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File: 061896_cia_62758_62758_01.txtSubject: IRAQI CW AND BW Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. SEP 90 SUBJECT: IRAQ'S POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE KEY JUDGEMENTS IRAQ HAS SUBSTANTIAL CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES THAT, AS DEMONSTATED IN THE WAR WITH IRAN, IT IS PREPARED TO USE. IRAQ ALSO HAS SOME BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BUT HAS NEVER USED THEM IN COMBAT. IN COMBAT WITH US AND ALLIED FORCES CHEMICAL WEAPONS: X--THE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IRAQI FORCES GAINED IN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN WOULD BE APPLIED AGAINST US AND ALLIED FORCES. X--IRAQ'S FORCES WOULD BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ANY DEFENSIVE SITUATION IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT WHERE THEY WERE BEING PUSHED BACK BY AN ALLIED OFFENSIVE. X--THEY WOULD BE HIGHLY LIKELY TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY OFFENSIVE INTO SAUDI ARABIA. X--ONCE THE IRAQI FORCES HAD BEGUN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST ALLIED FORCES, WE ANTICIPATE THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO USE THEIR ENTIRE CHEMICAL ARSENAL, INCLUDING MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: X--BECAUSE IRAQ HAS NEVER USED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WE HAVE LITTLE TO GO ON REGARDING HOW OR WHETHER SADDAM WOULD USE THESE WEAPONS AGAINST US AND ALLIED FORCES. HE PROBABLY CONSIDERS THEM TO BE WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT, PERCEIVING A GREATER RISK OF RETALIATION. X--ALTHOUGH MORE TOXIC THAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS HAVE LESS UTILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD BECAUSE THEIR EFFECTS DO NOT MATERIALIZE FOR DAYS. THUS, WE JUDGE IRAQ WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGAINST US OR ALLIED FORCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD. IN THE CURRENT, NONCOMBAT SITUATION: X--THE IRAQIS ARE NOT LIKELY TO USE EITHER CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OVERTLY. X--IF THE TRADE EMBARGO BEGINS TO CAUSE MAJOR DISRUPTIONS, HOWEVER, SADDAM CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE MORE OR LESS EXPLICIT THREATS TO USE CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TO RETALIATE AGAINST THOSE RESPONSIBLE. X--IF IRAQ'S CONDITION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT SADDAM WOULD ORDER COVERT CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPON ATTACKS AGAINST US OR OTHER ALLIED TARGETS WOULD INCREASE. X--SPECIAL FORCES OR OTHER AGENTS COULD COVERTLY DELIVER CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TO SELECTED TARGETS IN ALMOST ANY COUNTRY. LIKELIHOOD OF WARNING SADDAM HUSAYN, WHO PERSONALLY CONTROLS THE RELEASE OF BOTH KINDS OF WEAPONS, WOULD USE SECURE MEANS TO ORDER THEIR USE. THIS INFORMATION IS DISCUSSION AFTER NEARLY TWO DECADES OF WORK, IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED THE MOST EXTENSIVE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (CW AND BW) PROGRAMS IN THE THIRD WORLD IRAQ USED TACTICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS EXTENSIVELY IN ITS WAR WITH IRAN. BEGINNING WITH SMALL-SCALE AND RATHER INEFFECTUAL EFFORTS, BY THE END OF THE WAR IRAQ HAD DEVELOPED A LARGE, ROBUST, AND SOPHISTICATED CW CAPABILITY THAT WAS FULLY INTEGRATED INTO ITS MILITARY SYSTEM. IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT IF NOT DECISIVE ROLE IN THE CLIMACTIC BATTLES IN THE SPRING OF 1988 THAT FINALLY FORCED IRAN TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE. REPORTEDLY, THE IRAQI HIGH