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Subject = AAR COMMENTS  ODS AND DS 14TH PREVENTION MEDICINE UNIT  9 APR 91

Box ID = BX000284

Folder Title = AAR COMMENTS OPERATION DESERT SHIELD STORM 14TH PREVENTIVE MEDICINE UNIT 9 APR 91               

Unit = VII CORPS   

Parent Org = ARCENT      








     3) Recommendation - Equip all LB Team vehicles with AM or AM/FM Radios
     satellite-based electronic navigation aids (LORANS) for combat deployment.
  Revise the MFOE accordingly.

  e. Don't Depend on Local Food and Water

     (1) Issue - The host nation supplied all non-MRE food and all water but
  this could have been a major health problem. '
     (2) Discussion - The troops in SWA were fed one or two MREs daily,
  supplemented by MKT-prepared or catered food, using food from host-nation
  sources. These sources, which were from all over the world, were carefully
  inspected by veterinary service teams and added to an "approved" list of
  vendors for distribution to U.S. troops. Water was either bottled from plants
  in SWA, or chlorinated well water, both approved by PM personnel prior to use
  by U.S. troops. on numerous occasions, inspectors headed off potential
  problems due to food items that were not on the "approved" list or water from
  wells not checked by PM. Although some potential for food-borne diseases
  would also have occurred with U.S.-supplied food, there is a more severe
  situation that could have occurred. That relates to the potential for
  sabotage by enemy agents or sympathizers. Had sabotage been successful,
  thousands of U.S. soldiers may have been killed or rendered ineffective for
  combat.
     (3) Recommendation - Reconsider the future use of host nation sources for
  food and water during combat operations.

  f. Eliminate Mail and Pay Problems

     ,1) Issue - Ineffective mail service and continuous pay problems resulted
  i,. low morals among troops in SWA.
     (2) Discussion - Mail did not begin arriving to troops in the desert until
  at least 30 days after arrival in theater. Many units left CONUS (including
  the 14th) without being told their SWA mailing address. As a consequence,
  soldiers had to first send a letter home (which also took 30 days to get
  there) and to wait an additional 30 days (60 total in country) before getting
  the first letter from home. Package mail was even worse - first they were
  permitted, then not, then permitted again - and many packages never arrived in
  theater. Soldiers did not get many items sent by loved ones from home. Pay
  problems began at the mobilization station and never stopped. Once deployed,
  the soldier was 1-2 months out of cinc in finding out he had a pay problem,
  and then had no way in SWA to get it straightened out. Finance units in SWA

  were of no help except to obtain 2-month old copies of LESS. Morale was
  greatly impacted by these two issues. Isolation in the desert for long
  periods of time, coupled with the inability to get mail in a timely manner and
  the uncertainty regarding pay, was demoralizing. Congressional investigations
  have begun on many pay issues especially among officers who have had repeated
  problems since activation of the unit.
     (3) Recommendation - Establish effective and vastly improved postal and
  finance procedures to eliminate such morale-impacting problems.





                                 PETER F. JOHNSON
                                 COL, MS
                                 Commanding

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