3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR

File: 081996_jul96_decls1_0089.txt
Page: 0089
Total Pages: 269

Subject: 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR                 

Box  ID: BX001301

Document Number:          3

Folder Title: OPORDS AND  COMMAND AND CONTROL                                                                 

Folder Seq #:          4

Unit: 3D AD       

Parent Organzation: VII  CORPS  








                (9)  AIF FFSFE@, fh@ IjFi@Lid@ 4ra th@ main effort of the division
        received priority a+ close air support. The brigade plan was to
        incorporate CAS as an extension of the artillery. Air Force assets were
        distributed throughout the brigade to help coordinate CAS. At the brigade
        level, there were two ALO'S; one was stationed in the brigade TOC to
        consolidate air requests and work with the brigade S-3 for CAS
        requirements through the ASOC. The other ALO was forward with the brigade
        TAC working in direct coordination with the brigade commander to control
        and allocate CAS missions. On the afternoon of 26 Feb as the brigade
        engaged enemy -Forces, the need for close air support was determined to
        destroy a column of armored vehicles. The Air Force responded with A-10s
        within 15 minutes howe@r, they were unable to engage targets due to
        confusion caused by the location of the lst Squadron of the 2ACR.
        Approximately 16000 an 26 Feb the opportunity to use CAS appeared. The
        A-10s were on station but again were unable to drop their ordinance
        because of a confusing friendly situation. CAS was finally employed by TF
        4-6 with MK-82 500lbs bombs and using 3 Marverick missiles to destroy
        enemy armor. As the fight continued the weather began to worsen caused a
        low cloud cover. The battle raged throughout the night with direct fire,
        indirect'-Fire, and army aviation. IN the early morning a+ 27 Feb CAS was
        employed to support 3-8 CAV and TF 4-18 in preparation for the passage of
        lines with the Ist Bdo. That morning 4 A-10s and 2 F-16's dropped cluster
        bombs . Again several coordination problems developed resulting in 2
        unsuccessful flights of A-10s and 4 F-16 missions. Overall, the use of
        CAS in direct support of the brigade was rated by the ALOs as marginal at
ricide.
        Additionally, coordination and coordinated activities between army
        aviation and Air Force was nearly non existent. The employment c34 JAATs
        in a doctrinal sense were not conducted principally due to a concern over
        control at this stage of the fight.

Document 269 f:/Week-28/BX001301/OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL/3ad history of operation desert storm and spear:0816961333481
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001301
Unit = 3D AD
Parent Organization = VII CORPS
Folder Title = OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date = 18-JUL-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 16-AUG-1996