INTERIM AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: 980404_aug96_sagwi7_0008.txt
Page: 0008
Total Pages: 8
Subject = INTERIM AFTER ACTION REPORT                                     

Box ID = BX000481

Folder Title = COMMAND REPORTS ARCENT MEDICAL LESSONS LEARNED - OPPLAN                                         

Unit = ARCENT      

Parent Org = CENTCOM     









          was cross training of personnel between the relatively desirable
          (that is, with indoor plumbing) Riyadh area and the more austere
          KKMC area for a few days. Redeployment uncertainty was combatted
          by full communication of what we knew and the active collection
          (and, at times, invention) of preposterous rumors.

          8. Doctrine, tactics and techniques. Doctrine, tactics and
          techniques were adequate and appropriate, with necessary
          adjustments for climate and other local conditions.

          9. Equipment. Many of the lacks in supply were made up by local
          purchase by the unit Class A agent. However, this method was
          unable to resolve the problems (discussed above) with our water
          assay sets, since there was no source in theatre. This
          deficiency was made good, in part, by use of Saudi fixed
          facilities, at Riyadh Military Hospital. in a less developed
          nation even more problems would have occurred, since supplies
          would not be available anywhere.

              As noted above, we sampled the Kuwait Smoke for assay by
          AEHA. This would be impossible with the issued equipment (NSN
          6545-00-935-5881). It was done with supplemental equipment sent
          by AEHA in response to a similar problem (with CARC paint) during
          operation Desert Shield.

              There was one noticeable effect of local customs, on the
          design of latrines for the EPW camps. Contrary to the
          recommendations of CPT Dale Johnson, a sanitary engineer in the
          12th MED DET, the engineers used U.S. - type burn-out latrines
          for the first EPW enclosures. The first few hundred EPW showed
          the fallacy of using such devices for personnel who (1) squat,
          rather than sit, when defecating and (2) use water rather than
          toilet paper. The system was totally redesigned by the MP's and
          engineers and eventually became all but identical to the design
          of CPT Johnson.

          10. Supporting Documents. See 3rd MEDCOM files for relevant
          supporting documents.

          11.  Commander's Comments. As with operation Desert Shield, the
          primary lesson is the necessity of remaining flexible. Many
          missions were planned, but some, such as assaying samples from
          possibly poisoned wells and sending an LB Team to Kuwait as part
          of DAST, were not implemented. The greatest operational problems
          are poor communications and inadequate supplies, especially
          pesticides. These will continue to be problems during
          redeployment and the time of rising temperatures and insect
          population.




                                             THOMAS N. LITTLE
                                             MAJ, MC
                                             Commanding