INTERIM AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: 980404_aug96_sagwi7_0007.txt
Page: 0007
Total Pages: 8
Subject = INTERIM AFTER ACTION REPORT                                     

Box ID = BX000481

Folder Title = COMMAND REPORTS ARCENT MEDICAL LESSONS LEARNED - OPPLAN                                         

Unit = ARCENT      

Parent Org = CENTCOM     









          field assays of potentially poisoned water. Such field assays,
          with a turn around time of an hour or two, are essential to meet
          field commander's need for rapid answers on water quality. First,
          the water quality analysis set (NSN's 6630-00-140-7820 and 6630-
          00-140-7826) as constituted lack capability to test for
          contaminants in the primary drinking water regulations,      including
          potential poisoning agents such as lead and mercury. Also, the
          sets lack capability of measuring some important nonregulated
          chemicals, such as thallium (reported in the press to be used by
          Iraq against its Kurds). Finally, we were still unable to obtain
          reagents to use many of the tests included in the kits. We
          finally ordered some more adequate kits through the 10th Med
          Lab, but the end of the shooting led to the cancellation of the
          order. As noted above, we had arrangements for assays by a fixed
          laboratory, but the turnaround time would be 12-24 hours, at
          best, due to the need to transport samples to the laboratory.

              Another lack is radiation measuring equipment. We have been
          tasked with checking potential war trophies for contamination
          from our DU rounds and their own luminous equipment. The most
          serious problem is alpha-emitters, but we had no instrument to
          measure these. An alternative is a beta-gamma meter, such as a
          AN/PDR-27. However, the only such instrument we could obtain is
          an AN/PDR-27E, over thirty years old, requiring three different
          types of batteries. Since the batteries are still due-out, this
          radiometer is useless. Borrowed equipment was used for this
          task.

          4. Enemy Situation. This was irrelevant to our operations,
          except that some planned actions were not needed because Iraq did
          not initiate nastiness like chemical warfare and well poisoning.

          5. Planning Information. Planning guidance was adequate and
          accurate for Operation Desert Storm. However, the uncertainty
          during March over redeployment led to numerous rumors and
          confusion.

          6. Commander's Plans. The primary part of planning was to
          monitor the degree of activity in various parts of the area      of
          operations, then move teams to meet the need. No changes were
          needed until late March, when the 105th and 714th MED DET were
          sent out of theatre and LB Team #2 of the 12th MED DET was moved
          to the Dhahran area.

              At the end of the period covered by this report further
          planning for redeployment awaited guidance from above.

          7. ;Ltr_p_n_gth,and Related Factors. During this period, a number
          of filler personnel arrived from HSC. Some of these people will
          be used as the nucleus for the preventive medi.(,-i.ne activity after
          the 12th MED DET leaves the theatre.

              Morale continued good, but there have been problems with the
          slowness and uncertainty in mail deliveries. one useful action