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File: 0000016.txt
4. Comments . The dt--sire to find a culpri. . An . .) :-,.-rhLS magnitude is strong. Certainly, analysis of the fire itsE
training defiriericies, leadership oversights, mechavr--!~lems, and system design flaws. However, the ammunitic'd
decision is a ko--v element that elevatt-d what Wouli hav':--
-rh--rwise b-i~,tn a sinplt-- iirr- t,~i a significant incident. Althni.
-h:s it-cision d,,d not have the benefit of sufficient analytical
-;q-ut and neastirr-!s could have been taken to further reduce r.Ls~
:.in,3,--rly1.ng ratj.,?na1-! was sound. Combat read ines..' in urr -rtaln i-!nvirr:innent will always involve risk. occasions will
when ~-rneny action, ('.ir nisiakes, cause loss .)f property
lifee. As long is the fiyhting force accepts risk, the powerful
burd~--n r-~-mains to ensure that, once readiness is a'~-hievefl, risL
re,itiction is a *Primary, relentless effort.
Irivestigat-ing(Ifficer
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)
r I O-r ri-e n t s
Pt-rCj11nn,-l Assistiny in Investigation
-~i-r-:1-ItOin of Y n ci de. ri
17
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