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    BACKGROUND; PAPER
    
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    - . - r " PROPOSED ANTHRAX VACCINATION/ANTIBIOTICS ' PLAN'
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    Purpose of this paper is to recommend how to provide anthrax
    immunizations and antibiotics to CENTAF personnel as part of an
    integrated biological warfare (B\i) defense plan. The final
    determination of priorities and implementation methods is a
    CINCCENT prerogative.
    
    DISCUSSION
    
    A timely decision to vaccinate and establish vaccination
    priorities is critical to provide protection by mid-Jan 91.
    
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    The UK is implementing its own BW protection plan and has
    informally offered its excess vaccine to the US.
    
    The persistency and wide area coverage possible with anthrax
    make it the most significant threat to CENTAF forces. Iraq's
    likely delivery means for anthrax are spray tanks, bombs, SRBM,
    end' Iragi agents.
    
    A preemptive Iragi BI' attack is improbable. Anthrax use on


    





    the tactical battlefield is also unlikely because of its delayed
    effects and possible impact on Iragi troops. Due to its intelli-
    gence limitations, Iraq would probably employ anthrax against
    large, fixed targets.
    
    Because effects usually do not show for 1 - 6 days, anthrax
    is most militarily useful against 'rear area targets supporting
    combat operations. '
    
    The best protection against BW is a combination of vaccina-
    tion prior to exposure and use of antibiotics before onset of
    symptoms. The preferred post-exposure treatment for those not
    vaccinated is, in order of priority: 1-antiL'iotics plus vaccina-
    tion; 2-antibiotics alone; 3-vaccination alone.
    
    Other facets of the BW defense plan include: enhanced'
    detection, warning and reporting; effective use of protective
    masks; and, heightened CENTAF awareness. '
    
    The Army is leading the effort to ficid early warning and
    point detectors to fill current void. The CENTCOI4/CENTAF warning
    and reporting system is in pi/ace. - '
    
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