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    [(b)(1) see 3.4 (b)(5)]
    
    - .. . .
    
    A_ - i....
    
        ~ ~ Primary employment-difficulty :'' only' - ~
    seven s'amplers'and 200`ID kits will' tee available by mid-Jan"'-,-'-: '-
    
           - CurrentIy~fielded'protective masks provide adequate'~protec-
    
    tion if properly fitted. 'Host country collective protection----~-
    filter'systems-'are'thought to' provide adequate protection. Some
    commercially available industrial or disposable masks can filter
    out BY particles and could be made available'to the civilian
    populace.
    
    Emphasis on local orientation/training programs removes
    much of the uncertainty and apprehension about the possibility of
    BW attacks and the efficacy of US protective measures.
    
    RECOMMENDATIONS
    
    Initlition of Vaccination program should he.immediate to
    achieve effectiveness by mid-Jan 91.
    
    The US should pursue the UK offer to share excess vaccine.
    
    Priority for immunization should be based on protecting -
    personnel in the AOR by 31 Jan 91 at operating locations thought
    to be primary targets, as well as aircrew members at other loca-
    tions with missions likely to penetrate Iragi airspace
    
    Priority One - must be immunized ASAP (30,800 personnel --
    initial estimate of 15,000 didn't take into account additional
    deployment and relocation of existing assets within AORTA).
    
    Area A: All CENTAF personnel in Riyadh area -- Riyadh
    AB, King Khalid Intel, and Al Kharj (19,000 personnel). -
    
    This area includes: CENTAF staff; only TACC, all
    AWACS, ABCCC, and RC-13ss in AOR; plus some F-15C/Es, F-
    16s and tankers.
    
    Area B: All CENTAF personnel in Dammam area -- Dhah-
    ran, King Fahd Intel, Shaikh Isa, and Doha~-~(11,000 personnel).
    
    This area includes: all A-lOs, AC/HC/MC-130s, F-4Gs,
    Volant Solo, and RF-4Cs in AOR; plus some F-15Cs and F-16s.
    
    All other aircrew members flying missions fragged to
    penetrate Iragi airspace -- B-52s, EF-llls, F-16s, F-15C/Es,
    F-lllFs and F-117s (800 personnel).
    
    Recovery of aircraft which may have flown through BW
    contamination presents a minimal hazard to base personnel,
    if units adhere to necessary precautionary measures --
    
  ' protective masks, segregation and decontamination of
    aircraft, and antibiotics.


    





    
    

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