24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: 080596_jun96_decls21_0167.txt
Page: 0167
Total Pages: 253

Subject: 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT    

Box  ID: BX001437

Document Number:          2

Folder Title: 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT                                                             

Folder Seq #:        785

Unit: 24TH ID     

Parent Organzation: XVIII CORPS 






                                      UNCLASSIFIED
                                                                        05/30/91
                                    JULLS LONG REPORT

          1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 50878-65775 (00001), submitted by 1-5 ADA, 24
          ID, 870-5516, (912)767-5516.

          2. (U) Other OPN DESERT STORM NOTES conducted by 24 IN DIV (MECH)
          on 03/05/91.

          3. (U) KEYWORDS: AIR DEFENSE, EARLY WARNING, FORWARD AREA ALERT
          RADAR, .

          4. (U) TITLE: EARLY WARNING OF ATTACK BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT

          5. (U) OBSERVATION: The division has no ties to any national
          source nor digital downlink from AWACS or JSTARS. The division
          needs improved early warning capability and access to real-time
          early warning information.

          6. (U) DISCUSSION: The division has no radars with a capability
          of tracking any aircraft at a distance in excess of 20 km. The
          FAAR's that the division does have were literally pulled out of
          the Class VII turn-in yard when this crisis started. Their
          range is of little use in providing early warning to the entire
          division covering only a small sector. This is especially
          apparent on the offensive as it takes 20-45 minutes to emplace
          the FAAR. TDARS, its replacement, has a range of only 20 km
          also. The problem is twofold:

          a) The air defense battalion needs more AM radios, as do the
          maneuver battalions. They, as well as the Vulcan and Stinger
          gunners, need access to early warning.

          b) The early warning received from CRC and HIMAD nodes may be
          adequate against fixed wing aircraft but probably will not
          detect enemy helicopters at 50 feet AGL.

          7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: To provide early warning, the division
          placed early warning teams with the Air Force control and
          reporting center and with the local Hawk/Patriot task force.
They, through the use of AM radio, were able to pass early
          warning even to the furthest deployed locations.

          S. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION:
          a) Add AM radio assets to the battalion with attention to     the
          air defense battalion to use for early warning.
          b). Provide the division with an early warning link of its    own
          such as a rivet joint downlink. While it is true that the     enemy
          did not employ his aircraft assets against us, it is also true
          that we were not quite as well prepared as the addition of a few
          pieces of equipment could have made us.

               (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS

               (U) INTEROPERABILITY:.MATERIEL

                                        Page - I

                                      UNCLASSIFIED

Document 253 f:/Week-22/BX001437/24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT/24th mech inf div operation desert storm after a:08029615062350
Control Fields 17
File Room = jun96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-22
Box ID = BX001437
Unit = 24TH ID
Parent Organization = XVIII CORPS
Folder Title = 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT
Folder Seq # = 785
Subject = 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER A
Document Seq # = 50
Document Date =
Scan Date = 12-JUN-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-AUG-1996