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File: 071596_cia_71997_71991_01.txt
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Subject: IRAQ AS A MILITARY ADVERSARY

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







NOV 90







BODY:

SUBJECT: IRAQ AS A MILITARY ADVERSARY







IRAQI SCUDS CAN BE EMPLOYED WITH CONVENTIONAL, SOME CHEMICAL,

AND POSSIBLY EVEN BIOLOGICAL AGENT WARHEADS,







WE

ASSESS IRAQI CHEMICAL WARHEADS AS MOST LIKELY FILLED WITH MUSTARD OR

THE NERVE AGENTS, GF OR SARIN.



THE IRAQI SCUD FORCE, WHETHER CONVENTIONALLY OR CHEMICALLY

ARMED, IS PROBABLY MORE IMPORTANT AS A DETERRENT AND A PSYCHOLOGICAL

WEAPON THAN AS AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY INSTRUMENT. THE IRAQI SSMS CAN

REACH MUCH OF SAUDI ARABIA AND MOST OF ISRAEL, BUT THEIR INACCURACY

LIMITS THEM TO ATTACKS ON LARGE AREA TARGETS SUCH AS AIR BASES, OIL

FACILITIES, LARGE GARRISONS, AND CITIES. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE

SCUD FORCE COULD BE ENHANCED BY REPEATED ATTACKS AGAINST A TARGET--A

DOUBTFUL UNDERTAKING IN A HOSTILE AIR ENVIRONMENT.



CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS





IRAQ HAS THE

LARGEST CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD AND IS ABLE

TO PRODUCE ABOUT 2,000 TONS ANNUALLY OF THE BLISTER AGENT, MUSTARD,

AND THE NERVE AGENTS, SARIN AND GF. THE IRAQIS HAVE PLACED THESE

AGENTS INTO AERIAL BOMBS, ARTILLERY SHELLS, ROCKETS, AND PROBABLY

SOME SCUD-TYPE MISSILE WARHEADS. WE JUDGE THAT IRAQ HAS PRODUCED

SOME BINARY MUNITIONS AS CLAIMED BY SADDAM EARLIER THIS YEAR.





WE JUDGE IRAQ CAN PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF BOTULINUM

TOXIN AND ANTHRAX AND PROBABLY IS DEVELOPING OTHER TOXINS AND LIVING

ORGANISMS.







BAGHDAD MAY

ALSO HAVE FILLED SCUD MISSILE WARHEADS WITH BIOLOGICAL AGENTS. A

TASK WELL WITHIN IRAQI TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES.



SADDAM UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZES THAT USE OF HIS CHEMICAL OR

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WOULD EVOKE A STRONG COALITION RESPONSE:



X--FROM BAGHDAD'S POINT OF VIEW, THESE WEAPONS ARE AN IMPORTANT

STRATEGIC DETERRENT AND IRAQ WOULD AGAIN THREATEN THEIR USE EVEN

THOUGH IT MAY REMAIN RELUCTANT TO INITIATE SUCH WARFARE AGAINST FOES

CAPABLE OF CHEMICAL DEFENSE AND RETALIATION.



X--ANTHRAX WEAPONS WOULD PROBABLY BE EMPLOYED AS A WEAPON OF

LAST RESORT AGAINST STRATEGIC TARGETS BECAUSE THE AGENTS' SLOW

EFFECTS LIMIT THEIR BATTLEFIELD UTILITY. BOTULINUM TOXIN CAN CAUSE

EFFECTS IN AS LITTLE AS A FEW HOURS--QUICKER THAN MUSTARD--AND COULD

BE USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. NEVERTHELESS, BAGHDAD HAS MORE

EXPERIENCE WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS AND PROBABLY WOULD PREFER USING

THEM. NEW INFORMATION INDICATES THAT LARGE DOSES OF BOTULINUM

TOXIN CAN HAVE EFFECTS IN AS FEW AS SEVERAL HOURS,







X--IF SADDAM CONCLUDED HIS PERSONAL POSITION WAS BECOMING

HOPELESS, THIS COULD CONVINCE HIM TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TO SHOCK

THE COALITION INTO A CEASE-FIRE. IN SUCH A SITUATION, THE USE OF

ANTHRAX AGAINST A COALITION MILITARY INSTALLATION OR A MAJOR SAUDI

OIL FACILITY MIGHT SEEM AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION.



