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                 DESERT SHIELD/STORM LESSONS LEARNED REPORT #I

          POC:            [(b)(2)]

          TITLE: Volunteer Backfill Program
         
          OBSERVATION: The volunteer program was relied upon too
          heavily in the beginning of this contingency considering
          the massive known requirements. Policy communication was
          unclear.
         
         DISCUSSION: Volunteerism became unwieldy. In the
         beginning, our fill actions were restricted due to the
         policy for TAC-gained and TAC-trained IMA volunteers only
         for TAC bases. The great number of short tours, primarily
         by AFRES and ANG personnel was also counterproductive. As
         soon as some professionals were confirmed as credentialed,
         they were ready to go off their tours. Last minute tour
         requests and extension requests were also a big problem.
         Many unnecessary telephone calls, FAXs, and general crisis
         management was caused by this last minute notification.
         Tour location changes was also a large problem. Due to the
         voluntary nature of the program it was thought that the
         member could go wherever he/she wanted. This caused an
         administrative nightmare.
         
         LESSONS LEARNED: The volunteer program should always be
         looked upon as augmentation to involuntary backfill, never
         as a primary means of backfill. The volunteer program also
         needs tighter control.
         
         RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: Recommend three possible options: 1)
         If a volunteer program is utilized in the future, do not
         rely on the volunteer program as a primary means of
         backfill. Place policy limits on volunteerism early in the
         program. Limit tour location changes. Require tours to be
         30 days or more. Require at least two weeks lead time for
         tour requests or tour extension requests. Try to place
         volunteers as close to their homes as possible to avoid
         future moves. Establish volunteer program
         procedures/policies in a contingency plan. Bring in a HQ
         AFRES/SG and HQ NGB/SG representative to work with HQ
         ARPC/SG. 2) Do away with the volunteer program as soon as
         mobilization authority is granted, and mobilize those
         members on duty as volunteers. 3) Do not establish a
         volunteer program. The program does not work effectively
         for a large contingency like Operation Desert Shield/Storm.
         This option is recommended by HQ ARPC/SG.
         
         HQ ARPC/RC RELATED ITEMS: 4,6,9
         

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