COMMAND HAD COME TO CONSIDER CHEMICAL AGENTS AS AMONG ITS MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPONS AGAINST IRANIAN GROUND ATTACKS. IRAQ ALSO HAS AN AGGRESSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. BUT AS FAR AS WE KNOW THE IRAQIS DID NOT USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE WAR WITH IRAN. SINCE THE BIOLOGICAL AGENTS IN IRAQ'S INVENTORY DO NOT IMMEDIATELY INCAPACITATE THE VICTIM, THEY ARE MORE SUITABLE FOR STRATEGIC USE THAN FOR TACTICAL, BATTLEFIELD USE. IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED AND COMBAT TESTED A WIDE VARIETY OF TACTICAL CHEMICAL WEAPON DELIVERY MEANS, CHIEFLY ARTILLERY SHELLS, ROCKETS, AND BOMBS IRAQ HAS ALSO PRODUCED SOME BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS WITH CHEMICAL AND POSSIBLY BIOLOGICAL AGENT FILLS, BUT THESE STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS HAVE NOT BEEN TESTED IN COMBAT. IRAQ BEGAN DEVELOPING CW AND BW CAPABILITIES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS TO DETER ANY ATTACK BY ISRAEL, BUT THE WAR WITH IRAN TAUGHT SADDAM HUSAYN THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AT LEAST, ARE TOO USEFUL TO RESERVE FOR DETERRENCE ONLY. SADDAM NOW VIEWS THEM AS A VALUABLE COMPLEMENT TO HIS LARGE CONVENTIONAL ARSENAL. CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHILE IRAQ FIRST COVETED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE LATE 1960S, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) BEGAN IN EARNEST IN 1972. BY THE END OF THE WAR, WHICH IRAQ'S INCREASINGLY HEAVY USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS HELPED TO BRING ABOUT, THE IRAQIS HAD ESTABLISHED A SIZABLE AND SOPHISTICATED INFRASTRUCTURE FOR R&D, PRODUCTION, TESTING, AND STORAGE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS THE 1988 CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN DID NOT DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM, BUT IT DID SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE PROGRAM'S FOCUS. THE DEMANDS OF THE WAR HAD NECESSITATED LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE, PRODUCTION VIRTUALLY STOPPED. THEY WERE NOT NEEDED FOR ANY PROJECTED IMMEDIATE USE, AND THE SHORT SHELF LIFE, PARTICULARLY OF SARIN, PREVENTED STOCKPILING FOR FUTURE NEEDS. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, HOWEVER, CONTINUED UNABATED. TYPES OF AGENTS. DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IRAQ USED SEVERAL THOUSAND TONS OF MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENT SARIN AGAINST IRAN (MORE THAN TWICE AS MUCH MUSTARD AS SARIN). THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ ALSO USED LESSER AMOUNTS OF THE NERVE AGENTS TABUN AND GF, AS WELL AS THE RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS. IN EARLY 1984, APPARENTLY ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS, IRAQ ALSO USED DUSTY MUSTARD--A FINE POWDER IMPREGNATED WITH MUSTARD AGENT, IRAQ CAN PRODUCE ANY OR ALL OF THESE AGENTS--AND PROBABLY ALSO OTHER STANDARD AGENTS, SUCH AS HYDROGEN CYANIDE AND PHOSGENE OXIME IRAQ IS MAKING A HIGH-PRIORITY EFFORT TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE ADDITIONAL CW AGENTS, INCLUDING AGENTS THAT INDUCE VOMITING, THE NERVE AGENTS SOMAN AND VX--WHICH ARE BOTH MUCH MORE TOXIC AND PERSISTENT THAN SARIN--AND CROWN ETHERS, WHICH ARE NOT ONLY TOXIC IN THEMSELVES BUT ALSO CAN BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER AGENTS PROBABLY, THEY HAVE ALREADY PRODUCED AND WEAPONIZED SMALL QUANTITIES, OF VX. IN ADDITION TO LETHAL AGENTS, THEY USED VOMITING AGENTS AGAINST REBELLIOUS KURDS IN 1988. QUANTITIES OF AGENTS. ((AS A ROUGH ESTIMATE, UNDER OPTIMUM CONDITIONS, l TON OF PERSISTENT NERVE