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File: 0000002.txt
control, he shifted his effort to saving lives by shouting "Fire
and rapidly urging everyone out of the track park. Shortly
thereafter the camp fire department arrived with a fire truck.
Fifteen to twenty minutes of spraying water on the fire failed t
control it. After a number of small explosions within the
vehi-cle, those fighting the fire left the area. At about-1100
the first of a series of significant explosions occurred as the
ammunition in the M992 detonated. These major explosions,
accompanied by small arms ammunition cooking off, continued
without pause dntil about 1430. Ammunition in nearby vehicles,
in MILVANS, and on the ground in the track park detonated as
well. sporadic explosions continued throughout the afternoon an
night, ending at about 0600, 1-1 July 1991. The following annexe
will-be helpful in understanding the events: Annex D, a detaile
narAtive; Exhibit D-2 of Annia-k D, a time sequence; Annex E, a
les~ription of the M992; Annex U, detail photographs of the
inside 9f an m992.
b. Five factors merited close examination regarding the
cause of the fire and the ability to control it: crew training,
mode settings on the Automatic Fire Extinguishing System (AFES),
s.dfety pin settings on the AFES, the crew compartment personnel
heater, and the camp fire fighting capability. The findings in
the five areas are below.
The m992 driver received his qualification to opera ' te
the vehicle on 8 June 1991 and his license on 19 June 1991 (See
Exhibit R-6.) He had not been trained on emergency response for
fire in the crew conpartment. He did not know nor did he take
the correct innediate action (emergency procedures) of using thE
portable fire extinguisher or manually discharging the Automatic
Fire Extinguishing System WES). Rather, he called for his
section chief who told him to use a portable fire extinguisher.
5 U.S.C. 552 (b)TA~- section chief, did not take the correct
rml-i~,.-diate act.%oA steps. He called s gunnery sergeant who
properly activated the AFES using the manual pull lanyard on tht
outside of the M992. Although they did not take the specified
emergency steps, the driver and section chief acted in a prompt
manner. They both received "Desert Certification,* a training
program conducted by 4hich included some, but not all.
emergency procedures for the M992. (See Annex H for crew
emergency procedures; Annex R for Desert Certification.)
d. Th", Operator's Manual for the M992, TM 9-2350-267-101
88, uith changes 1-3 (the version available to the driver),
ha- t~i~.- -~-nerg#--ncy procedures for crew compartment fires
labelled as "Engine Compartment Fires" (page 2-259)
akes t
Th---i,~- -~-n,-!rrj,~--ncy procedures also fail to mention that it t
manua I Al't LVAtt ions, f ive seconds apart, on the crew Test and
10ti I I bt-no..-E it f rom the nAnual a0, i;~7at, imi SYst
71, Vilrt 11--V, tit- Pr. . 1~' -r- IV-7-t
I h-n the C L re rt,~,
2
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