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File: 081996_jul96_decls1_0037.txt
Subject: 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Box ID: BX001301
Document Number: 3
Folder Title: OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq #: 4
Unit: 3D AD
Parent Organzation: VII CORPS
what's happening on the battlefield.
o The frequent visits forward by the ADC-S, in a helicopter, was
indispensable to effective synchronization of rear operations, with
both close and deep operations. We never lacked for fuel, but this
was because of all the planning and rehearsals we conducted, not to
mention adding both HEMKT and 5000 gallon fuel haulers to our
structure. Logistics never constrained our operations.
o Along the same line, there is also no substitute for face-to-face
discussions between higher and subordinate commanders. It is the
best way to clarify intent, get an accurate sense of a units'
capabilities, and make good decisions. Both LTG Franks and KG Funk
moved forward and visited their subordinate commanders at least once
a day.
a Crosstalk between brigade commanders on the division command net
was outstanding, facilitating coordination along the flanks, a
coordinated attack, and equally important, prevention of fratricide.
a Eavesdrop on division FM nets, although seldom addressed in CZ
discussions, does more for synchronizing the battle than we could
ever give credit. Just listening to reports, orders, and discussions
an the radio gives all an awareness c4 the situation, both friendly
and enemy, and helped every leader anticipate requirements or know
when it was time -For them to act.
o Command and control starts with a plan (lots c34 good work done
here in teaching the process particularly by BCTP, NTC, CKTC, and
PCC) based upon clear intent and commander's philosophy (which must
C2
structure, i.e. usually communications of all types.
a The expression of C2 intent during the orders pr6cess is
important, too.
c Battle drills at division level work and are necessary. I
recognize the problem with definition of "drill". ' Call them what you
will, they worked for us (See enclosure 1).
o The control of direct fires is neglected in our Army. We need
better doctrine and lots more training.
i3 Putting together (i.e. habitual relationships) brigade combat
teams'and keeping them stable as far In advance and as long as
possible is important in all operations but particularly 'in offensive
operations.
a The 'burden of welfare' must be constantly stripped from command
posts and units to obtain the mobility and agility required to
conduct armored operations.
12
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Document 269 f:/Week-28/BX001301/OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL/3ad history of operation desert storm and spear:0816961333481
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001301
Unit = 3D AD
Parent Organization = VII CORPS
Folder Title = OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date = 18-JUL-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 16-AUG-1996