AGENT WILL KILL ROUGHLY HALF THE UNPROTECTED PERSONS IN AN OPEN AREA OF 2 OR 3 SQUARE KILMETERS. IN THE SPRING OF 1990, THE IRAQIS RESUMED PRODUCTION OF SARIN AND MUSTARD. THEY COULD HAVE PRODUCED ABOUT 300 TONS OF EACH BY THE TIME PRODUCTION REPORTEDLY STOPPED IN LATE JULY. UPON RESUMPTION THE IRAQIS COULD ADD TO THIS INVENTORY AT THE RATE OF 6 TO 1 0 TONS PER DAY. THE 600 TONS OF NEW AGENT PLUS PROBABLE STOCKS OF LEFTOVER MUSTARD WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN IRAQI FORCES FOR ABOUT A WEEK AT AN INTENSE COMBAT EXPENDITURE RATE SUCH AS THAT EMPLOYED BY IRAQ DURING THE 30-HOUR BATTLE OF AL FAW IN APRIL 1988. IT WOULD ALSO BE MORE THAN ENOUGH TO EQUIP HUNDREDS OF MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS IN AN EFFORT TO LENGTHEN THE SHELF LIFE OF ITS CHEMICAL AGENTS, IRAQ HAS BEEN WORKING TO IMPROVE THE PURITY OF ITS PRECURSOR CHEMICALS. IRAQ HAS PROBABLY ALSO PRODUCED BINARY MUNITIONS WHICH, BECAUSE FINAL MIXING DOES NOT OCCUR UNTIL JUST BEFORE USE, WOULD HAVE A LONGER STORAGE LIFE THAN UNITARY MUNITIONS AND BE SAFER TO HANDLE, AS WELL. A DISADVANTAGE IS THAT BINARY MUNITIONS DELIVER SOMEWHAT LESS AGENT THAN THE SAME SIZE UNITARY MUNITIONS TACTICAL WEAPONIZATION. IN ANTICIPATION OF HOSTILITIES, IRAQ HAS WEAPONIZED MOST OF ITS CHEMICAL AGENT STOCKPILE. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS WERE GENERALLY WEAPONIZED AND USED SOON AFTER PRODUCTION THE IRAQIS CAN DELIVER CHEMICAL AGENTS IN A VARIETY OF WAYS. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, THEY MADE EXTENSIVE USE OF 250-KILOGRAM AERIAL BOMBS, 90-MILLIMETER (90-MM) AIR-TO-GROUND ROCKETS, AND HELICOPTER-MOUNTED AERIAL SPRAY DEVICES. THEY ALSO HAD I- TO 3- KILOGRAM CHEMICAL ROUNDS FOR 82-MM AND 120-MM MORTARS AND 122-MM, 130-MM, 152-MM, AND 155-MM HOWITZERS, AS WELL AS 8-KILOGRAM CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR 122-MM ROCKETS. A VARIETY OF OTHER WEAPONS, INCLUDING FROG ROCKETS AND AIR-TO- SURFACE MISSILES, COULD BE USED TO DELIVER CHEMICAL AGENTS, NEVERTHELESS, IRAQ HAS THE TECHNOLOGY AND EXPERTISE TO PRODUCE EFFECTIVE CHEMICAL AGENT PAYLOADS FOR THEM. DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. IRAQ PRODUCES INDIGENOUSLY MOST OF THE ITEMS REQUIRED FOR PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL AGENTS. IN FACT IT EXPORTS PROTECTIVE MASKS, FILTERS, SUITS, BOOTS, AND GLOVES. THE QUALITY OF SOME OF THIS EQUIPMENT IS POOR, HOWEVER, AND IRAQ IMPORTS BETTER EQUIPMENT FROM FOREIGN SOURCES IRAQI FORCES UNDERSTAND WELL THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CW PROTECTION, IN PARTICULAR THE NEED TO PROPERLY MAINTAIN PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT. SINCE THE END OF THE WAR WITH IRAN, THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO TRAIN FOR OPERATIONS IN A CW ENVIRONMENT BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, THOUGH GENERALLY SLOWER ACTING, ARE USUALLY ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE MORE TOXIC THAN THE MOST TOXIC CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THEREFORE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE WOULD DIFFER CONSIDERABLY FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD CALL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE MORE USEFUL AGAINST STRATEGIC TARGETS, SUCH AS CITIES, THAN AGAINST BATTLEFIELD TARGETS IRAQ HAS NOT, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, EVER USED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF SUBSTANTIAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING THE EFFORTS OF IRAQ TO ACQUIRE EQUIPMENT AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS ABROAD, WE BELIEVE IT HAS NOW DEVELOPED AND