AR 15-6 Investigation,

File: 0000001.txt
Page: 0001
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    5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)
    
                               DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                     4eadlquarters,' Army Central Command (FWD)
                               APO 1.'ew '.-ork 09616
    
    A.TSC-DCI-j                               6 August 1301
    
                              C;eneral, Army Certral
      cmmand ( FWD APO N ew Yo rSUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation,
                        in 11 July 1991 Fire and Explosion at
                        DOFIA compound, Doha, Kuwait.
    
     I
    I
     4. . In accordance with the appointment memorandums dated 2.10
     J.'alY 1991 and 25 July 1991 (enclosure I & II) and AR
    0 15-6e, para 2-1, c, (4), a separate inquiry was made into the
     conduct and duty performance of
                                            as it relates to
     'the 11 July 1991 fire and explosions at Doha Compcund,
     Doha, Kuwait.                                              11-7
    
     2.  While specifically directed to inquire into those
      ssues related to                  e also included in my,
     & , I hav
     recommendations a number of additional actions I believi
     must be pursued in order to ensure maximum benefit from
     this incident is provided to the total force.
    
         o the extent the AR 15-6 investigation conducted-by
     ated 27-July 1991 is consistent and supportive RE
     e n ings and recommendations herein, it is specificall.v
     referenced and incorporated into this report.
    
     FINDINGS:
    
     A. The scope of the appointment order directed Une
     investigation to address the conduct and duty performance..
     of                                                    as
     it relates to the 11 July 1991 fire and explosion at the
     Doha Compo~und, Doha, Kuwait. While the specific and
     inherent responsibility for safety within all military
     organizations rests ultimately with the commander, in this
     particular instance the following findings are made.
    
     B.  The immediate cause of the fire that lead to the
     explosions is thought to have resulted from a crew
     heater malfunction in a Field Artillery Ammunition Support
     Vehicle (FAASV) that was uploaded with ammunition and
     parked in and around other vehicles in a track park- in
     close proximity to stored ammunition. The design, use and
     opt-ration of a heater is beyond the immedia
     respcns1bility of a field commander such as&~Va
    
    5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)