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Subject: IRAQI CW PRODUCTION

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







OCT 90     DIRECTOR 331995







DIRECTOR 331995







SUBJECT:          BRIEFING MATERIAL ON THE IRAQ CRISIS







IN LATE SEPTEMBER U.S. COMMANDERS IN THE GULF INTENSIFIED AIR

PATROLS, MOVED MAJOR GROUND UNITS CLOSER TO SAUDI ARABIA!S BORDER

WITH KUWAIT AND INCREASED THEIR PROGRAM TO DISRUPT IRAQI GROUND AND

AIR COMMUNICATIONS. BY MID-OCTOBER MILITARY LEADERS IN THE

MULTINATIONAL FORCES BELIEVED THEY WERE PREPARED FOR MILITARY

ENGAGEMENT IF IT BECAME NECESSARY. MEANWHILE, SADDAM IS PRESSING

AHEAD WITH HIS DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND

DELIVERY SYSTEMS.          BY LATE 1990 OR EARLY 1991, HE

COULD HAVE "MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT" NUMBERS OF SHELLS, BOMBS AND

MISSILES THAT COULD DELIVER HUGE AMOUNTS OF POISONOUS GASES AND

DEADLY GERMS SUCH AS ANTHRAX.







THERE MAYBE SOME

FEELING THAT SADDAM MUST BE STOPPED FOR GOOD AT THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS

STAGE AND BEFORE HE REACHES NUCLEAR CAPABILITY







END OF MESSAGE







1.5(c)

62713:62713

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