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File: 070396_cia_75021_75021_01.txtSubject: IRAQ'S FOREIGN DEPENDENCY IN DEV Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. IRAQ: FOREIGN DEPENDENCY IN DEVELOPING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT IRAQ: FOREIGN DEPENDENCY IN DEVELOPING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION KEY JUDGMENTS INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF JANUARY 1991 WAS USED IN THIS REPORT. IRAQ HAS DEPENDED ON EXTENSIVE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOP THE MOST ADVANCED ARSENAL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE ARAB WORLD. WITHOUT SUCH ASSISTANCE, BAGHDAD WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY THE RANGE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THAT IT WIELDS TODAY, NOR WOULD IT POSSESS THE INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY TO FIELD MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS WITH RANGE AND PAYLOAD CAPABILITIES THAT COULD THREATEN MOST OF THE MIDDLE EAST. ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ'S UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS HAS COME FROM WEST EUROPEAN FIRMS, BAGHDAD ALSO VIEWS THIRD WORLD FIRMS AS POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIERS AND MAY TURN TO THEM INCREASINGLY- -IF WESTERN SOURCES ARE CUT OFF WE BELIEVE THE CURRENT UN-SPONSORED EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ IS PROVING EFFECTIVE IN STEMMING THE FLOW OF FOREIGN GOODS TO IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. BAGHDAD, HOWEVER, IS NOT GIVING UP. IF THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT PERSIAN GULF CRISIS RESULTS IN THE DISMANTLING OF IRAQI FACILITIES THAT SUPPORT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, WE BELIEVE BAGHDAD'S CAPABILITY TO RESEARCH, DEVELOP, TEST, AND PRODUCE MANY OF THESE WEAPONS WOULD BE SET BACK BY AT LEAST TWO TO FIVE YEARS-PROBABLY LONGER IF DISMANTLING INCLUDED PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION. MOREOVER, IRAQ WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REGAIN ITS PRESENT CAPABILITIES WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) FACILITIES WOULD BE EXCEPTIONS BECAUSE A CW INFRASTRUCTURE COULD STILL BE INTEGRATED INTO IRAQ'S LEGITIMATE PESTICIDE PRODUCTION PROGRAM, AND ANY REMAINING VACCINE OR PHARMACEUTICAL PLANTS COULD MANUFACTURE BW AGENTS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO AN IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT COULD BE IMPEDED MOST EFFECTIVELY BY A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDED PROVISIONS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS (SIMILAR TO US-SOVIET INF INSPECTIONS AND COCOM PRELICENSE AND POSTSHIPMENT CHECKS) AND DISSOLUTION OF BAGHDAD'S COVERT PROCUREMENT NETWORK. TO BE EFFECTIVE, ANY SUCH AGREEMENT ALSO WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE MEASURES TO INHIBIT THE RECONSTITUTION OF IRAQ'S PROCUREMENT NETWORK, SUCH AS REQUIRING ALL IRAQI FOREIGN TRADE ACTIVITIES/ORGANIZATIONS TO BE REGISTERED WITH AN INTERNATIONAL GROUP AND APERIODICALLY INSPECTED. IRAQ: FOREIGN DEPENDENCY IN DEVELOPING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CURRENT CAPABILITIES IRAQ'S PROGRAMS TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE THE MOST ADVANCED IN THE ARAB WORLD. BAGHDAD HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED A CAPABILI- TY TO PRODUCE AND USE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAP- ONS AND IS DEVELOPING AN ARSENAL OF MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS WITH RANGE AND PAYLOAD CAPABILITIES THAT COULD THREATEN MOST OF THE MIDDLE EAST. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ HAS NO NUCLEAR WEAPON TODAY, WE BELIEVE IT COULD PRODUCE A WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990s. CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM: BECOMING SELF-SUFFICIENT AND DEADLY BEFORE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT ON 2 AUGUST 1990, THE IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) PROGRAM, BY FAR THE LARGEST IN THE THIRD WORLD, WAS RAPIDLY BECOMING SELF- SUFFICIENT. SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN, IRAQ HAS STRESSED DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED CW AGENTS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IT IS PURSUING PERSISTENT NERVE AGENTS SUCH AS VX THAT ARE MUCH MORE TOXIC THAN THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENT SARIN-THE PRINCI- PAL AGENTS NOW IN IRAQ'S ARSENAL. IN ADDITION, IRAQ PROBABLY HAS DEVELOPED BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITH A LONGER SHELF LIFE, ENABLING IT TO MAINTAIN A SIZABLE STOCKPILE. IN CONCERT WITH DEVELOPING A MORE SOPHISTI- CATED CW STOCKPILE, THE IRAQIS