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File: doc08_32.txt
Page: 32
Total Pages: 38

                        Employment

-16 food-borne outbreaks occurred in theater at 10 different locations, due in most
part to the inability to inspect and enforce reconirnendations to contract food
service operations.

-Commanders were reluctant to follow medical recommendations to close
contract food services because of adverse impact on morale.

-Face-to-face sensitive and polite communication with the local medical
authorities usually resulted in good host nation support.

"Go" medications were used by 57% of TAC pilots during Desert Storrn, ai~d
considered essential to operations by 61% of those who used them.

-Fatigue was the most significant and pervasive aircrew problem in Operatton
Desert Storm.

-Heavy air tasking orders, especially early in the war forced sigxiif~t deviations
from normal crew restlscheduling practices

-Dedicated `1day" and fl~~g~~~O squadrons worked well.

It appears that real-time acquisition of intelligence made targeting and
retargeting information available more rapidly than in past wars.

-The pace of the war was so rapid that many individuals did not have time to deal
with personal emotions such as loss of a squadron mate or the reality of ~~ing

-Vehicles of opportunity served as 11ambulances'0 for flight line ~ponse~ but lack
of equipment packages often relegated them to a transport-Only role

-Missed meals were a problem for aircrews either because dining halls were not
open during ground tirnes or pilots chose sleeping over eating ilL a demanding
schedule

-Although contact lenses deteriorated more rapidly in theaterr the program
worked well for those who chose to continue use

                 Comm and and Control
-Lac~ of understanding of the aeromedical mission by the ATW personnel cr$to~I
counterproductive tensions within the overall medical support structure

Reporting requirements were conflicting and overlapping

-Command and control of SME's was frequently misunderstood by the medical
command structure resulting in impaired effectiveness of overall medical care
and aeromedical support to the flying squadrons


                                 .31.


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