Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

File: 970729_aadep_01.txt
Page: 01
Total Pages: 2

SUBJECT:   CENTAF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL REPORT, KUWAIT, 15 APR 91    





    EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL REPORT AFTO FORM 358
    
    To: DET 63  3100 SMSQ			 Thru ( MAJCOM) USCENTAF/DOSE
    NAVEODTECHCEN APO NY 09852			  APO NY 09852
    INDIAN HEAD, MD 20640-5099
    
    
    
   From:			Reported by: Capt Klel			Unit Control No
   CENTAF EOD/KRT			Air Force EOD
   Freedom Village, Kuwait			Kuwait
    
             Time		Date		Participating 	Manhours	Special Identifier
    Reported:0600		15 Apr 91		N/A	N/A		Incident:  01
    Start:0600		15 Apr 91
    Stop:1700		15 Apr 91
    

                             Injury Code: 01		Property Damage Code: 01
    
   Natl	Class	Qty	Nomenclature	RSP	DP		Tech Data                
    
   			 SEE NARRATIVE
    
    Narrative: This is a consolidated End of Trip/After Actions report for
    the closure of operations for Air Force EOD participating in the restor-
    ation of Kuwait. The first thing that needs to be addressed is the sup-
    port needs that are required for an operation of this magnitudes, An in-
    dependant duty-qualified medic must accompany EOD at each operating loc-
    ation. We had difficulty obtaining medic support from the Army. The
    nearest medical aid station was five miles away (15 minutes by road), and
    we had to depend on the Army to provide medics on an " as available
    basis." The deployment of two mechanics with the EOD unit proved
    essential. Both of our mechanics worked solid ten hour days, repairing
    tires and servicing vehicles. Most of their work took place after we re-

  





    turned each day. They were able to keep on top of even minor discrepanc-
    ies ( burnt out lights, broken seat belts ) and kept our vehicle fleet
    100% available for use. We strongly recommend at least two mechanics per
    operating location. We experienced limited usefulness of our SMUD cap-
    ability due to an inability to control entry of looting Egyptian Army
    personnel and the close proximity of Egyptign camps to the base perimeter
    We needed to communicate with aircraft or warn them to clear the area, due
    to being overflown at least twenty times a day, many times at very low
    altitudes and speeds. We recommend at least one guard channel radio per
    operating location, Overall,our needs were met, but much of this was due
    to our troops ability to " Wheel and Deal." The total amount of area
    cleared on Ali Al Salem came to 20 square kilometers of area, 200 bunkers
    65 buildings, 20 hardened aircraft shelters, and 35 kilometers of taxi-
    ways without mishap or equipment damage.
    
    Number of		 Typed/Printed Name &	Typed/Printed Name &	Date
    Attachments		 Signature of Team Chief    Signature of Supervisor	15 Apr 91
    			 MICHAEL KEENEY	JAMES W. KIEL 
    			SMSgt, USAF		Capt, USAF
 							MAJCOM Comments   
    			Concur     XNonConcur

							V000234

Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search