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    exe.eptionally brave.
    
         k. once explosions began, control was impossible. The
              continued tt, propayate after the-- initial detonations
    lit--cause uf the proximity of other ammunition. Some of this
    annunition was in vehico4es with their hatches open because
    soldiers had been performing maintenance following a field
    exercise. Other munitions were stored in the general vicinity in
    -z
    accordance with the 2d Squadron plan. See Annex M for a technical
    description of the ammunition, thZ- quantities on hand at the time
    of explosion, and factors affecting propagation.
    
            I.   The 2d squadron dt--veloped the ammunition storage plan
    for the regiment because they were the first unit deployed to
    Dohcy. The squadron's allocation of ammunition, termed Tier 1,
    CnmLbrised the vehicle basic load plus 'the amount of ammunition
    thei , 1; organic cargo vehicles could haul in one lift. The
    s5uAdrofi.Aivided the Tier I into three categories: guard,
    contingen"cy, and support loads. See Annex M, Exhibit M-4, for
    the squadron's ammunition SOP.
    
              (1) The guard load was uploaded in the vehicles and
    remained there at all times. This included the full load for the
    M992, a partial load for the MIAI (tank), and a partial load for
    rhe M2A2 (Bradley).                                      %
    
           (2) The contingency load was the remaining ammunition.
    upload every combat vehicle, especially the MIA1, M2A2, and
    M10q. Tho.- bulk of the contingnncy load was stored in MILVA-Ns by
    I- I a t- oo n - The renainder was stored on the ground near the
    MILVANs.
    
              (3) The support load was held in an area s-urrounded by
    crinc-s~-rtina immediately behind the M992s. The squadron intended
    to roove the support load behind the HEMTTs (large cargo carrying
    trucks) to improve safety and speed upload because the support.
    load would be carried on the HEMTTs in case of conflict.
    
            M.   The chronology leading up to the decision to store
    ammunition on the Doha compound is shown below.
    
              (1) Before deployment, the Regimental Commander
    1.1`11114:aterl              his intent too store ammunition on the compound.
              (2) On 2 June, 5 U.S.C. 652 (b)(6) Regimental S4, or
    RS4),                        ualit Assurance Specialist,
    All"111110 i-ro                              Theater Ammunition
                                  "'a"t A84
    
    Off 1c-:r-Forw;ird) , ando M.-Oconastruction engineer)f visited
                         't."" s~
                                  ra
                                    cl_.T~
            --,-,nsidf-r ammunition s orage. The exchange of views was
                   Tb- Avr,1irw.,,n -Noertc; prtessed fnr iroff p,w-~
                                       PIZ-'                  t
                      r. r I.-        F                     V-
    

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