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File: 081996_jul96_decls1_0088.txt
Page: 0088
Total Pages: 269

Subject: 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR                 

Box  ID: BX001301

Document Number:          3

Folder Title: OPORDS AND  COMMAND AND CONTROL                                                                 

Folder Seq #:          4

Unit: 3D AD       

Parent Organzation: VII  CORPS  






                (2) Army Aviation.   During the planning process for the attack,
       the brigade commander determined a need for at least one OH-58 type
       aircraft to.,p@v
                     . i@e a forward  screen to the brigade as wp-ll as maintain
       visual contact with the 2ACR to our front, the IAD to our left flank and
       Ist Bde to our might flank. The brigade was allocated an OH-58C
       helicopter, this was only useful +or daylight operations, for its use.
       During the initial phase of the attack, the communications with the air
       craft, which eventually ended up being an air troop mission, was
       sporadic. At times during the movement to contact and the actual attack,
       visibility was greatly reduced which also hampered aerial operations. The
       aerial screen paid big dividends during the initial two days of the attack
       as the brigade maintained a 10-15km distance behind the 2ACR trail
       squadron. Additionally, the aerial screen was able to provide accurate,
       immediate information an our. flank 'units movements, contact points and
       intelligence. On the morning of 26 Feb 91 When the ACR slipped out the
       brigade sector, the aerial screen became'vitally important to the
       brigade. As the battle joined between the 2Bde and B brigade of the
       TAWAKANA Division, the importance of the army air was apparent. Initial
       contacts indicated the need +or attack helicopters as well as scout
       helicopters equipped with night observation devices. As the battle began,
       attack helicopter support was provided to the brigade by the 2d Battalion
       227 Aviation (AH-64). The brigade command not was used to control the
       attack with OH-58D and Apache helicopters identifying and destroying
       targets both close in and in depth forward of the brigade front line.
       Concern over possible fratricide was evident throughout the use of attack
 and
       then turned over to the control of battalion commanders on the brigade
       comm@nd net. The division command net was dominated by the CB and ADC(M)
       both on the progress of the battle and on the employment of the attack
       assets. At one point, it appeared that the AH-64's were close to engaging
       targets in IAD sector-- these turned out to be the lead battalion'% scouts
       for the division who were right on the divisional boundary. The entire
       engagement of attack helicopters initially lasted for over an hour during
       which, a possible counterattack into the +lank of the brigade was
       identified and halted and armored ambush discovered through interrogation
       of prisoners of war was identified and defeated. The following morning
       (27 Feb) the attack helicopters continued to engage targets in tne brigade
       sector as the brigade prepared to pass the 3d brigade forward to assume
       the attack.   Several times during the battle the attack helicopters had
       to break contact or be rerouted to other targets because of possible
       fratricide or recognizable targets. The most glaring problem throughout
       the ba tle anl-,t a use of the aviation assets was the brigade aviation LNO
       abilit  to c        te with the attack aircraft. The single radio
       provided to tw@- NEL was incapable of transmitting the necessary distance
       to request an'@'W.Nii:t the employment of the attack helicopters.

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Document 269 f:/Week-28/BX001301/OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL/3ad history of operation desert storm and spear:0816961333481
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001301
Unit = 3D AD
Parent Organization = VII CORPS
Folder Title = OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date = 18-JUL-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 16-AUG-1996