IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

File: cia_65268_65268_01.txt
Page: 01
Total Pages: 1
Subject: IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







FEB 91    DIRECTOR 491746







SUBJECT: IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM







IN NOVEMBER, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING

ASSESSMENT:

-- WE BELIEVE IT WOULD TAKE IRAQ SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR--

AND PROBABLY LONGER--TO DEVELOP ONE OR TWO CRUDE NUCLEAR

EXPLOSIVE DEVICES USING SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR MATERIAL FROM

THE START OF A CRASH PROGRAM. SUCH DEVICES WOULD BE OF

QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY AND WOULD NOT BE DELIVERABLE BY

MISSILE OR COMBAT AIRCRAFT. (NOTE THE DISTINCTION MADE

BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPON--WHICH CAN BE DELIVERABLE BY TACTICAL

AIRCRAFT OR MISSILE--AND A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE--WHICH CAN BE

CRUDE AND BULKY. POTENTIALLY, A CRUDE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE

COULD BE DELIVERED BY A TRUCK OR NON-TACTICAL AIRCRAFT.)

-- IN THE ABSENCE OF A CRASH PROGRAM, WE BELIEVE IRAQ HAS

THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE, IF COMBINED WITH CLANDESTINELY

OBTAINED TECHNOLOGY AND CONTINUED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, TO

DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990S USING INDIGENOUSLY

PRODUCED FISSILE MATERIAL.

CURRENTLY, WE ASSESS IRAQ'S SHORT-TERM OPTION FOR A NUCLEAR

EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY IS SEVERELY DAMAGED BUT NOT UNCONDITIONALLY

ELIMINATED BY OPERATION DESERT STORM. THE REACTORS AT THE TUWAITHA

NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER WHICH HELD THE FUELS APPLICABLE TO A CRASH

EFFORT HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THE REACTOR FUELS, UNLESS MOVED TO

SAFETY BEFOREHAND, ARE PROBABLY BURIED OR DESTROYED. WITHOUT THIS

POTENTIAL SOURCE OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR A CRASH EFFORT, BAGHDAD

WOULD HAVE TO RESORT TO A CLANDESTINE SOURCE OF FISSILE MATERIAL

FURTHERMORE, KEY FACILITIES AT TUWAITHA THAT

PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN USED IN A CRASH EFFORT MAY BE DAMAGED OR

ABANDONED AS A RESULT OF DESERT STORM OPERATIONS.







IN THE SHORT TERM, IRAQ MAY ATTEMPT TO SIMULATE A NUCLEAR

EXPLOSION BY UTILIZING MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVE

MATERIALS AND/OR A RADIOACTIVE DISPERSAL DEVICE. SUCH AN IRAQI

EXPLOSIVE RADIOLOGICAL DEVICE WOULD NOT BE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT

WEAPON. IT WOULD CREATE NO SPECIAL BLAST EFFECT, AND IT COULD NOT

CAUSE WIDESPREAD RADIATION SICKNESS. THERE COULD, HOWEVER, BE A

SUBSTANTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT.

RADIATION CONTAMINATION AT TUWAITHA

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE          IRT AND

ISIS REACTORS AT THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER HAS PROBABLY

ONLY RESULTED IN LIMITED LOCAL RADIATION CONTAMINATION

DAMAGE AND RESEARCH REACTOR TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, THERE

IS PROBABLY NO RADIATION CONTAMINATION OUTSIDE OF A FEW KILOMETERS

FROM TUWAITHA--ASSUMING THE FUELS WERE NOT REMOVED PRIOR TO THE

ATTACK. THE RADIATION CONTAMINATION AT TUWAITHA WOULD COME LARGELY

FROM DISPERSAL OF THE IRT REACTOR FUEL BECAUSE THE ISIS REACTOR FUEL

IS ALMOST CERTAINLY BURIED UNDER RUBBLE.

IN THE MOST SEVERE CASE--WHICH WE DON'T BELIEVE HAS OCCURRED--

THE IRT REACTOR WOULD HAVE BEEN OPERATING BEFORE THE ATTACK AND THE

FUEL AND OTHER CORE MATERIALS WOULD HAVE TAKEN A DIRECT HIT. THEN,

THROUGH A MOST UNFAVORABLE CHAIN OF EVENTS, THESE MATERIALS WOULD BE

SCATTERED AROUND TUWAITHA AND SOMEHOW FORCED TO BURN. RADIOACTIVE

PARTICLES WOULD THEN ESCAPE THE BERMED CONFINES OF TUWAITHA TO

CONTAMINATE A FEW SQUARE KILOMETERS OF AREA DOWN WIND.

ANY ADVERSE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES FROM THE BOMBING OF THE REACTOR

WOULD ALSO PROBABLY BE LIMITED TO THE AREA. IN THE WORST CASE OF

DISPERSAL OF RADIOACTIVITY JUST DESCRIBED,

ESTIMATED THAT THE RADIATION

DOSE WOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN 1 REM INTERNALLY AND 0.3 REM

EXTERNALLY AT A DISTANCE OF 100 METERS FROM THE REACTOR. WHILE SUCH

DOSES ARE NOT TRIVIAL, THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO CREATE SUCH

CONTAMINATION ARE NOT VERY LIKELY TO HAVE OCCURRED. IN ANY CASE, THE

POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASED FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE REACTORS

IS MINISCULE IN COMPARISON TO THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT.







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