AR 15-6 R-1-vt of invest 19ation, Fire Explosit)ij ac

File: 0000003.txt
Page: 0003
Total Pages: 20
    




    5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)
    
         e. The M992 has an Automatic Fire Extinguishing System
    (AFES). (See Annex F for a detailed description of the AFES.)
    The AFES (in the model of M992 involved in the accident) had si
    bottles of halon to extinguish hydrocarbon (fuel) fires, two fa
    the engine compartment and four for the crew compartment. The
    system has two settings: maintenance mode and operating.node.
    
               (1)  The AFES i             HOW47'25, was set in the
    maintenance mode, precluding it from detecting a fire and
    discharging automatically- This mode also defeats the manual
    activation switch on the crew Test and Alarm Panel. rn simple
    terms, this means that the fire extinguishing system would not
    operate automatically, nor would it activate from the manual
    switch inside the vehicle. The only way to activate the syster
    WOL4d be to go outside the vehicle and pull the lanyard. Even
    th4n, only two of the four crew compartment bottles discharge.
    "The.severe limitations of keeping the AFES in the maintenance
    mode are shown at Annex G.
    
              (2) All AFEs switches in the howitzer battery's .4992!
    were set in the maintenance mode. Some members of the battery
    as well as the Combat Support Squadron Maintenance Technician,
                 had been told in Germany prior tti deployment that
    t e AFES wo Id inadvertently discharge in the desert, heat if 1,
        ttqh P-     rating mode. The information came from a nearby uni-
        h&I P
            ' pp
           Field Artillery, that had served in Saudi Arabia. When
    the       quadron's Howitzer Battery received their equipment
    fron the Combat Equipment Group, Southwest Asia (CEGSWA) on ab,
    7 June, the switches were in the maintenance mode. When
    nainte-nance personnel were setting the switches to the
    4,perational mode, one of the systems discharged, convincing th
    naintenance sergeant,             that the information regardin
    inadvertent discharges was acc rate. Additionallyr an
    unidentified technician at CEGSWA advised the maintenance
    sergeant to leave the switches in maintenance mode.
    
              (3)  The battery commander,             briefed the
    squadron commander,               on the issue, and the squadrc
    commander approved the ma n enance setting. They both believe
    that activating the system manually would discharge all bottlE
    thus reducing the risk of using the maintenance setting. The~
    did not discuss their assumption with             the squadron
    naintenance technician, who was acquainted with the systen an~
    knew thot linitations of having the switch in the maintenance
     nocie.
    
     (4) The chain of command, from the driver through
     sc4,j,ctdrnn connander, was not knowledgeable about the AFES, its
     -clr,-ratirin and limitations. Their lack of knowledge is
                       T-, cI-2-t5n-2(,7-jn is P~-Nl:r-eru~-lv -:onEtisin-3 antl
                               :~FES- Thv
    
                        5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(d)