3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR

File: 081996_jul96_decls1_0036.txt
Page: 0036
Total Pages: 269

Subject: 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR                 

Box  ID: BX001301

Document Number:          3

Folder Title: OPORDS AND  COMMAND AND CONTROL                                                                 

Folder Seq #:          4

Unit: 3D AD       

Parent Organzation: VII  CORPS  






               DTAC, and CG's command group were co-located in the center of the
               zone. The Jump MAIN remained at its site where it stopped the
               previous evening. The DMAIN moved at 0800 to its final position in
               Kuwait whereupon the Jump MAIN rejoined it.    The DMAIN was
               operational at 1630.
                                            - CONCLUSION -

                   There are many lessons to learn from the battle, both good and
               bad. What we had to keep in mind was the fact that we were breaking
               new ground.  Never before had a heavy division attacked an enemy
               force in the desert over a distance of 225 km in four days. Never
               had we trained to establish and extend an MSE network through a zone
               30 km wide and 225 km long (this does tell us that the objectives of
               USAREUR for offensive operations are correct).    Never had we trained
               to bound command posts over that distance while continuing to perform
               functional responsibilities without interruption.     In short, we could
               be too hard on ourselves, given the conditions of the battlefield and
               our experience. Nonetheless, here are the conclusions we've drawn.

                                            LESSONS LEARNED

               a No means of communications can surpass the flexibility and
               responsiveness provided by the FM secure radio.     It is the linchpin
               of fast moving, highly mobile armored warfare, even at division
               level. All the more reason our Army needs to invest quickly and
               procure a new, reliable FM series of radios, much smaller, with
               greater range.

               a MSE is a winner in our book. Despite some problems, it proved to
               be a flexible and reliable communications system, capable of
n armored division or
               corps for that matter. Seldom were we unable to maintain complete
               service within the division.   if vri Corps would have had the MSE
               system, in our view, command and control would have been
               significantly enhanced.. Most certainly the agility of the Corp would
               have been enhanced.

               a The current Division Main Command Post is too large, slow to
               displace, and limited by poor off-road mobility of heavy 5-ton
               expando vans.   It is not agile - a product of a 20 year focus on
               requirements to support defensive operations. To support both
               defensive and offensive operations effectively, perhaps a division
               should have two command posts, configured exactly alike, capable of
               performing the functions of both the DTAC and DMAIN as currently
               expressed in doctrine. This would improve survivability provide a
               redundant capability, and enhance flexibility. One could set, while
               one bounds forward. In hindsight, this has a lot of appeal.

               a There is no substitute for having the Commanding General
               well-forward, behind his lead brigade, listening to the progress of
               the battle, immediately available to make decisions, discuss courses
               ,f action and future plans with the ADC-M, and most important, see

Document 269 f:/Week-28/BX001301/OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL/3ad history of operation desert storm and spear:0816961333481
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001301
Unit = 3D AD
Parent Organization = VII CORPS
Folder Title = OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date = 18-JUL-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 16-AUG-1996