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File: 110596_jul96_decls13_0001.txt
Page: 0001
Total Pages: 1

Subject: PROTECTION AGAINST BIOLOGICAL ATTACK                            

Unit: ARCENT      

Parent Organization: CENTCOM     

Box ID: BX000426

Folder Title: OPERATIONS DESERT STORM LESSONS LEARNED VOL 3                                                   

Document Number:         53

Folder SEQ  #:         24










         ISSUE: Protection against biological attack was inadequate.

         DISCUSSION:

             a. At the start of Operation DESERT SHIELD, U.S. Forces were
         ill prepared for defense against biological attack, even though
         the Iraqi were assessed to have anthrax and botulinum weaponized.
         Vaccines were not available until early 1991 and then only in
         limited quantities. We had no fielded means to detect and warn
         air, sea and land forces against biological attacks.

             b. in January, a few developmental and commercial biological
         samplers were sent to the theater to alleviate the lack of
         detection capability. The developmental models'were deployed
         forward to major logistical bases. Specially trained teams were
         put together from a CONUS-based unit to operate the systems since
         no force structure exists for biological detection and warning.
         The systems were slow and plagued with false positive detections,
         and incapable of providing real-time warning. Once a sample
         showed up positive at a field site, it had to be transported to
         the Army or Navy laboratories at YKMC or Al Jubayl for
         verification. It took many hours to confirm the tests.

             C. Furthermore, limited detection and analysis capability
         exists that allows commanders to avoid biological contamination
         or to determine when it is safe to have his soldiers unmask. Nor
         are there adequate field techniques and procedures for operating
         in areas where biological weapons have been employed.

         RECOMMENDATIONS:

             a. Continue development of biological point detectors.

             b. Develop and field an early warning stand-off biological
         detector system.

             C. Develop and publish tactics, techniques and procedures to
         support avoidance, protection, decontamination and treatment for
         biological defense.

  d. Continue to produce vaccines for all personnel at risk
         and for all validated threats.






                                      III-4-7

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Document 1 f:/Week-29/BX000426/OPERATIONS DESERT STORM LESSONS LEARNED VOL 3/protection against biological attack:11049609131547
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-29
Box ID = BX000426
Unit = ARCENT
Parent Organization = CENTCOM
Folder Title = OPERATIONS DESERT STORM LESSONS LEARNED VOL 3
Folder Seq # = 24
Subject = PROTECTION AGAINST BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
Document Seq # = 53
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 04-NOV-1996