AR 15-6 R-1-vt of invest 19ation, Fire Explosit)ij ac

File: 0000015.txt
Page: 0015
Total Pages: 20
    




    regarding heater hazards for all vehicles Using the typt.- heater
    involved in this accident; if already done, reiterate the
    message.
    
                   (6)     Accelerate the ECPIMSIO for a guard over th~.- heir-m?r
    switch on tho.- 44992-
    
                   (7)     Design and relocate (out of the crew departnetit) ..k
    safer heater for the M992 (and other vehicles if applicable),
    espe,--ially regarding fuef overflow.
    
                   (8)     Change the PMCS fur the heate-r to include ~-h,-7kLn-j
    for Vroper operation, including ignition and blower notor
    opera-tion; include a warninq that fuel will overflow if the hw_.4'*er
    OpPv~atean improperly.
    
                     (9)     Provide the results of this report to agencies
    -49chnically qualified to assess the facts surrounding the fire,
    to helP in further determining the exact cause.
    
          d.    Headquarters, Department of the Army. Deternine the ne-e,!
    for installation level deployment support packages if the Army
    transitions into a CONUS-based contingency force, including fire
    fighting, garrison comm unica t ions, quality of life support#
    facilities engineer'simple construction, and power
    g--neration-distribution. Typically, support is conceived,Ln totrrt
    of Corps or L)ivisinn slices. Deployments such as the 11th ACR r-n
    Doha nee-d A garrison slice. The capacity to deliver such -:.k slir-sr
    is e~*ritical to the Army's emerging quick reacrton, force
    
         e.  Disciplinary recommendat ions.All persons involved it;
    this accident bear some portion of the responsibility, though n-
    Ont, ' o4nerges as deserving a disproportic.-inate share of the blar.-_.
    The nov,-_ into Doha was complex and difficult. The Task Forc" and
    Reginent had only been in position for less than a month when 'th-r
    accident occurred. Settling the force into a hostile environment
    with grossly substandard living conditiorts, and the urgent ne--d
    to be constantly ready for the unexpected, placed extraordinary
    demands on the leadership. The same is true of the SUPC(M staff
    which cr~ntinuously and vigorously worked in support of the
    ret:eptilin, vtaying, and deployment of these forward units. 17 nd -- r
    su(,h cnntlil-itins, the decisions and Judgments of every particip;int
    fell w-11 within a reasrinable range          This mitigates the
    r-liltirj~-rit-nt f-.r stronej diiciplinary act-inn. The reconnerld.-Ati..r".
    n#-It-0     sLz.ktld be crtnsitiered iii this tjtene-ral ctint-ext.
    
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