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File: cia_62716_62080_01.txtSubject: STATUS OF KUWAITI OILFIELDS Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. DIRECTOR 229512 WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE COUNTRY: KUWAIT/IRAQ SUBJ: 1. STATUS OF KUWAITI OILFIELDS INCLUDING THOSE CONTAINING HYDROGEN SULFIDE DOI: AUGUST 1990 THE OIL WELLS IN KUWAIT NUMBER 900-1000 AND HAVE PRODUCTION CAPACITY OF TWO MILLION BARRELS PER DAY (BPD). ALTHOUGH OPEC LIMITED KUWAITI PRODUCTION TO 1.335 MILLION BPD, DURING THE PERIOD AUGUST 1989-AUGUST 1990, THE KUWAIT DRILLING COMPANY (KDC) INCREASED DRILLING ACTIVITY FROM SIX TO 10 RIGS IN ORDER TO BOOST PRODUCTION CAPACITY TO APPROXIMATELY 3-3.5 MILLION BPD 3. FROM 1979 UNTIL MID-1990, DEEP-WELL DRILLING INTO FORMATIONS BELOW THE BURGAN AND MANAGEESH WAS INITIATED, AT DEPTHS OF 12000-15000 FEET. 4. THE DEEP WELLS HAVE A HYDROGEN SULFIDE (H2S) CONCENTRATION OF ONE TO TWO PERCENT.THIS IS A VERY HIGH CONCENTRATION.) BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE DANGER OF EXPOSURE TO H2S, SEVEN OF THE 10 DEEP TEST RIGS DRILLED BY KDC ARE EQUIPPED WITH H2S LIGHT AND SOUND ALARM SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS A PERMANENT AIR SUPPLY WITH FACEMASKS AND PORTABLE OXYGEN BOTTLES THE ALARM WARNING LIGHT IS SET TO ACTIVATE IN AN ATMOSPHERE CONTAINING 10 PARTS PER MILLION (PPM) H2S. A SOUND ALARM WILL ACTIVATE AT 20 PPM. ATMOSPHERIC CONTAMINATION BY H2S WAS NOT A PROBLEM AT ANY OF THE DEEP WELL RIGS BEING DRILLED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT YET DEEP ENOUGH. IF H2S WAS DISCOVERED THOUGH, THE WORK WOULD CONTINUE SAFELY WITH THE FULL-TIME USE OF THE PERMANENT AND PORTABLE AIR SUPPLY AND MASKS. AS A GENERAL RULE ONE CAN DETECT H2S BY SMELL AT 10 PPM. AT 40 PPM, THE SENSE OF SMELL IS DISABLED BECAUSE OF NERVE DAMAGE AND ONE CANNOT DETECT THE ODOR. AT CONCENTRATIONS GREATER THAN 80 PPM, VOMITING WILL OCCUR. IMMEDIATE DEATH WILL RESULT FROM CONCENTRATIONS GREATER THAN 400 PPM. THE PREVAILING WIND IN KUWAIT RUNS FROM THE NORTHWEST TO THE SOUTHEAST.) 5. AT THE AR-RAWDHATAIN AND SABRIYA OILFIELDS IN NORTHERN KUWAIT, DRILLING RIGS REACHED AN AVERAGE WELL DEPTH OF 8000-9000 FEET, ALTHOUGH ONE WELL WAS RECENTLY DRILLED TO 9800 FEET. ALL THE DEEP-TEST WELLS BEING DRILLED WERE IN THE BEGINNING STAGES; THAT IS TO SAY THEY HAD NOT YET REACHED THE TOXIC GAS AREA. KDC RIG 5, AN ARTIFICIAL LIFT WELL BEING WORKED OVER, WAS AT 12000 FEET. KDC RIG 11 WAS AT A DEPTH OF 8500-8900 FEET. THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 104 WELLS IN THE NORTH REGION TAPPED INTO A SHALLOW RESERVOIR PRODUCING A MAXIMUM OF 20 THOUSAND BPD AT A DEPTH OF 800-1500 FEET. AT THE AL BURGAN, AL-AHMADI AND AL-MAQWA OILFIELDS IN THE SOUTH, THE AVERAGE WELL REACHES THE BURGAN RESERVOIR AT 4000-6000 FEET. 6. DURING THE INVASION, EIGHT OF THE 10 KDC RIGS WERE SECURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE SAFETY STANDARDS. OF THE OTHER TWO, ONE HAD CASES IN PLACE BUT WAS NOT YET CEMENTED; THE OTHER HAD THE CASE HALFWAY DOWN THE HOLE WHEN THE RIG WAS SHUT DOWN THE TWO RIGS NOT SECURED TO STANDARDS DO NOT POSE A SIGNIFICANT RISK SINCE