STOCKPILED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TYPES OF AGENTS. SINCE 1989, IRAQ HAS BEEN PRODUCING TWO BIOLOGICAL AGENTS: BOTULINUM TOXIN AND ANTHRAX. THE IRAQIS ARE PROBABLY TRYING TO DEVELOP OTHER TOXINS AND LIVE AGENTS: X--BOTULINUM IS A TOXIN THAT ATTACKS THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. A FEW MILLIONTHS OF A GRAM IS A LETHAL DOSE. SYMPTOMS USUALLY DO NOT OCCUR FOR AT LEAST 12 HOURS AFTER EXPOSURE, WITH DEATH OCCURRING PERHAPS DAYS LATER. BOTULINUM TOXIN DEGRADES WITHIN HOURS IN SUNLIGHT. X--ANTHRAX WOULD BE DISPERSED AS SPORES, WHICH CAUSE PULMONARY FAILURE SOME DAYS AFTER INHALATION. ANTHRAX SPORES ARE HARDY AND CAN REMAIN VIABLE IN THE SOIL FOR YEARS. X--BOTH OF THESE SUBSTANCES OCCUR NATURALLY, ALTHOUGH ONLY RARELY; THUS, ISOLATED DEATHS CAUSED BY BOTULINUM TOXIN OR ANTHRAX SPORES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE IMMEDIATELY ATTRIBUTED TO A BW ATTACK THE BOTULINUM TOXIN IS PROBABLY BEING PRODUCED AT A VACCINE PLANT IN A WESTERN SUBURB OF BAGHDAD. THE ANTHRAX IS PROBABLY BEING PRODUCED AT A BW FACILITY AT SALMAN PAK OR TAJI. THE IRAQIS MAY BE USING THE FERMENTERS TO PRODUCE THE ANTHRAX SPORES. QUANTITIES OF AGENTS IRAQ HAS THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE ENOUGH OF EITHER EACH DAY TO LETHALLY CONTAMINATE HUNDREDS OF SQUARE KILOMETERS OF TERRITORY. IN OTHER WORDS, IRAQ COULD EASILY AND QUICKLY PRODUCE ENOUGH ANTHRAX SPORES AND BOTULINUM TOXIN TO SATISFY ANY CONCEIVABLE DEMAND BECAUSE OF THE MUCH GREATER TOXICITY OF BW AGENTS COMPARED WITH CW AGENTS, ONLY SMALL AMOUNTS WOULD BE NEEDED TO ACHIEVE ENORMOUS IMPACT TACTICAL WEAPONIZATION. IRAQ HAS AVAILABLE A NUMBER OF TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEMS THAT COULD BE ADAPTED FOR USE WITH BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, INCLUDING MOST OF THOSE ADAPTED FOR USE WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS. SINCE IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS HAVE NEVER BEEN COMBAT TESTED, THE IRAQIS MAY HARBOR SOME DOUBTS ABOUT HOW WELL THEY WILL WORK-- ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING HOW LONG IT TOOK THEM TO LEARN TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS EFFECTIVELY. THIS MIGHT NOT PREVENT THEM FROM USING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, HOWEVER. IN THE WAR WITH IRAN, IRAQ TESTED MANY OF ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. MOREOVER, SOME OF THE LESSONS THE IRAQIS LEARNED IN PERFECTING THEIR CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AS WELL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. VACCINES ARE AVAILABLE THAT PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL PROTECTION AGAINST BOTH BOTULINUM TOXIN AND ANTHRAX SPORES STRATEGIC WEAPONIZATION AIRCRAFT. IRAQ HAS MIRAGE, BADGER, AND FENCER AIRCRAFT THAT COULD ACCURATELY DELIVER CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL PAYLOADS OVER LONG DISTANCES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MIRAGE COULD DELIVER SEVERAL 250- KILOGRAM BOMBS A FEW HUNDRED KILOMETERS. USE OF THESE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION AGAINST LIGHTLY DEFENDED TARGETS, BUT THE IRAQIS WOULD ANTICIPATE A HIGH ATTRITION RATE AMONG AIRCRAFT ATTACKING TARGETS DEFENDED BY US OR OTHER AIRCRAFT AND GROUND AND SHIP-BASED ANTIAIRCRAFT SYSTEMS. BALLISTIC MISSILES. IRAQ'S PRIMARY STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE ITS SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES. WE ESTIMATE IRAQ HAS ABOUT 700 SCUD- TYPE MISSILES; IT COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLY MORE. SEVERAL HUNDRED OF THESE--THE AL HUSAYN AND AL ABBAS MISSILES--ARE INDIGENOUSLY MODIFIED SCUDS DESIGNED TO DELIVER LIGHTER