3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR

File: 081996_jul96_decls1_0083.txt
Page: 0083
Total Pages: 269

Subject: 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR                 

Box  ID: BX001301

Document Number:          3

Folder Title: OPORDS AND  COMMAND AND CONTROL                                                                 

Folder Seq #:          4

Unit: 3D AD       

Parent Organzation: VII  CORPS  










                                        26 FEBRUARY
                                          The Battle
                                (PL SIABON to PL TANGERINE)


           On the morning  o-F-26 Feb 91, the 2ACR slipped to the southeast out of
       the division sector and the 2d Bde attacked to the cast. The brigade
       moved forward during the morning maintaining contact on its flank with 1AD
       and lst Bde, 3AD. The brigade attacked at 0600 crossing PL SMASH at 0824.
       At PL CAIRO (0945hrs) the brigade halted +or an hour to allow lst brigade
       to come on line and to issue at FRAGO to our units from information
       received during the night. During this time the division issued another
       verbal frago to the brigade, however, it had minimal impact as the frago
       was in synch with the brigade plan and anticipated division actions. The
       orders meeting was held at the Bde TAC and was concluded at 261045. The
       brigade began it attack again at approximately 1200 hours. The situation
       was still unclear since as the 2ACR slipped out of sector a coordinated
       battle handover had not been conducted nor a good intelligence dump
       performed. 2d Bde was the lead for the division and save for an aerial
       scout screen requested by the brigade commander was running somewhat blind
       into the.enemy. At 1230 hrs the brigade crossed PL MILLER and continued
       the attack with minor engagements with enemy dismounts. During the mid
       afternoon of 26 Feb the visibility began to diminish to barely 1 km caused
       by blowing sand. At approximately 1500 the brigade was preparing to set
       on PL TANGERINE and conduct refuel operations when the brigade was ordered
       to continue the attack and maintain the pressure on the retreating RGFC.
       Approximately 261630 Feb the brigade began encountering the "B" Brigade of
       the TAWAKANA Mechanized Division of the RGFC. The battle was joined
til 1045hrs the -Following
       day. During the battle the 2d Bde was the division main effort. Initial
       contact with enemy forces came from the Scout of TF 4-8 who encountered
       air burst artillery, RPS rounds and mortar fire.. Immediately followed by
       mortar and direct fire on TF 4-8 and then 4-18. The lead elements reported
       an extensive bunker complex. By 261725 3-8 CAV was receiving artillery
       fire and the air screen enemy dismounts along the 72 gridline. At the
       onset of the battle the brigade received considerable pressure from Me
       Funk and BG Blackwell to move forward, both believing that we had
       encountered only a screening force and not a deliberate defense. The
       Brigade commander sensing that the brigade encountered more than a screen
       line continued to pound the Iraqi bunker line with FA and CAB and Army
       Aviation . The brigade commander ordered the units to move up on line at
       1740hro and codtlaus to attack the Iraqi positions.     Direct fire
       engagements       ,u@d through out.the day and night as the Bde developed
       the situat            8 became the brigade main effort and was reporting an
                            p
       extensive b           lex in excess of 3-4 km in length. It quickly became
       apparent th         .13ade was facing a deliberately prepared defense
       comprising the majority of the "B" brigade entrenched in bunkers and
       fighting positions. The brigade commander, following the intent of the
       Division commander, moved out of enemy effective direct fire range as much
       as possible to allow +or the use of indirect and air assets to
       destroy enemy forces prior to commitment of direct -Fire engagements. A/40
       FA (general support reinforcing to the brigade) was inside the Skm minimum
       distance upon contact and was forced to back up several kilometers to -Fire
       their rockets. This caused some commotion and concern as several HMMWVs
 but this was quickly controlled and handled by unit
       commanders. The brigade continued to use direct fire in conjunction with
       indirect (both cannon artillery and MLRS) and air assets (Army aviation
       and Air Force A-10s) maximizing the superior stand a++ range of the
       MIAL and M2 BFV systems. The brigade TAC with the Brigade commander and a
       @mA II h At t I= @4 wA@ I nr Ai-@rl wi th TF 4-R CAV. ths? brio ade*-.; advance

Document 269 f:/Week-28/BX001301/OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL/3ad history of operation desert storm and spear:0816961333481
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001301
Unit = 3D AD
Parent Organization = VII CORPS
Folder Title = OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date = 18-JUL-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 16-AUG-1996