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File: 970815_sep96_decls59_0017.txt
Subject = TAB D UNITS ENCLOSURE 1 COMMANDERS REPORT
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Unit = VII CORPS
Folder Title = MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND HISTORICAL REPORTS-7TH CORPS SUPPORT GROUP 1
Document Number = 1
Box ID = BX000311
The decision to establish LOG PACS was reached when the Group realized the
MSCs could not reach their objective unless given additional support. There
was some discussion over how this support should be provided. Initially, the
concept of having the assets separate and under the direct control of the
LTFs was discussed, however, this plan was rejected. It was felt that the
assets should be as close to the supported unit as possible. This was done in
order to provide direct support to divisional and nondivisional units,
shorten response time, and give the commanders the freedom to direct these
assets as needed on the battlefield. There was some skepticism over this plan
initially, because it was +eared the divisions/ RSS would take ownership of
these assets. In some regards, this was true, however, these assets were
critical to providing overall support needed for the rapid movement into Iraq.
This plan worked exceedingly well.
On 24 February, LTF 1, 71 and elements of LTF 6 headquarters and the 7th CSG
Jump CP departed with the MSCs' combat formations.
On 24 February, LTF 6 and elements of the 7th CSG headquarters staged and
departed the STAMA at 1910 hrs with over 700 vehicles to support operations at
TTP West.
A major problem which was encountered during the night move to TTP West or
Phase Line Apple was that a great number of soldiers became lost. There were
insufficient numbers of navigational devices (LORANs), night vision goggles
and maps. Convoys were easily separated because vehicles became stuck and
remaining vehicles behind the disabled vehicle slowed or stopped. The convoy
would then continue while leaving behind personnel and equipment with no means
of finding their destination in the dark. At daybreak on the 25th, all lost
vehicles converged on only one of three MSRS. The other two MSRs were not
marked, which resulted in everyone using the same MSR. The general attitude
was that no one knew where they were going. Vehicles were simply following
other vehiclesin front of them. This created a hugh traffic jam at the berm
in Iraqi of approximately 2000 vehicles. This traffic jam could have been
eliminated if Corps/divisions had taken responsibility for properly marking
MSRs north and south of the LD. The problem of marking MSRs was never solved.
Throughout the operation markings consisted of nothing more than a sheet of
plywood, discarded 55 gallon drums or tires.
On 25 February, LTF 1, 6, 71 and elements of 7th CSG cros4ithc? Line of
Departure (LD) into Iraq.
On 25 February, MSTs were linked up with their supported elements. Three
additional MSTs were added from the 936 MNT GO to support the 142 FA and the
92 ENG.
On 25 February, TTP West was established by LTF 6. The TTP was only
operational for 2 days, however, the significance of this operation cannot be
overstated. The TTP along with the accompanied LOG PAC played a key role in
providing fuel to the MSCs during the initial thrust forward. In two days,
TTP West provided 860,000 gallons of fuel consisting of rolling stock (172 5k
tankers) to support Ist AD, 3rd AD, and 2d ACR and nondivisional units in
sector. The divisions and ACR would come back with empty tanker and a swap
was made +or a full one.
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