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File: 970729_aadev_05.txt
~100_51' ~ A- - ~ ~
Colonel Warden, ~
[Attached is the paper as it went to CSAF this P.M. The Tank
briefing was going to give three U.S. options: (1) Begin
inoculating U.S. forces only; (2) Begin inoculating allied forces
in addition to U.S. forces; and (3) Defer (he decision to begin
inoculating. Air Staff recommendation was support Option 2,
especially forces in Cz nodes such as Riyadh.
Gen McPeak questioned that recommendation asking if we
shouldn't be concerned with inoculating the entire population in
Riyadh (civilian and military). Gen Adams said we were only
concerned with combat forces, so Gen McPeak asked how air forces
would stack up with other forces in theater given that CINCCENT
would have many areas of concern and would have to prioritize the
[limited inoculations available. (Before the meeting, Gen Adams
had discussed the CINCs 'Personal For the Chairman' [vERY
SENSITIVE!] and said it reflected "...an infantryman's concern for
his fellow infantrymen..."and that the CINC was looking for an out
from having to make the call on who gets inoculated, and who
doesn't). Gen Adams agreed with Gen McPeak's concern, but said we
had looked at it from the aspect of "the most bang for the buck"
for Hussein and that he could do- most damage to the coalition by
attacking air forces.
At that point, Gen Loh directed Gen McPeak to the paper,
saying we had ID' d two specific target areas where Hussein could
really hurt us (sol Gernhardt had also done some quick research on
personnel in these two areas and had a 'hip-pocket' number of
15,000 CENTAF personnel). The Chief said 'OK, good,' and closed
his briefing book and left. The consensus was that he was going
to go forward to the Chairman with a position that AN has, as a
minimum, the need to protect its personnel at these locations.
~7
.~ ~
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