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    3
    
     fighting procedure * s, having the AFES in the maintenance mode, an
     1 imit#-d f ire fighting training and resources reduced the unit's
     ability to contain the fire.
    
             (3)     The exact position of the safety pins in the halc
     botti-, c-*annot be determined. The inpact of this factor an
     control Of the fire cannot be determined.
    
             (4)     The unit's preparation f6r and response to the
     fire ihowed initiative and concern for fire safety.
    
             (5)     Although 22d SUPCOM responded to the regiment's*
     resJULremn%nt for firefighting equipment, the fire truck and
     extinqtaishers that were, provided were less than adequate to meet
     thelro-ginent's comprehensive needs.
    
     Findings regarding the fire department and crew require
     somot Lit-frccpective- See Mnex L regarding the fire department.
    
                (1)  Doha camp is not an installation in any accepted
 -'sensit. The camp is a Ruwaiti warehouse complex that was occupio
     by the Iraqis during the war. The Iraqis destroyed much of the
     infrastructure as they departed. This destruction and the natui
     of thf-t -*f.)Gtrjl#-,x left the following facilities or systp-ms either
     nonexistent or completely inadequater power, running water,,
     se%%a%j@_                                                     kin,
           ., telephones, air conditioning, sleeping quarters, coo
     faci I Lt 11~-S, communications center, recreation facilities-, and
     fire rightLng equipment. Although improvements are rapid and
     contLfMOUSI Visualizing Doha as an installation is misleading.
                                              5           (b)(6)
                (2) The unit that preceded the had only
     port-ible. fire extinguishers as a fire fighting capability. The
     fire liydrants on the camp have no water source. After the firs
     leadev's recon (middle of May), the Regimental Commander showed
     init Lat LVe in insisting on obtaining a fire truck and creating
     fire d#-partrient out of unit assets. In addition, he asked for
     no or tht- large chemical fire extinguishers. A substantial
     nunb,.-c* Of these were made available by the unit that the~
     rep I -iv tell - On about 22 June 1991, a M45A2 fire truck was
     delivered. Two Navy Seabees with fire fighting experience were
     flown re) Onha to train the department 1-3 July. The primary fc
     was 1.sn fires in buildings.
    
                (3)    On 11 july the fire department responded quickl~
     CL1111     1.1:1 the fire in the track park.        They did not L
             !-t,:L fir~_ cightLng techniqu.-e-s f,.s*r a fuel fire, b-t-cause
              'K.-d th- traininrj and ne,:essLry equipment. 4:ht-110--tl I\tinguishers on the firse truck and in the track park.
                    approach the rear of the n992 close enough to use
                                                          -Having left
                                           J.              f
    

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