IRAQI OFFENSIVE TACTICS

File: 110296_cia_61989_61989_02.txt
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SUBJECT: IRAQI OFFENSIVE TACTICS

NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MARCH 1995

SUMMARY: THIS REPORT PROVIDES INFORMATION ON OFFENSIVE TACTICS

THE IRAQI ARMY DEVELOPED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, BEYOND THE

TRIANGULAR FORMATIONS WHICH IT HAD LEARNED

USE OF THE MOBILE RESERVE AND THE COMBAT TASK FORCE, INCLUDING

TASK FORCE COMPOSITION, ARE IDENTIFIED TOGETHER WITH FORMS OF

OFFENSIVE MANEUVERS, OBJECTIVE DEPTHS, ORGANIZATION OF TANK

SECURITY ELEMENTS, AND USE OF COLORED FLARES. IRAQI PROCEDURES TO

FIX DEFENSIVE UNITS WITH INFANTRY WHILE USING ARMORED FORMATIONS

TO BYPASS THEM ARE DISCUSSED.

2. DURING THE EARLY 1980S, STANDARD IRAQI ARMY DOCTRINE

REQUIRED UNITS TO DEPLOY IN A TRIANGULAR FORMATION DURING BOTH

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, A DIVISION

DEPLOYED TWO BRIGADES FORWARD AND KEPT ONE BRIGADE CENTERED IN THE

REAR DURING THE OFFENSE. THE IRAQIS LEARNED THE TRIANGULAR

FORMATION DOCTRINE THESE TACTICS

WERE TAUGHT AND REINFORCED AT ALMOST ALL LEVELS OF MILITARY

TRAINING OR INSTRUCTION.

3. BY MID-1984, IRAQI UNITS DEVELOPED BATTLEFIELD TACTICS

WHICH INTRODUCED THE CONCEPT OF A MOBILE RESERVE AND WHICH CHANGED

THE STANDARD DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS.

A. THE MOBILE RESERVE CONCEPT STRESSED THE NEED FOR

LARGE (DIVISION-SIZED) FORMATIONS TO BE DEPLOYED BEHIND FORWARD

UNITS. THE MOBILE RESERVE WAS USUALLY COMPOSED OF ARMORED,

ARTILLERY, AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY UNITS WHICH WERE CAPABLE OF

MOVING QUICKLY TO SUPPORT AND REINFORCE FORWARD UNITS. THE

LARGEST FORMATION IN THE MOBILE RESERVE WAS ALTERNATELY REFERRED

TO AS A COMBAT TASK FORCE ("JNAFIL MNARAKA") OR AN ASSAULT FORCE

("AL SAUWLA!'). IN A COMBAT TASK FORCE, WHICH WAS ALSO USED

DEFENSIVELY, VARIOUS UNITS WERE ASSEMBLED TO PROVIDE THE COMMANDER

WITH AN INDEPENDENT AND MOBILE FIGHTING FORCE. FOR EXAMPLE, A

COMBAT TASK FORCE COULD BE COMPOSED OF ONE MECHANIZED INFANTRY

BRIGADE, ONE TANK BATTALION, ONE ARTILLERY BATTALION, ONE COMBAT

ENGINEER COMPANY, AND OTHER COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS. THE

COMBAT TASK FORCE WAS NORMALLY SUBORDINATE TO A DIVISION.

COMMENT: THE COMBAT TASK FORCE EVOLVED THROUGHOUT THE IRAN-IRAQ

WAR UNTIL IT BECAME AN INDEPENDENT, SELF-SUPPORTING FORMATION.)

B. FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, IRAQI ARMY DIVISIONS BY

MID-1984 DEPLOYED WITH THREE BRIGADES ON LINE AND ONE BRIGADE

CENTERED REARWARD. THE MOBILE RESERVE WAS DEPLOYED TO THE REAR OF

THE CENTERED BRIGADE. BRIGADES DEPLOYED SIMILARLY, WITH THREE

REGIMENTS ON LINE AND ONE REGIMENT CENTERED REARWARD.

C. THE ACTUAL ASSAULT WAS PRECEDED BY AN ARTILLERY

BARRAGE, AND THE FORWARD UNITS, USUALLY INFANTRY OR MECHANIZED

INFANTRY, ATTACKED TO FIX ENEMY POSITIONS AND ENGAGE ENEMY FORCES.

ONCE THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED, IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES ("QUWAAT SA'IQA")

OR COMMANDO ("MAGHAWEER") UNITS ATTACKED AROUND OR THROUGH THE

FORWARD UNITS IN ORDER TO OCCUPY AND SECURE THE INITIAL OBJECTIVE.

THE INITIAL OBJECTIVE WAS USUALLY 5 TO 1 0 KILOMETERS (KM) BEHIND

THE ENEMY'S FORWARD DEFENSES. ONCE THE INITIAL OBJECTIVE WAS

SECURED, THE COMBAT TASK FORCE MANUEVERED THROUGH OR FLANKED

AROUND THE FORWARD UNITS AND ATTACKED TOWARD THE PRIMARY

OBJECTIVE, WHICH WAS USUALLY 25 TO 35 KM BEHIND THE ENEMY'S

FORWARD DEFENSES. COMMENT: DISTANCE TO THE PRIMARY

OBJECTIVE WAS VARIABLE DEPENDING UPON TERRAIN, ENEMY STRENGTH,

FRIENDLY FORCES, AND WEATHER.) FOR THIS TYPE OF ASSAULT, THE

COMBAT TASK FORCE WAS USUALLY ARMOR HEAVY, SUPPORTED BY MECHANIZED

INFANTRY OR COMMANDO UNITS. BY DOCTRINE, A SQUAD OF SOLDIERS

ACCOMPANIED EACH TANK INTO BATTLE.

D. DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE IRAQIS LEARNED TO RELY

HEAVILY UPON ARMORED UNITS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. BY 1984,

TANK FORMATIONS WERE ALMOST ALWAYS USED FOR THE PRIMARY ASSAULT

UNITS, I.E., THE UNITS WHICH WERE TASKED TO SEIZE AND OCCUPY AN

OBJECTIVE. DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, A TANK SECURITY ELEMENT

WAS DEPLOYED FORWARD OF THE MAIN FORMATION. THE COMPOSITION OF THE

TANK SECURITY ELEMENT VARIED DEPENDING UPON THE ECHELON OF THE

FORMATION. FOR EXAMPLE, AN ARMORED DIVISION TANK SECURITY ELEMENT

NORMALLY CONSISTED OF THE DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE UNIT AND ONE

TANK OR ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE FROM EACH SUBORDINATE TANK

BATTALION.

4. ANOTHER TACTIC DEVELOPED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WAS THE

MEETING ATTACK ("HUJUUM MUQABIL"). IN THIS CASE, DEFENDING IRAQI

UNITS MOVED FORWARD TO ENGAGE ATTACKING IRANIANS ALONG THE FRONT.

THIS TACTIC WAS USED ONLY BY ARMORED UNITS WITH SUPPORTING

INFANTRY OR COMMANDO UNITS, BUT NEVER BY INFANTRY UNITS ALONE.

THE SUCCESS OF THIS TACTIC DEPENDED UPON THE LEADERSHIP, COMBAT

EFFECTIVENESS, AND MORALE OF THE IRAQI UNITS. ON OCCASION, THREE

OR FOUR IRAQI BRIGADES LAUNCHED A MEETING ATTACKAGAINST AS MANY

AS THREE IRANIAN DIVISIONS. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THIS TACTIC

WAS SIMPLY TO STOP AN IRANIAN ATTACK AT A SPECIFIED POINT. AS

SUCH, IT WAS NOT A TRULY OFFENSIVF OPERATION WITH THE GOAL OF

SEIZING ENEMY TERRITORY. COMMENT: IRAQI FORCES WERE

BETTER TRAINED AND MORE DISCIPLINED, AND HAD BETTER COMMAND AND

CONTROL THAN THE IRANIANS. THEREFORE THIS TACTIC WAS OFTEN

SUCCESSFUL WITH THE LIMITED GOALS OF DISRUPTING AND HALTING AN

IRANIAN ATTACK.)

5. ANOTHER OFFENSIVE TACTIC WAS THE PREEMPTIVE STRIKE, OR

SPOILING ATTACK. THIS TACTIC WAS USED WHEN INTELLIGENCE INDICATED

THAT IRANIAN UNITS WERE MASSING FOR AN ATTACKALONG THE FRONT.

THE PREEMPTIVE STRIKE WAS CONDUCTED BY A SINGLE BRIGADE, DIVISION,

OR CORPS. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PREEMPTIVE STRIKE WERE TO DISRUPT

AND CAUSE ATTRITION AMONG ENEMY FORCES PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF

THEIR BUILDUP FOR AN ATTACK. AFTER THE AYATOLLAH ((KHOMEINI))

ROSE TO POWER IN IRAN, HE ORDERED THE EXECUTION OF MANY

HIGH-RANKING IRANIAN OFFICERS. SHI'ITE CLERICS REPLACED THESE

OFFICERS. AND IN SOME CASES SERVED AS DIVISION COMMANDERS IN

IRANIAN UNITS.

6. CIRCA 1984 TO 1988, THE IRAQIS ALSO REFINED THE OFFENSIVE

USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE IRANIANS. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

WERE USED DURING ARTILLERY PREPARATORY FIRE PRIOR TO IRAQI

ASSAULTS. COMMENT: CHEMICALS WERE PARTICULARLY USED

AGAINST THE ENEMY IN AREAS THAT THE IRAQIS DID NOT INTEND TO

OCCUPY.) IN SOME CASES, ADVANCING IRAQI UNITS WERE REQUIRED TO

PASS THROUGH CONTAMINATED AREAS. DURING THE MID-1980S, THE IRAQI

ARMY CHEMICAL BRANCH INTRODUCED TRAINING AND STANDARD OPERATING

PROCEDURES (SOP) FOR ARMORED UNITS TO USE WHEN OPERATING IN A

CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA. COMMENT:

THE AREAS

CONTAMINATED BY IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE USUALLY MARKED BY

IRAQI CHEMICAL DETACHMENTS AND AVOIDED BY ADVANCING UNITS

ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS A T-55B TANK

THROUGH CONTAMINATED AREAS LATER CONDUCTED

DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES.

7. USE OF COLORED SIGNAL FLARES WAS INCORPORATED INTO ARMY

PROCEDURES, AND BECAME PART OF THE OPERATIONAL ORDER (OPORDER).

THE OPORDER FOR ANY NIGHT ASSAULT SPECIFIED FLARE COLOR USAGE AND

MEANING. THE MAIN COLORS USED WERE GREEN, RED, AND YELLOW.

COMMENT: FOR UNKNOWN REASONS WHITE WAS SELDOM USED. FOR

EXAMPLE, THE MOST COMMON USAGE WAS FOR ONE COLOR TO INDICATE THAT

THE OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN OCCUPIED, ANOTHER COLOR TO INDICATE THAT

THE OBJECTIVE COULD NOT BE OCCUPIED, AND A THIRD COLOR TO INDICATE

THE NEED FOR REINFORCEMENTS BECAUSE THE ATTACKING UNIT HAD BEEN

CUT OFF OR SURROUNDED.

END OF MESSAGE

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