ARE MAINTAINING A WIDE RANGE OF BATTLEFIELD-PROVEN DELIVERY OPTIONS, INCLUDING BOMBS, SHELLS, ARTILLERY ROCKETS, AND BALLISTIC MISSILES. WITHOUT THE UN-SPONSORED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, IRAQ PROBABLY COULD HAVE COMPLETED, ENOUGH ADDITIONAL PRECURSOR CHEMICAL FACILITIES TO DOUBLE ITS CW AGENT PRODUCTION CAPACITY.1 THE ECONOMIC SANC- TIONS HAVE INTERRUPTED THIS SCHEDULE INDEFINITELY, BUT IRAQ STILL MAINTAINS A FORMIDABLE ARSENAL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE PRODUCTION FACILITIES TO INCREASE IT 1WITH OPTIMUM USE OF ITS CW FACILITIES, IRAQ PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ANNUALLY PRODUCE ABOUT 4,000 TON OF NERVE AND BLISTER AGENTS COMBINED-TWICE THE 2,000 TONS PER YEAR IT WAS PRODUCING AT THE END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR-WITHOUT HAVING TO WORRY ABOUT FOREIGN EMBARGOES OF MOST ESSENTIAL PRECURSORS. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM: SADDAM'S ACE IN THE HOLE IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, (BW) PROGRAM IS THE MOST EXTENSIVE IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE BW PROGRAM IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF IRAQ'S HIGH-PRIORITY DRIVE TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES. WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ HAS BEEN PRODUCING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ANTHRAX SPORES AND BOTULINUM TOXIN. THE IRAQIS VERY LIKELY ARE DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL BW AGENTS-PROBABLY INFEC- TIOUS AGENTS AND ADDITIONAL TOXINS- IRAQ PLANS TO PUT BOTULINUM TOXIN INTO CLUSTER BOMBS AND WILL EVENTUALLY USE BW AGENTS TO FILL WARHEADS FOR THEIR INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED SCUD MISSILES. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS: CREDIBLE MEANS OF DELIVERY IRAQ POSSESSES TWO OPERATIONAL MISSILES-IRAQI-MODI- FIED SOVIET SCUD Bs CALLED THE AL HUSAYN AND THE AL ABBAS-CAPABLE OF REACHING TEL AVIV OR TEHRAN, TARGETS SOME 600 KM AWAY. IRAQ ALSO IS SEEKING AN INDIGENOUS MISSILE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AND IS WELL UNDER WAY IN DEVELOPING AT LEAST FIVE OTHER MISSILES CAPABLE OF GREATER RANGES AND PAYLOAD WE JUDGE THAT, IN ADDITION TO HIGH-EXPLOSIVE WAR- HEADS, IRAQ WILL DEVELOP AND MANUFACTURE CHEMICAL AND POSSIBLY BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS FOR ALL OF ITS MISSILE SYSTEMS. INDEED, IT MAY ALREADY POSSESS A CHEMICAL WARHEAD FOR ITS MODIFIED SCUDS. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOG- ICAL WARHEADS ARE MORE COST EFFECTIVE, RESULT IN GREATER NUMBERS OF HUMAN CASUALTIES, PROVIDE A PSYCHOLOGICAL EDGE, AND MAKE THE MISSILE A MORE EFFECTIVE DETERRENT. WE ALSO JUDGE THAT, WITH CONSIDERABLE FOREIGN ASSIS- TANCE, IRAQ MAY BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WARHEAD HOWEVER, THIS WILL NOT BE A SIMPLE TASK. THERE ARE PROBLEMS WITH WEAPONIZATION THAT, IF NOT READILY SOLVED, COULD ADD YEARS TO DEVELOPMENT TIME. NUCLEAR PROGRAM: A MILITARY ORIENTATION THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM HAS EXISTED SINCE AT LEAST THE LATE 1980s. BAGHDAD'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS THE TECHNICAL COMPE- TENCE TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990s WITH INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED FISSILE MATERIAL OTHER WORST CASE AND MUCH LESS LIKELY SCENARIOS EXIST IN WHICH BAGHDAD COULD DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IN AS LITTLE AS SEVERAL MONTHS AFTER A DECISION TO DO SO. THESE LATTER SCENARIOS INVOLVE THE USE OF A CLANDESTINE SOURCE OF FISSILE MATERIAL OR THE DIVERSION AND PROCESSING OF SAFEGUARDED RESEARCH REACTOR FUELS INTO MATERIAL SUITABLE FOR A CRASH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES PROGRAM. HOWEVER, WE JUDGE THAT BOTH OF THESE SCENARIOS ARE VERY UNLIKELY. WE CONTINUE TO ESTIMATE THAT IF IRAQ INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) IT COULD PRODUCE A NUCLEAR WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990s. TO PRODUCE HEU, HOWEVER, BAGHDAD WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE CONTINUED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OR TECHNOLOGY. FOREIGN CW ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE HOWEVER, IRAQ'S ONCE NEAR- TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN EXPERTISE AND MATERIALS HAS DECLINED MARKEDLY SINCE THE EARLY 1980s AS THE IRAQIS GAINED CW EXPERIENCE AND EMBARKED ON AN INDIGENOUS PRECURSOR PRODUCTION EFFORT. WEST EUROPEAN FIRMS HAVE PROVIDED CRITICAL ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ BY CONSTRUCTING KEY CW FACILITIES AND PROCUR- ING EQUIPMENT AND PRECURSOR CHEMICALS FOREIGN BW ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN CRITICAL WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING EQUIPMENT AND TRAIN- ING HAS BEEN CRITICAL TO IRAQ'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AN OFFENSIVE BW CAPABILITY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE WESTERN FIRMS WERE UNAWARE OF THE END USE OF THE TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM IRAQ'S DEVELOPMENT OF TWO OF THE AGENTS -BOTULINUM TOXIN AND ANTHRAX. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT: A COMMITMENT TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY IRAQ HAS MADE INDIGENOUS MISSILE PRODUCTION ONE OF ITS HIGHEST PRIORITIES FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, IRAQ WANTS TO DEMONSTRATE TO ITS ALLIES AND ENEMIES THAT IT HAS OPERATIONAL MISSILES WITH RANGES SUFFICIENT TO THREATEN MIDDLE EASTERN CITIES. BAGHDAD PROBABLY BELIEVES THIS CAPABILITY WOULD ESTABLISH IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A MILITARY POWER AND A TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED NATION. SECOND, BAGHDAD WANTS TO END ITS DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SUPPORT-BOTH FOR OPERATIONAL MISSILES AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY. ONLY BY BUILDING ITS OWN MISSILE R&D INFRASTRUCTURE OF PEOPLE AND FACILITIES CAN IRAQ WEAN ITSELF FROM THIS DEPENDENCE. IRAQ ALSO VIEWS OTHER THIRD WORLD MISSILE DEVELOPERS AS POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIERS AND MAY TURN TO THEM INCREASINGLY IF WESTERN SOURCES ARE CUT OFF. SUPPLIERS NECESSARY FOR SENSITIVE NUCLEAR RESEARCH BAGHDAD HAS DEMONSTRATED AGGRESSIVE TECHNIQUES TO ACQUIRE CONTROLLED NUCLEAR-RELATED MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGIES IRAQ IS SEEKING NOT ONLY THE COMPONENTS OF NUCLEAR- WEAPONS-RELATED EQUIPMENT, BUT ALSO THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE THOSE COMPONENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT UN-SPONSORED EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ IS PROVING EFFECTIVE IN STEMMING THE FLOW OF FOREIGN GOODS TO IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. BAGHDAD, HOWEVER, IS NOT GIVING UP. POTENTIAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION IF IRAQ'S FACILITIES FOR DEVELOPING AND PRODUCING WEAP ONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WERE DISMANTLED AND/OR DE- STROYED, IRAQ WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REGAIN ITS PRESENT CAPABILITY WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. THE SMALL INDUSTRIAL BASE FROM WHICH IRAQ WOULD BE STARTING, COMBINED WITH ITS LIMITED INVESTMENT CAPITAL AND RELATIVELY SMALL CADRE OF HIGHLY SKILLED PERSONNEL, WOULD PREVENT RAPID RECONSTRUCTION OF MOST OF ITS STRATEGIC WEAPONS FACILITIES. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FACILITIES WOULD BE EXCEPTIONS. ANY REMAINING VACCINE OR PHARMACEUTICAL PLANTS COULD MANUFACTURE BW AGENTS.4 A CW INFRASTRUCTURE COULD STILL BE INTEGRATED INTO IRAQ'S LEGITIMATE PESTICIDE PRODUCTION PROGRAM; IRAQ COULD EVEN LEGITIMATELY IMPORT OR MAIN- TAIN PRODUCTION OF SEVERAL KEY CW AGENT PRECURSORS USED TO MAKE PESTICIDES 4 BIOLOGICAL AGENTS WERE ONCE SLOW AND EXPENSIVE TO MAKE AND HAD TO BE PRODUCED UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS. TODAY, HOWEVER, MANY OF THESE AGENTS ARE CHEAP AND EASY TO PRODUCE WITH LITTLE MORE EQUIPMENT THAN WOULD TYPICALLY BE FOUND IN AN INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH LABORATORY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE TIME REQUIRED TO PRODUCE FISSILE MATERIAL WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE PACING ELEMENT OF AN IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. THE REMOVAL OF IRAQ'S RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL AND RESTRICTING IMPORTS OF SUCH FUEL OF OBTAINING A CLANDESTINE SOURCE OF MATERIAL WOULD GREATLY DIMINISH ANY POTENTIAL SURPRISE SCENARIO FOR A SHORT-TERM IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. OUTLOOK WE BELIEVE THAT CURRENT PROSPECTS ARE GOOD FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THAT BUILDS ON EXISTING MECH- ANISMS TO CONTROL IRAQ'S FUTURE ACCESS TO MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DE- STRUCTION. ALTHOUGH EMERGING INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIERS PROBABLY WILL BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT ANY AGREEMENT THAT INHIBITS THEIR EXPORTS, MATURE SUPPLIERS PROBABLY WILL BE ANXIOUS TO PREVENT A RERUN OF THE DIFFICULT (AND IN SOME CASES EMBARRASSING) SITUATION THEY NOW FACE-A POSSIBLE MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH A STATE THAT HAS DEVELOPED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WITH FOREIGN- BOUGHT EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. 1.5 (C) 75021-76021
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