WARHEADS TO TARGETS AT GREATER DISTANCES THAN THE 300-KILOMETER LIMIT OF STANDARD SCUDS: X--WE ARE CERTAIN THAT IRAQ HAS SOME CHEMICAL WARHEADS, X--WE ALSO THINK IT LIKELY THAT IRAQ PLANS TO DEVELOP BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS FOR THESE MISSILES, IF IT HAS NOT DONE SO ALREADY THE AL ABBAS, THE LONGEST RANGE MODIFIED SCUD, COULD DELIVER COMPARATIVELY SMALL QUANTITIES OF AGENT (ON THE ORDER OF 85 KILOGRAMS) AN ESTIMATED 735 KILOMETERS. THE OTHER SCUD-TYPE MISSILES COULD DELIVER PROPORTIONATELY LARGER QUANTITIES TO CLOSER TARGETS. ABOUT HALF A SQUARE KILOMETER. CITIES AND OTHER AREA TARGETS SUCH AS AIRFIELDS AND LARGE INDUSTRIAL OR MILITARY FACILITIES ARE THE MOST LIKELY TARGETS FOR IRAQ'S MODIFIED SCUDS, BECAUSE THEIR POOR ACCURACY MAKES THEM UNSUITABLE FOR USE AGAINST POINT TARGETS. IF LAUNCHED FROM IRAQ'S WESTERN DESERT, SUCH MISSILES COULD REACH lSRAEL AND PARTS OF EGYPT. IF LAUNCHED FROM SOUTHERN IRAQ OR KUWAIT, SUCH MISSILES COULD REACH AS FAR SOUTH AS RIYADH AND QATAR THE OBJECTIVE OF ATTACKING CITIES WOULD BE TO CAUSE CASUALTIES AND PANIC AMONG CIVILIANS. UNDER OPTIMUM CIRCUMSTANCES, A NERVE AGENT WARHEAD COULD CAUSE MANY HUNDREDS AND POSSIBLY EVEN THOUSANDS OF IMMEDIATE CASUALTIES, INCLUDING A LARGE NUMBER OF NEARLY IMMEDIATE FATALITIES. THE FATALITY COUNT FROM A BIOLOGICAL WEAPON WOULD BE MUCH HIGHER, ALTHOUGH THE FULL EFFECTS WOULD NOT BE FELT FOR SOME DAYS. THE LACK OF ACCURACY OF IRAQ'S SCUDS WOULD NOT REDUCE THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT, SINCE NO ONE IN A TARGET COMMUNITY WOULD FEEL SAFE THE OBJECTIVE OF ATTACKING AN AIRFIELD, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD NOT BE TO CAUSE CASUALTIES SO MUCH AS TO PUT ITS DEFENSES OUT OF COMMISSION. WHILE A CHEMICAL WEAPON ATTACK WOULD PROBABLY NOT CLOSE A MILITARILY PREPARED AIRPORT FOR MORE THAN A FEW HOURS, SADDAM MIGHT CALCULATE THAT WOULD BE LONG ENOUGH FOR IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK THE AIRPORT WITH MORE ACCURATE WEAPONS THAT COULD CAUSE GREATER AND MORE LASTING DAMAGE IRAQ HAS LITTLE OR NO EXPERIENCE IN DELIVERING BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL AGENTS VIA MISSILE. DURING THE WAR, IRAQ LAUNCHED HUNDREDS OF SCUD MISSILES TOWARD IRAN, BUT AS FAR AS WE KNOW ALL OF THEM HAD HIGH-EXPLOSIVE WARHEADS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMBAT EXPERIENCE THE IRAQIS DO NOT KNOW FOR SURE HOW EFFECTIVE THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS ON THEIR MISSILES WOULD BE. THAT MIGHT NOT MATTER TOO MUCH TO SADDAM IF CHEMICAL WARHEADS ARE USED. BUT, FACING ADVERSARIES WITH STRONG RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES, SADDAM WOULD PROBABLY NOT EMPLOY BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS UNLESS HE WAS CONFIDENT THEY WOULD WORK WELL--OR WAS IN SUCH DESPERATE STRAITS THAT HE DID NOT CARE WHETHER THEY WORKED OR NOT. UNCONVENTIONAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IRAQ COULD ATTACK TARGETS OUT OF RANGE OF EVEN ITS MISSILES BY USING SPECIAL FORCES, CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AGENTS, OR FOREIGN TERRORISTS TO HAND-DELIVER BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL AGENTS CLANDESTINELY. EVEN IN REGIONS WITHIN RANGE OF IRAQ'S BOMBERS AND MISSILES, THAT MIGHT BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO ATTACK SPECIFIC SITES WITH SUCH WEAPONS. IT WOULD BE AN ESPECIALLY ATTRACTIVE OPTION IF IRAQ WISHED TO CONDUCT SUCH AN ATTACK WITHOUT OFFICIALLY ACKNOWLEDGING AUTHORSHIP IN THE PAST, IRAQI "DIPLOMATS" HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY IMPLICATED IN LETHAL ACTS OF TERRORISM, ALTHOUGH MOSTLY DIRECTED AGAINST IRAQI CITIZENS ABROAD. EVEN BEFORE IT INVADED