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File: 970107_sep96_decls5_0011.txt
Subject: SAFETY AAR OPERATION DESERT SHEILD STORM 17 JUL 91
Unit: 2D ACR
Parent Organization: VII CORPS
Box ID: BX001703
Folder Title: ODS SAFETY AAR
Document Number: 1
Folder Seq #: 43
7"
AETSAC-4SQDN-ASO
._SUBJECT: -.Safety AAR Desert Shield/Storm
S;,.:.COMBAT PHASE: Direct pnit,.involvment in combat operations
-@'o6cutied@ from .,23 to 28 February 1991. operational @ice'
his period was intense and involved movement, communication and
resupply over large distances of unfamiliar terrain. 1100 flight
hours (of 6000 total in theater) were logged by squadron aircraft
during this six day period.
a. Human Factors. Most problems noted in other 15hases'of the
deployment were still present during combat operations. The
addition of near continuous operations and contact with hostile
forces did intensify some problems.
(1) Risk Assessments. The use of a paper matrix to
establish numerical mission risk assessment had been discontinued
by this stage of operations. Line troop commanders personally
briefed and flew in nearly every flight mission. mission taskings
were often unavoidably vague and absolute reliance on air/ground
crew judgement was critical.
(2) Accident Investigation. Unit level accident
investigations were suspended once combat operations started.
Control of wreckage and accident sights was normally passed to
follow on units within hours of the mishap. AVUM/AVIM recovery
and- s@ivage operations were preceeded only by EOD safing of
wreckage.
b. Material Factors. No combat specific material factors
were noted. Problems during earlier phases sometimes became more
t engine
failures and compressor stalls for example, did occur more
frequently as flight time (exposure) increased.
C. Environmental Factors. Flight missions in reduced
visibility (less than I km) were conducted during four of the six
days. The inherent risk (gnd/mid-air collision) of these missions
increased dramatically as enemy ground units were encountered.
Target detection and positive identification was normally
impossible until aircraft were well within enemy crew served
weapons range. Unintentional low level target overflight with
resulting small arms fire occurred several times due to poor
flight visibility. Stand off range for returning enemy fire was
also reduced by poor visibility.
d. Lessons Learned. In general, the unit performed the
mission as it had beee-trained to perform. There were almost no
"new" or "untrained" tasks specific to the combat phase.
Proficiency on recently added tasks such as high gross weight
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Document 12 f:/Week-48/BX001703/ODS SAFETY AAR/safety aar operation desert sheild storm 17 jul :01029718421510
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-48
Box ID = BX001703
Unit = 2D ACR
Parent Organization = VII CORPS
Folder Title = ODS SAFETY AAR
Folder Seq # = 43
Subject = SAFETY AAR OPERATION DESERT SHEILD STORM 17 JUL
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-JAN-1997