IRAQI CHEMICAL DEFENSE

File: cia_63682_61636_01.txt
Page: 01
Total Pages: 1
Subject: IRAQI CHEMICAL DEFENSE

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







DEC 90







CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY







COUNTRY: IRAQ



SUBJ:  DEBRIEFING REPORT ON IRAQI CHEMICAL DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES







SUMMARY: THIS REPORT PROVIDES INFORMATION ON CHEMICAL DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE IRAQI VII ARMY CORPS DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ

WAR, INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES.



TEXT: 1. AT PLATOON AND SQUAD LEVEL, CHEMICAL WARFARE DEFENSE

MEASURES WITHIN THE IRAQI VII ARMY CORPS DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

WERE LIMITED. EACH SOLDIER CARRIED AN UNIDENTIFIED SOVIET-MADE

CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL-RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) MASK SIMILAR TO THE U.S.

M-17 MASK AND RUBBER CAPE, ONE ATROPINE INJECTION, AND A BLISTER

AGENT KIT WITH SMALL SLATS TO REMOVE CHEMICAL DROPLETS. EACH SQUAD

ALSO HAD ONE SOLDIER TRAINED AS A COMBAT MEDIC.

THE GAS MASK COULD HAVE BEEN EITHER THE CZECH M-10 MASK OR THE

POLISH MP-4 MASK.



A. THE PROTECTIVE MASK AND CAPE WERE SELDOM WORN, EVEN

THOUGH COMMANDERS WERE EXTREMELY STRICT ABOUT THEIR USE. IT WAS NOT

UNCOMMON THAT A SOLDIER WAS CAUGHT WITHOUT HIS MASK OR HELMET AND

WOULD PLACED IN THE STOCKADE FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR OR FIVE DAYS;

NOR WAS IT UNCOMMON THAT SOLDIERS IGNORED THE THREAT OF A CHEMICAL

ATTACK, PREFERRING TO AVOID THE DISCOMFORT OF WEARING THE MASK. THE

CAPE WAS NEVER WORN. OVERALL, SOLDIERS HAD LITTLE FAITH IN THE

EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS EQUIPMENT. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, CALLS WOULD

COME DOWN FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS TO THE FIELDED UNITS TO WARN THEM

OF A SENIOR COMMANDER'S VISIT AND TO IMPRESS UPON THEM THE NEED TO

HAVE THEIR MASKS WITH THEM AS EVEN IMMEDIATE COMMANDERS WERE KNOWN TO

PLACE LITTLE EMPHASIS ON CHEMICAL PROTECTION.



B. THE ATROPINE INJECTION, EXACT DOSAGE UNKNOWN, WAS ISSUED

ONE PER SOLDIER. THE INJECTOR HAD A SPRING-LOADED NEEDLE SIMILAR TO

THE U.S. ATROPINE INJECTOR. IF A SOLDIER FELT THE SYMPTOMS OF

EXPOSURE TO A NERVE AGENT, HE WAS TO INJECT HIMSELF IMMEDIATELY AND

THEN ATTACH THE INJECTOR TO HIS COLLAR SO THAT THE MEDIC WOULD KNOW

HE HAD ALREADY HAD ONE INJECTION.



C. THE SOVIET-MADE BLISTER AGENT KIT HAD AN UNIDENTIFIED

POWDER AND SMALL STICKS FOR REMOVING BLISTER AGENTS.







2. AT BATTERY OR COMPANY LEVEL, THERE WERE USUALLY TWO COMBAT

MEDICS AND ONE CHEMICAL DEFENSE WARRANT OFFICER. THE WARRANT OFFICER

WENT TO A ONE-MONTH CHEMICAL DEFENSE SCHOOL. IN THE EARLY YEARS OF

THE WAR, THERE WAS LESS EMPHASIS ON CHEMICAL TRAINING; BECAUSE OF THE

WAR EXPERIENCES, HOWEVER, MORE IMPORTANCE WAS ATTACHED TO CHEMICAL

DEFENSE. THE WARRANT OFFICER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TEACHING CBR

MEASURES DURING THE SOLDIERS'NORMAL TRAINING.



3. AT BATTALION LEVEL, THERE USUALLY WAS A SMALL BUILDING WITH

TWO SMALL ROOMS FOR PERSONAL DECONTAMINATION.          THIS

BUILDING WAS NOT A PORTABLE BUILDING, BUT RATHER A PERMANENT

STRUCTURE. IF THE BATTALION WAS TO MOVE, OR IF THE BATTALION WAS A

MANEUVER UNIT (I.E., A COMBAT ARMS BATTALION), TENTS THE SIZE OF A

U.S. ARMY GENERAL PURPOSE (GP) SMALL TENT WOULD BE USED INSTEAD. IN

THE FIRST ROOM WAS A TECHNICIAN WITH AN UNIDENTIFIED BOX, PRESUMABLY

FOR DECONTAMINATION. ON THE WALLS WERE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO

CONDUCT PERSONAL DECONTAMINATION. IN THE SECOND ROOM WAS A SHOWER.

NOT ALL UNITS HAD SMALL BUILDINGS FOR THIS PURPOSE--SOME HAD TENTS.







4. AT DIVISION LEVEL, THERE WAS A MASH UNIT WITH ABOUT 20

DOCTORS AND TWO TO EIGHT CBR TECHNICIANS. THE NUMBER OF TECHNICIANS

USUALLY INCREASED WHEN IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN INTENDED TO

USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS







THE DIVISION MASH UNIT WAS USUALLY 10

TO 15 KILOMETERS TO THE REAR OF THE FRONT LINES.







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