KUWAIT, BAGHDAD HAD BEEN CULTIVATING A NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING SEVERAL--SUCH AS THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION AND THE PFLP GENERAL COMMAND--WITH OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES IN NUMEROUS COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE. ALREADY, SOME OF THESE TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE PUBLICLY VOLUNTEERED TO ATTACK US TARGETS ON BEHALF OF IRAQ. TO BE SURE,THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS YET THAT THEY COULD OR WOULD USE CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. DOCTRINE AND TACTICS THERE IS AMPLE AND PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE INCORPORATED THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN BOTH STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL WAR PLANNING. WE DOUBT SADDAM WOULD HAVE DIRECTED THAT SUCH WEAPONS BE DEVELOPED WITHOUT INTENDING TO USE THEM IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES SADDAM PERSONALLY DECIDES UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES AND EXTENT BW AND CW WEAPONS ARE USED. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, ONCE HE HAD AUTHORIZED THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN A SPECIFIC CAMPAIGN OR BATTLE, THE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE WHEN AND HOW SUCH WEAPONS WOULD ACTUALLY BE EMPLOYED WAS DELEGATED TO THE ARMY COMMANDERS. BY 1986, CORPS COMMANDERS HAD THIS AUTHORITY. THE IRAQIS WOULD PROBABLY DO THE SAME IN ANY FUTURE MAJOR CONFLICT SADDAM IS UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE OF THE ESCALATORY POTENTIAL OF USING CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGAINST AN ADVERSARY CAPABLE OF ESCALATION, SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES. HE WOULD CERTAINLY WEIGH THE POTENTIAL UTILITY OF ANY USE OF SUCH WEAPONS AGAINST THE RISK OF RETALIATION IN KIND--OR WORSE. IN MAKING HIS CALCULATIONS, SADDAM WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING IN MIND: CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WEAPONS TACTICAL UTILITY HIGH LOW STRATEGIC UTILITY MODERATE HIGH RISK OF SEVERE HIGH VERY HIGH RETALIATION CHEMICAL WEAPONS. SADDAM EVIDENTLY BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BOTH A CHEMICAL AND A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE THEATER. BUT WE DOUBT THAT WOULD DETER HIM FROM EMPLOYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN A MAJOR CONFLICT WITH THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WE JUDGE THAT SADDAM VALUES THE FORCE-MULTIPLICATION CAPABILITY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS TOO HIGHLY TO FORGO THEIR USE IN ANY IMPORTANT COMBAT SITUATION WHERE USING THEM WOULD PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL TACTICAL BENEFITS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE ESTIMATE THAT: X--IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ANY DEFENSIVE SITUATION IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT WHERE THEY WERE BEING PUSHED BACK BY AN ALLIED OFFENSIVE X--IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE HIGHLY LIKELY TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY OFFENSIVE INTO TERRITORY DEFENDED BY THE UNITED STATES AND ALLIED FORCES. X--ONCE THE IRAQI FORCES HAD BEGUN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST ALLIED FORCES, WE ANTICIPATE THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO USE THEIR ENTIRE CHEMICAL ARSENAL, INCLUDING MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS. X--SPECIAL FORCES OR OTHER AGENTS COULD ALSO HAND-DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO SELECTED TARGETS IN ALMOST