BOTH WERE SECURED WITH BLOW-OUT PREVENTERS AND THE HOLES WERE FILLED WITH MUD. IT IS LIKELY THE FORMATION HAS PACKED-IN BY NOW. FROM AN ENGINEERING VIEWPOINT, THE PROBLEMS NOW FOCUS MAINLY ON FUTURE COMPLETION AT THESE TWO SITES. WITH RESPECT TO A BLOWOUT ON ANY OF THE KDC DRILLING RIGS, THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CONCERN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT IT HAPPENS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF RIG 7, WHICH IS IN A LIVE WELL. IT WAS DORMANT FOR SOME 20 YEARS AND WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING WORKED-OVER WHEN THE INVASION OCCURRED.) 7. THE MAIN RISK TO THE OILFIELDS COMES FROM EXPLOSIVES THAT THE IRAQI ARMY ATTACHED TO OIL WELLHEADS, WHICH RISE SOME SIX TO SEVEN FEET ABOVE GROUND LEVEL, ON SOME I 00 WELLS IN THE AL-MANAGEESH, AL-AHMADI AND AL-BURGAN OILFIELDS. THE MAGNITUDE AND TYPE OF CHARGE IS NOT KNOWN. THE IRAQI ARMY WAS NOT SELECTIVE IN CHOOSING THE DEEP WELLS OVER THE SHALLOW WELLS, WHICH ARE EASILY IDENTIFIABLE BECAUSE THE DEEP WELLHEADS ARE MORE SOPHISTICATED IN APPEARANCE. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN WELLHEADS IS ROUGHLY 2000 FEET. IF A DEEP WELL CAUGHT FIRE AT 5000 PSI, IT WOULD BE A MAJOR PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE WELL COULD BRIDGE ITSELF. RECALLING THAT A 1964 BLOWOUT IN THE BURGAN FIELD TOOK 60 DAYS TO BRING UNDER CONTROL, AND A 1979 MARRAT WELL BLOWOUT BRIDGED ITSELF, IT WOULD LIKELY TAKE FROM 30-90 DAYS TO BRING A SINGLE WELL FIRE UNDER CONTROL. IT IS NOT KNOWN HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO CONTAIN MULTIPLE WELL FIRES IN THE SAME REGION, THOUGH THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE OF THE HIGH PRESSURES AND PRESENCE OF TOXIC GASES.) 8. THE MAIN WATER SUPPLY FOR FIGHTING FIRES IN THE FIELDS IS FROM SOURCES IN SHIQAYA AND ABDAL]YAH IN ADDITION TO WATER FROM THE REFINERIES THE LIMITED WATER SUPPLY IN THE DESERT MUST BE PUMPED FROM THE SOURCES, WHICH WOULD BE UNAVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF POWER FAILURE AT MAIN POWER PLANTS IN RAS AL-ZOR, DOHA, AND MINA AHMADI.) 9. WITH RESPECT TO KDC DRILLING RIGS 7,8, 10, AND 142, IRAQI SOLDIERS HAD PLACED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES IN THE WELLHEAD, AND FOUR MINES AROUND THE PERIMETER OF EACH RIG. IT IS UNKNOWN WHETHER SOLDIERS TOOK THE SAME ACTION ON RIGS IN THE NORTH SINCE THERE WAS NO CONTACT WITH RIG WORKERS THERE. KDC RIG 7 IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN SINCE IT IS VERY CLOSE TO A GAS INJECTION PLANT AND SMALL GAS POWER PLANT. IN GENERAL, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT IRAQI SOLDIERS CAUSED ANY SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE DRILLING RIGS DURING THE INVASION, THOUGH THEY DID DAMAGE THE CONTINUOUS/PORTABLE BREATHING APPARATUS ON SOME RIGS.) 10. PRIOR TO THE INVASION THE REFINERY AT AL-AHMADI, THE REFINERY WAS PRODUCING 300 THOUSAND BPD FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND HAD REACHED ITS MAXIMUM STORAGE CAPACITY OF SIX MILLION BARRELS. END OF MESSAGE 1.5 (c) 62716:62080
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