LEAKING WAREHOUSE IN KTO

File: 062096_cia_68833_68831_01.txt
Page: 01
Total Pages: 1
Subject: LEAKING WAREHOUSE IN KTO

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







KUWAIT: EXPLANATION OF LEAKING WAREHOUSE IN KUWAIT THEATER

OF OPERATIONS



LIQUID          LEAKING FROM A WAREHOUSE HAS BEEN

IDENTIFIED THROUGH KUWAITI REPORTS AS WATER STAINED

WITH PETROLEUM COKE, ALLAYING CONCERNS THAT IT

MIGHT INDICATE PRODUCTION OF AVERY LARGE AMMONIUM-

NITRATE-FUEL-OIL (ANFO) EXPLOSIVE. EVEN IF IRAQ

HAS COVERTLY ACQUIRED AMMONIUM NITRATE, LARGE

AMOUNTS OF ANFO IN A WAREHOUSE MIGHT BE DIFFICULT

TO DETONATE.







2. KUWAIT:  EXPLANATION OF LEAKING WAREHOUSE IN KUWAIT

THEATER OF OPERATIONS

THE SHUAIBA REFINERY COMPLEX IN KUWAIT

INITIALLY THOUGHT TO BE OIL--

LEAKING FROM A WAREHOUSE. INFORMATION

INDICATES THAT THE WAREHOUSE IS USED TO STORE AMMONIUM

NITRATE, A CRYSTALLINE SALT USED AS FERTILIZER. AMMONIUM

NITRATE MIXED WITH FUEL OIL IS KNOWN AS ANFO, A RELATIVELY

INSENSITIVE, LOW-POWER HIGH EXPLOSIVE WHOSE BLAST

EQUIVALENCY IS ABOUT 80 PERCENT THAT OF TNT. THE BUILDING,







IF THREE-QUARTERS FULL, WOULD CONTAIN ABOUT 150

KILOTONS OF THE MIXTURE (EQUIVALENT TO 125 KILOTONS OF TNT)

AND WOULD REPRESENT A POSSIBLE EXPLOSION HAZARD.



COMMENT:

THE EXPLOSIVE POTENTIAL OF AMMONIUM NITRATE, COUPLED WITH

IRAQI CLAIMS OF A DEVASTATING WEAPON IN KUWAIT, AROUSED

CONCERN THAT A VERY LARGE EXPLOSIVE WAS BEING PRODUCED.

HOWEVER, INFORMATION

HAS REVEALED THAT THE

LIQUID IS IN FACT STAINED WATER.

THE WAREHOUSE IS USED

TO STORE PETROLEUM COKE, A SUBSTANCE THAT RESEMBLES COAL,

PRODUCED AT THE NEARBY MINA ABD ALLAH REFINERY. IN DECEMBER

1990, A SPRINKLER SYSTEM IN THE WAREHOUSE MALFUNCTIONED,

WASHING DOWN THE PETROLEUM COKE AND PRODUCING THE

DARK STAIN OUTSIDE THE BUILDING.



OUR ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE DATA FURTHER SHOWS THAT KUWAIT

NEITHER PRODUCES NOR IMPORTS AMMONIUM NITRATE. ADDITIONALLY,

KUWAITI OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT AMMONIUM NITRATE IS NOT

STORED IN ANY OF THE BUILDINGS IN THE SHUAIBA AREA.-1 - THE

ONLY FERTILIZER PRODUCED IN KUWAIT IS UREA, A NITROGEN-BASED

COMPOUND THAT, WHEN MIXED WITH FUEL OIL, IS INERT.

CONSEQUENTLY, ANY AMMONIUM NITRATE TO BE FOUND IN KUWAIT

WOULD HAVE BEEN SURREPTITIOUSLY IMPORTED BY THE IRAQIS SINCE

THE INVASION.







X-1 -IN ADDITION, THERE ARE NO KNOWN AMMONIUM NITRATE PLANTS

IN IRAQ.



ADDITIONALLY, OUR ANALYSIS REVEALS THAT THE DETONATION OF A

LARGE HEAP OF AMMONIUM NITRATE SOAKED WITH FUEL OIL MAY NOT

BE EASILY ACCOMPLISHED. A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE DETONATOR,

PROPERLY PLACED UNDERNEATH THE HEAP OF ANFO, WOULD BE

REQUIRED TO DETONATE SUCH A MIXTURE INSIDE A WAREHOUSE-LIKE

BUILDING. BECAUSE IT IS RELATIVELY INSENSITIVE, ANFO REQUIRES

CONSIDERABLE CONFINEMENT TO DETONATE. ATTEMPTS TO EXPLODE THE

MIXTURE BY PLACING DETONATORS ON TOP OF THE HEAP (OR POSSIBLY

EVEN DROPPING A BOMB ON IT) MIGHT RESULT IN A FIRE BUT

PROBABLY NOT AN EXPLOSION.







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