Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

           Desert Shield/Desert Storm
                Aerospace M edi cifle
       Consolidated After~Actiofl Report


                      F in din~s:

                     Deployment

-The SME concept~was validated.

-In many cases, airlift priority decisions precluded ATC pac~age from arriving
concurrently with the SME or forced last minute downsizing of pallets -- at 10 of 14
locations, the ATO equipment package arrived more than 4 days after the SME or
a complete package never arrived at all

-In many cases, squadrons departed home base without knowing their beddown
location or the initial location was changed in route

-Many false starts occurred in the deployment phase resulting in additional
emotional turmoil and crew rest problems

- 65% of fighter pilots used "Go" pills on the deployment flight

-Only a few flight surgeons were part of the deployment planning Crisis Action
Teams or "Paring and Tailoring" Committees such as that used success~y by
AFSOC

-Medical intelligence was adequate and accessible when the destination was
known

-SAC and Aeroinedical Evacuation flight surgeons were deployed as individuals
and were disadvantaged in having to learn the miSsiOns and to establish rapport
and integrate with new units from scratch

-There was a tendency among fighter pilots to carry too little water for the long
deployment leg

-There were problems with inflight urinary collection systems such as
disconnections or insuff~cient storage capacity

Deploying flight surgeons packed medical supplies on life support and other
1,paflets of opportunity" or in cockpits as well as hand carried a portion of the 250
lbs. of optional AT0 gear. In many cases these were the only medical supplies for
the first several days

Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search