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File: 120396_sep96_decls1_0005.txt
Subject: AFTER ACTION REPORT ON EOD OPERATION DURING OPERATIONS DESER
Unit: 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization: ARCENT
Box ID: BX005554
Folder Title: ARMY EOD IN DESERT STORM VOL 4 543 EOD TEAM EODCT
Document Number: 9
Folder SEQ #: 4
b. Observations:
1) I was present during one such conversation between
LTC Keenan, XO of the 3rd ACR, and CPT Shannon, CO of the 147th
EDD. The topic a+ discussion was how the EOD unit would support
the 3rd ACR in the ground offensive. At the end of the
discussion, LTC @...'eenan told CPT Shannon, "You can say or think
what you want (about command and control) but I'm here and they
(Control) are there so who's order are you going to follow
Captain?" The point that was being made was that the EDD unit
was depending on the life support from an organization which it
was attempting to say no to.
2) Life Support is based on one basic commodity. '.I
have got this. What can you do +or me so I will want to give it
to you?" This is obviously not the doctrinal Supply and support
system but it is what was actually taking place. It was
accepted as the legitimate method during this operation as it
was during the Vietnam era.
3) This of course worked to the advantage with EOD
units willing to negotiate services and Supplies for use a+ the
one commodity they possessed, the Small Emplacement Excavator
(SEE). Many favors and commodities were exchanged with the use
of this piece of equipment.
C. Possible SolLAtion-. The solution to the problem of
command and control is very complicated. However, one thing is
certain. With command and control comes the inherent
responsibility of life support. Control of a unit from a remote
location in a combat location is neither desirable nor
possible. This is due to such + 'actors as lac@f. of
communications, changing situations, and command ranic to name a
few. Even if there were published doctrine on the EOD role +or
, problems in command and
control would still exist since doctrine is not always followed
during combat. The EDD unit would receive greater support if
the unit were attached to divisions in the same way other Army
units are. This of course would cause an asset loss to the EOD
Control or EOD Group however. The present doctrine of
maintaining command and control within EOD channels means
requiring the EOD Control and EDD Group to insure to the Ltnit's
life Support, supply, and maintenance requirements. This was
not done during this operation and as a result, unit's trying to
operate doctrinally received little to no Support.
4. Equipment:
a. Problems: There are many opinions about how to solve
problems dealing with the MTOE. The following problems,
however, did surface during this operation:
1) Units do not possess the necessary internal assets
to move all MTOE and CTA authorized equipment to facilitate
mobile operations.
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Document 21 f:/Week-42/BX005554/ARMY EOD IN DESERT STORM VOL 4 543 EOD TEAM EODCT/after action report on eod operation during oper:11089615150943
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-42
Box ID = BX005554
Unit = 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = ARMY EOD IN DESERT STORM VOL 4 543 EOD TEAM EODCT
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = AFTER ACTION REPORT ON EOD OPERATION DURING OPER
Document Seq # = 9
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 08-NOV-1996