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File: 081996_jul96_decls1_0023.txt
Subject: 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Box ID: BX001301
Document Number: 3
Folder Title: OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq #: 4
Unit: 3D AD
Parent Organzation: VII CORPS
the problems and flaws which had to be corrected to give us the
capability we required to accomplish our mission.
Another important command and control tool emerged from ths
exercise - a standard division template. (See diagram Th:t
template depicted the division wedge formation, and the =pa.:al
relationships for all units within the formation. Given ths
template, it was simple to reorient the division on the move. A!: we
had to do was identify the 1.2 o'clocl@, siz,.-digit grid coordinates anc!
the center point grid coordinates, specify a time to execute, then
without further orders, units moved and tool, their positions as shown
by the template once placed an the map. By the way, we used
1.250,000 scale maps to train and fight the battle at division,
brigade, and battalion level. (This is not recommended. T@e Army
probably needs 1:10;,OOO maps for operations of this scale. The
Iraqis had good ones as we found out later.)
- MOVEMENT FROM TAA HENRY TO FAA BUTTS
14 - 16 February 91
Our movement from the tactical assembly area to our forward
assembly area, just south of the Iraqi border, gave us the
opportunity to exercise our C2 plan once again before the battle.
We considered it our dress rehearsal. We moved the division over a
period of 3 days, from 14 - 16 Feb, over a distance of 160km. Our
MSE system performed well, however, we had gaps in our RAU coverage,
which prevented commanders from using MSRT to communicate with one
another. Consequently, MG Funk and BB Blackwell, ADC-M, commanded
with FM radio, Division Command
Net. And that wasn't good. Without MSRT capability through RAUs
into the MSE systems and without proper placement of our FM
retransmission teams, MG Funk and BB Blackwell could not communicate
with the division staff nor the Division Rear CP for about 18 hours.
rn short, we overextended our MSE capability trying to sustain a
linkage across the entire distance between the TAA and FAA.
Moreover, we didn't place our FM retransmission teams at the right
place to give our command posts the ability to hear the orders and
directives given by the CB or ADC-M. These were hard lessons to
learn, so close to combat, but the experience forged some changes
which paid off a few days later when we crossed the LD.
CONSTRAINED BY A DINOSAUR
One of the factors that influenced where and when we moved the
Jump MAIN and DMAIN was the "old" PCM multichannel communications
system which provided our link to vrr Corps headquarters. It was
through this system we obtained our hard copy intelligence
information via a USC-144, and the Corps Bulletin Board System (BBS),
a computer-modem link, which VII Corps used to transmit orders,
plans, and staff information. We had to sustain this link. In other
words, we couldn't move the DMAIN until the Jump MAIN had established
a PCM link to VII Corps via the one, multichannel TACSAT system
5
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Document 269 f:/Week-28/BX001301/OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL/3ad history of operation desert storm and spear:0816961333481
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001301
Unit = 3D AD
Parent Organization = VII CORPS
Folder Title = OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date = 18-JUL-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 16-AUG-1996