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File: 080596_jun96_decls21_0200.txt
Subject: 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT
Box ID: BX001437
Document Number: 2
Folder Title: 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT
Folder Seq #: 785
Unit: 24TH ID
Parent Organzation: XVIII CORPS
UNCLASSIFIED
06/01,
JULLS LONG REPORT
1. (TJ) S @ER: 51975-32537 (00002), submitted by PROVOST
MMSHALL, 24 ID, 870-5516, (912)767-5516.
2. (U) No type OPN DESERT STORM NOTES conducted by 24 IN DIV (I'
on 05/20/91.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: MILITARY POLICE, COMMAND AND CONTROL, CILAIN OF
COMMAND, .
4. (U) TITLE: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MILITARY POLICE
5. (U) OBSERVATION: Command and control of the military police
is a Provost Marshal mission.
6. (TJ) DISCUSSION: The operational control-of the military
police was an issue throughout the deployment. MP units were
attached to separate battalion headquarters for command and
control during various phases of the deployment creating a
problem with the direction of the MP effort and making it
difficult to establish a clearly defined chain of command. The
Division Provost Marshal continued to develop missions for use
of the MP units, however, command and control was not within his
purview. While exercising his duties as a special staff
officer, the Division Provost Marshal exercises a relationship
tantamount to command over the military police assigned or
attached to the division. In this deployment the Provost
Marshal controlled, for a significant time period, two MP
companies. When "Green Tab" responsibility for command and
control was deemed appropriate, the Military Police were task
organized under the operational control of a separate battalion.
Command and control was exercised by the battalion staff and the
level of expertise in the use of MP assets was severely
this task organization, the military
police were not used to their full capabilities and were not
effectively deployed as combat multipliers. Mission briefings
and supervision continued to be a role carried out by the
Provost Marshal.
7. (U) LESSON LEARNED:
1. Military Police are best led by military police
officers.
2. The loss of operational control by the Provost Marshal
during two major movements resulted in the military police being
ineffectively employed.
S. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: The Division Provost Marshal should
be dual hatted. While continuing to perform his duties as a
special staff officer, he should also be a battalion commander.
Establishment of a military police battalion to command and
control MP units assigned to the division would relieve separate
battalions of the burden of controlling units with which they
Page - 2
UNCLASSIFIED
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Document 253 f:/Week-22/BX001437/24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT/24th mech inf div operation desert storm after a:08029615062350
Control Fields 17
File Room = jun96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-22
Box ID = BX001437
Unit = 24TH ID
Parent Organization = XVIII CORPS
Folder Title = 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT
Folder Seq # = 785
Subject = 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER A
Document Seq # = 50
Document Date =
Scan Date = 12-JUN-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-AUG-1996