IRAQ IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TACTICALLY TO

AVOID SERIOUS BATTLEFIELD DEFEATS. THE IRAQI MILITARY HAS INTEGRATED

CHEMICAL WEAPONS INTO ITS DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS AND, IN THE WAR

AGAINST IRAN, DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO USE THEM:



X--IRAQI UNITS APPEAR PREPARED FOR A RAPID TRANSITION TO

CHEMICAL WARFARE. DECONTAMINATION SITES AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN

IDENTIFIED FORWARD IN KUWAIT, AND CHEMICAL MUNITIONS PROBABLY HAVE

BEEN MOVED TO AIRFIELDS IN SOUTHEASTERN IRAQ AND PERHAPS KUWAIT.



X--THE SERIES OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED IN KUWAIT.

SUGGESTS THAT BAGHDAD IS PREPARED FOR A NUMBER OF TACTICAL RETREATS

AND MIGHT NOT FEEL PRESSURED INTO IMMEDIATE CHEMICAL USE.

BATTLEFIELD USE WOULD BE INCREASINGLY LIKELY AS THE COALITION FORCES

PUSHED DEEPER INTO KUWAIT AND THE MORE IRAQ ITSELF APPEARED TO

SADDAM TO BE IN JEOPARDY.



X--WE CANNOT RULE OUT IRAQI CHEMICAL ATTACKS TO DISRUPT

COALITION FORCES IF BAGHDAD BELIEVES A COALITION ATTACK IS IMMINENT.







NUCLEAR WEAPONS.







WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS

VERY UNLIKELY THAT IRAQI SCIENTISTS HAVE COMPLETED ALL DESIGN,

ENGINEERING, AND NONNUCLEAR TESTING WORK REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE

VIABILITY OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE DESIGN AND, THEREFORE, THAT IRAQ

CURRENTLY DOES NOT HAVE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE.





SPECIAL WEAPONS. THE IRAQI ARMED FORCSS--ALONE AMONG MODERN

MILITARIES--HAVE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE BATTLEFIELD

EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE SUSTAINED USE OF SURFACE-TO-

SURFACE MISSILES (SSMS). WE JUDGE THAT IRAQ WOULD AGAIN USE SUCH

WEAPONS IN A WAR WITH THE COALITION. IN THE WAR WITH IRAN, IRAQ

EMPLOYED CHEMICALS

OCCASIONALLY TO INTERDICT THE MOVEMENT

OF IRANIAN RESERVES, DISRUPT HEADQUARTERS, AND SUPPRESS IRANIAN

ARTILLERY FIRE. IRAQI TROOPS ARE FAMILIAR WITH HANDLING CHEMICAL

WEAPONS, AND PLANNERS ARE EXPERIENCED IN INTEGRATING CHEMICALS IN

THEIR PLANNING.







X--THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD PROBABLY BE BLOCKED

UNLESS RELEASE AUTHORITY HAD BEEN PREDELEGATED FROM BAGHDAD TO A

CORPS COMMANDER.



X--IRAQI MISSILE TROOPS WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO LAUNCH STRIKES

WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION FROM SADDAM.







WEATHER



THE DESERT CLIMATE OF THE KUWAITI THEATER HAS A SUBSTANTIAL

INFLUENCE ON MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS. THERE ARE TWO PRIMARY

SEASONS: SUMMER (JUNE THROUGH SEPTEMBER) AND WINTER (NOVEMBER

THROUGH APRIL), WITH ONE-MONTH TRANSITION PERIODS IN BETWEEN. THE

MOST IMPORTANT WEATHER COMPONENTS ARE TEMPERATURE, WIND, AND

PRECIPITATION.



TEMPERATURE. TEMPERATURES IN THE KUWAITI THEATER CAN RANGE

FROM A SUMMER HIGH OF OVER 120 F TO A WINTER LOW OF ABOUT 40 F. THE

HIGH TEMPERATURES HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE ON OPERATIONS:







WIND. WIND CONDITIONS CAN HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT IN THE CASE OF

DUSTSTORMS AND THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS:



X--WIND PATTERNS FAVOR CHEMICAL USE IN THE EARLY MORNING AND

LATE EVENING WHEN WINDS BLOW ENOUGH TO SPREAD AN AGENT BUT NOT

ENOUGH TO DISPERSE IT.







1.5(c)

71997-71991

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