AFTER ACTION RPT ODS AND DESERT STORM 6 MARCH 91

File: 980404_sep96_sagwi11_0002.txt
Page: 0002
Total Pages: 4

Subject = AFTER ACTION RPT ODS AND DESERT STORM 6 MARCH 91

Box ID = BX000284

Folder Title = AAR COMMENTS OPERATION DESERT SHIELD STORM 14TH PREVENTIVE MEDICINE UNIT 9 APR 91

Unit = VII CORPS

Parent Org = ARCENT

Lessons Learned Were as Follows:

a. Bring whatever you need with you/Don't expect to get it when you get
there. The 14th brought life support, vehicles, critical equipment,
laboratory chemicals and other mission-essential items with us to
enable us to begin our mission immediately without having to depend on
other units to support our logistic shortages. Other units who did
not pre-plan and stock up on essential items were not able to function
and preform as well as the 14th. We had to ask for very little
support, which turned out satisfactory because very little support was
provided even when we asked for it. Higher HQ emphasis was
justifiably placed on supporting/supplying the command's hospil@al$;
resources and personnel were unable to cope with the needs of smaller
units. In addition, there was a completo breakdown in the resupply
system. Requisitions were provided through chain-of-command supply
channels as shortages occurred, only to find out that such
requisitions v,-are lost, mishandled or ignored. Of the few that were
filled, the logistic personnel did not give the item to the unit which
requested it; rather,. if you happened to be standing in line when an
item you needed comes in, you get it, even it was requested by someone
else. Also, when supply units relocated, all requests were cancelled.
Reserve and National Guards supply units from the U.S. proved to be
more efficient and cooperative than active component 5UPPlY units from
Germany, probably because the latter depend heavily on a civilian work
force. The result of the situation led to stealing, stockpiling,
hoarding and bypassing the chain-of-command. It is recommended
that a more efficient logistics system be developed to stock units
prior to mobilization with basic loads of key equipment, spare parts
and equipment, then to "plus-up" with other parts and supply items
during mobilization, and then to keep resupplying items which require
rapid replacement or restocking during deployment.

b. Don't design everything for the "worst case scenario", especially when
it means excess personnel. The planners for the next war should not
put so many PM assets in support of a Corps. Over 100 personnel above
Division level is excessive and a waste of resources. Even if the war
had extended further north, or into the summer months, adequate PM
support could have been provided by a smaller command: An AM Team and
four LB Teams would have been adequate. Support from EAC, just like
the Corps PM support the Division PM, could have been used as needed.
C. Provide better "fixed installation" PM support for personnel a@ EAC,
especially large troop staging areas such as entry/exit ports and
airports. The observed level of PM support at EAC was extremely
lacking. It was a miracle that thousands of incoming troops did not
get very sick at the ports due to lack of handwashing facilities
inadequate number of (and very poorly maintained) latrines, unsanitary
food service facilities and personnel, and very overcrowded troop
housing. If more emphasis is not placed on this situation during
re-deployment, serious home-bound health problems will result. This
has been and remains an EAC mission, for which their PM support teams
should be reminded.

d. Communication will always be one of the keys to effective c6mmand and
control. Although the 14th Medical Detachment and its teams were not
authorized or provided an efficient means to communicate, measures
were taken to ensure daily conference calls with all team commanders