ANY COUNTRY. DURING THEIR WAR WITH IRAN, THE IRAQIS LEARNED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN WAYS THAT MAXIMIZED THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY DISSEMINATED CHEMICAL AGENTS IN THE MORNING RATHER THAN LATER IN THE DAY, TYPICALLY, THE IRAQIS WOULD DEPOSIT PERSISTENT MUSTARD AGENT IN AN IRANIAN FORCE'S REAR AREA AND THEN BOMBARD THE FRONTLINES WITH NONPERSISTENT BUT HIGHLY LETHAL SARIN. THE PANIC- STRICKEN IRANIAN SOLDIERS FLEEING TO THE REAR WOULD RUN RIGHT INTO THE MUSTARD. IN ADDITION TO BATTLEFIELD EMPLOYMENT FOR ANTIPERSONNEL AND AREA-DENIAL PURPOSES, TARGETS DEEP IN THE REAR SUCH AS LOGISTIC STOCKPILES, PORTS, AND AIRFIELDS WOULD ALSO BE ATTACKED. AIRFIELDS, IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BE CONSIDERED CRITICAL TARGETS BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF US AND ALLIED AIR POWER. AGAINST AN AIRFIELD, CHEMICAL WEAPONS COULD BEST BE USED TO SUPPRESS DEFENSES LONG ENOUGH FOR IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO CARRY OUT STRIKES WITH HIGH-EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS. OCCASIONAL HARASSING ATTACKS COULD BE CONDUCTED AGAINST A WIDE RANGE OF TARGETS TO KEEP ENEMY FORCES JUMPY AND DEMORALIZED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE IRAQIS COULD EFFECTIVELY CONDUCT EITHER BW OR CW ATTACKS AGAINST BLOCKADING NAVAL SHIPS. BUT THEY MIGHT TRY ANYWAY BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. WE JUDGE THAT SADDAM HUSAYN UNDERSTANDS THAT USING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ON ANY SUBSTANTIAL SCALE ENTAILS A MUCH MORE SERIOUS RISK OF MASSIVE RATALIATION THAN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ACCORDINGLY, WE BELIEVE, SADDAM REGARDS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PRIMARILY AS DETERRENTS AND DOOMSDAY WEAPONS. AS A RESULT, WE JUDGE THAT SADDAM WOULD REFRAIN FROM USING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS UNTIL HE PERCEIVED HIS SITUATION TO BE DESPERATE- -SUCH AS IF HE WERE BEING SEVERELY PRESSED BY ALLIED MILITARY ADVANCES OR THE GROWING IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. SADDAM WOULD PROBABLY PRECEDE ANY USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WITH MORE OR LESS EXPLICIT THREATS TO TRY TO ACHIEVE HIS GOALS SHORT OF ACTUAL USE AND THE ATTENDANT RISK OF RETALIATION. IF HIS THREATS WERE NOT HEEDED, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE SADDAM MIGHT ORDER A BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ATTACK--PROBABLY DELIVERED CLANDESTINELY BY A TERRORIST AGAINST A REGIONAL TARGET, SO AS TO PRESERVE PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY. BEYOND THIS, IF SADDAM BELIEVED HIS POSITION WERE CONTINUING TO DETERIORATE, HE MIGHT AUTHORIZE ADDITIONAL BW ATTACKS AGAINST TARGETS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD SADDAM MIGHT ORDER BW MISSILE STRIKES WHETHER HE HOPED THEY WOULD REVERSE HIS FORTUNES OR HAD ALREADY CONCLUDED HIS CAUSE WAS HOPELESS. IN THE LATTER CASE, HE WOULD WANT TO TAKE AS MANY OF HIS ENEMIES WITH HIM AS HE COULD. DOES IRAQ HAVE RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS? IN ADDITION TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, IRAQ MAY HAVE RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THAT COULD BE DELIVERED EITHER BY AIR OR MISSILE: X--IN 1988, IRAQ REPORTEDLY TESTED AN AIR-DROPPED BOMB THAT CONTAINED RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS BUT WAS NOT AN ATOMIC BOMB RESULTS OF THE TEST WERE SENT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. THE IRAQIS COULD HAVE OBTAINED SOME RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM OPERATION OF THEIR RESEARCH REACTORS. THE IRAQIS MAY