early identification of the pathogen may have significantly enhanced epidemiologic investigations and treatment. 9. Detailed reports of foodborne illness investigations were not written and/or forwarded to USCENTAF/SG. This deficiency represents a missed opportunity during the deployment to share information between bases and to educate food managers and commanders. Detailed reports would also have enhanced post- deployment analysis of the foodborne illness risks associated with Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. 10. EH training during Operational Readiness Exercises did not include structured food safety tasks. EH personnel were not well prepared to conduct, nor were ATH Commanders well acquainted with, EH foodborne illness prevention tasks in a barebase setting.
Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search