PLAN TO DISPERSE THIS MATERIAL USING A CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVE CHARGE WE DOUBT THAT THE AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AVAILABLE IS ENOUGH TO PRODUCE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WEAPON. IF IRAQ HAS A RADIATION WEAPON, IT PROBABLY WOULD BE USED AS A LAST RESORT, WITH THE INTENTION OF CAUSING PANIC IN A CITY. ITS DETONATION WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO CAUSE WIDESPREAD RADIATION SICKNESS BUT WOULD REQUIRE AN EXPENSIVE CLEANUP. INDICATIONS AND WARNING THE INDICATIONS WHETHER IRAQI FORCES WERE PREPARED TO USE SUCH WEAPONS WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN. THEY ARE READY NOW. THE AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD PROBABLY BE CONVEYED BY SECURE MEANS SIMILARLY, THE IRAQIS COULD ATTACK US FORCES OR OTHER TARGETS WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IRAQ'S PAST USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE WAR WITH IRAN BETWEEN 1983 AND 1988, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON A SCALE NOT SEEN SINCE WORLD WAR 1. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE ATTACKS WAS MINIMAL AT FIRST BUT INCREASED GRADUALLY AS IRAQ GAINED EXPERIENCE IN CW AND DEVELOPED NEW AGENTS, WEAPONS, AND TACTICS ON 17 MARCH 1984 IRAQ USED THE NERVE AGENT TABUN AGAINST IRAN, EARNING THE DUBIOUS HONOR OF BEING THE FIRST NATION TO USE NERVE AGENTS IN BATTLE. CHEMICAL WEAPONS HELPED BRING THE WAR TO A FAIRLY SUDDEN CONCLUSION IN 1988, WHEN IRAQ INCORPORATED MASSED NERVE AGENT STRIKES INTO A SERIES OF HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVES IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THREE DISTINCT PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE, WHICH CONTINUED UNTIL 1986, INVOLVED THE USE OF CW AGENTS IN A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE ROLE, TO DISRUPT OR HALT IRANIAN OFFENSIVES. IN A TRANSITION PHASE LASTING FROM LATE 1986 TO EARLY 1988, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS PREEMPTIVELY AGAINST STAGING AREAS PRIOR TO IRANIAN OFFENSIVES, WHILE CONTINUING TO RELY ON CW TO DISRUPT THESE OFFENSIVES. FINALLY, AND MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, IRAQ USED MASSED NERVE AGENT STRIKES AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ITS WELL-ORCHESTRATED OFFENSIVES IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1988. THE SUCCESS OF THESE OFFENSIVES PROMPTED IRAN TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE IN AUGUST 1988 WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ DECIDED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER TO COMPENSATE FOR IRAN'S MANPOWER ADVANTAGE. IRAQ'S USE OF CW HELPED TO MINIMIZE IRAQI PERSONNEL AND TERRITORIAL LOSSES BY STALLING IRANIAN HUMAN WAVE ATTACKS. IRAQI CW USE WAS ENHANCED BY THE LIMITED IRANIAN CW PROTECTIVE CAPABILITY AND IRAN'S INABILITY TO RETALIATE IN KIND ON ANY APPRECIABLE SCALE. AS THE WAR PROGRESSED, THE IRAQIS BECAME MUCH MORE PROFICIENT IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE THAT ONE REASON FOR THIS WAS THE DELEGATION OF CW RELEASE AUTHORITY TO IRAQI CORPS COMMANDERS IN 1986. THIS PERMITTED BETTER INTEGRATION OF CW INTO BATTLEFIELD PLANNING. BEFORE 1986, SADDAM HUSAYN PERSONALLY CONTROLLED THE RELEASE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. DURING THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR, IRAQ MADE HEAVY USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE REGIME USED BOTH LETHAL AND NONLETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS AGAINST IRAQI KURDS IN LATE AUGUST 1988 END OF MESSAGE 1.5 (c) (62758:62758)
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