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File: 970409_cia_762668_762668_01.txt
cia_74543_65158_06.txt 664 164 36 6755 6322667001 7252 Subject: SUBJ: CIA RELAYS CONCERNS ABOUT UNMARKED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS,
6 MARCH 1991
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
061923Z MAR 91 DIRECTOR 551818
TO: IMMEDIATE JILE/SAUDI
FROM: DI
SUBJECT: PROPOSED TDY
REF: A.
B. DIRECTOR 545985
ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPHS 2, 6, AND 7.
1. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT ARMY TEAM
ANALYSTS WERE TO ACCOMPANY HAS BEEN CANCELLED. ANALYSTS STILL
HAVE URGENT NEED FOR THE SAKE OF FUTURE ANALYTICAL REQUIREMENTS TO
VISIT ANY OF THE FOLLOWING FACILITIES WHILE THEY REMAIN UNDER
COALITION CONTROL:
A. AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STORAGE EAST
3200N 4500E
B. AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STORAGE SW
3157N 4454E
C. AN NASIRIYAH AMMO STORAGE SW
3058N 4611E
D. ASH SHUAYBAH AMMO STORAGE NE
3029N 4739E
E. TALLIL AIRFIELD
3056N 4605E
2. URGENTLY REQUEST THAT JILE/SAUDI DETERMINE IF ANY OF THE
ABOVE IRAQI FACILITIES WILL STILL BE IN COALITION HANDS IN THE NEXT
60 HOURS.
3. HIGH LEVEL POLICYMAKERS WANT IMMEDIATE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
ON PRESENCE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN THE KTO. THE NEXT TWO WEEKS,
WHILE FACILITIES ARE STILL IN COALITION CONTROL, ARE A PERIOD OF
GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT COULD
ANSWER THESE INQUIRIES. PRESENCE OF ANALYSTS WILL ENSURE THAT
POLICYMAKERS' QUESTIONS ARE ADDRESSED.
4. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN EPW REPORTS THAT IRAQ'S CHEMlCAL
MUNITIONS HAVE COLORED BANDS OTHER MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION, OUR
EXPERIENCE WITH THE MUNITIONS IRAQ USED IN ITS WAR WITH IRAN
INDICATES THAT THE IRAQIS DID NOT/NOT MARK THEIR CHEMICALLY FILLED
MUNITIONS. WE BELIEVE THE EPW REPORTS ON MARKINGS MAY REFLECT
TRAINING CLASSES ON CHEMICAL MUNITIONS USING SOVIET EXAMPLES. OUR
EXPERTS ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE SPECIFIC TYPES OF MUNITIONS THAT IRAQ
FILLED WITH CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IF
PERSONNEL IN THE KTO ARE NOT AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY, OPPORTUNITIES
TO SUCCESSFULLY IDENTIFY CHEMICALLY FILLED MUNITIONS MAY BE MISSED.
WHEN CACHES OF UNMARKED MUNITIONS ARE DESTROYED, THERE IS ALSO THE
POSSIBILITY THAT INDIVIDUALS COULD BE EXPOSED TO CHEMICAL WARFARE
AGENTS. IF ANY CW AGENTS ARE DETECTED, EXPERTS WILL PROVIDE
REAL-TIME GUIDANCE ON TYPES OF AGENTS KNOWN OR SUSPECTED OF BEING IN
THE IRAQ ARSENAL.
5. PRESENCE OF EXPERTS WILL ALSO ENSURE THAT ANY
DOCUMENTS, MATERIALS, OR INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM EPWS OR CAPTURED
AREAS CAN BE REVIEWED IN REAL-TIME FOR CW RELEVANCE. OUR EXPERTS CAN
ALSO HELP FOCUS DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS AND COLLECTION EFFORTS.
6. REQUEST JILE/SAUDI IMMEDIATELY PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION
AVAILABLE ON RECENT REPORTING INDICATING THAT A US SOLDIER HAD BEEN
EXPOSED TO BLISTER AGENTS. WHEN REPORTING OF THIS TYPE SHOWS UP,
HIGH LEVEL CONSUMERS--THE PRESIDENT, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE, AND MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL--DEMAND AN
IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT. WITHOUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS, OUR EXPERTS ARE
UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF SUCH REPORTS. INITIAL
ASSESSMENTS THAT WE ARE UNSURE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE REPORTS
CAN ONLY KEEP THESE CONSUMERS AT BAY, FOR A SHORT TIME.
7. REQUEST THAT JILE/SAUDI DIRECTLY APPROACH CENTCOM CCJ2 AND
ASK FOR IMMEDIATE COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR ANALYSTS. ANALYSTS ARE
READY FOR IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE WHEN COUNTRY CLEARANCE RECEIVED.
1.5(c)
74543:65158
cia_76864_76864_05.txt 666 223 36 7357 6322714607 7271 Subject: SUBJ: IRAQI DECLARATION
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
ANNEX IV
LOCATION, CONDITION, AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF MUNITIONS
NO: 1
LOCATION.: MUTHANNA ESTABLISHMENT (SAMARRA)
AGENT: SARIN
MUNITION: 122-MM ROCKET WARHEAD
QTY: 6,120
DESCRIPTION: METAL WARHEAD COMPRISING TWO PLASTIC CONTAINERS (TOTAL CAPACITY
7 LITRES), EQUIPPED WITH IMPACT FUSE AND INTERNAL BURSTER FILLED WITH RDX; MOUNTED
ON MISSILE VEHICLE WITH BINARY-SYSTEM SOLID FUEL STORED OUTDOORS IN WOODEN BOXES
CONDITION: NORMAL
NO: 2
LOCATION: MUTHANNA ESTABLISHMENT
AGENT: SARIN
MUNITION: 122-MM ROCKET
QTY: 2,500
DESCRIPTION: METAL WARHEAD COMPRISING THREE METAL CONTAINERS LINED WITH TEFLON
(TOTAL CAPACITY 6 LITRES); FOLLOWING DISPERSAL, THE CONTAINERS ARE OPERATED BY
IGNITING AN ALL-WAYS FUSE; MOUNTED ON MISSILE VEHICLE COVERED BY BINARY-SYSTEM
SOLID FUEL
CONDITION: UNDER DEBRIS IN DAMAGED STORE
NO: 3
LOCATION: MUHAMMADIYAT
AGENT: SARIN
MUNITION: DS-2 SERIAL BOMB
QTY: 200
DESCRIPTION: MADE OF LOCALLY-PRODUCED ALUMINIUM; CAPACITY 220 LITRES; EQUIPPED
WITH INTERNAL BURSTER FILLED WITH RDX AND IMPACT FUSE
CONDITION: UNDER DEBRIS; DESTROYED
NO: 4
LOCATION: MUHAMMADIYAT
AGENT: MUSTARD GAS
MUNITION: LD-250 SERIAL BOMB
QTY: 200
DESCRIPTION: LOCALLY PRODUCED; EQUIPPED WITH INTERNAL BURSTER FILLED WITH RDX
AND IMPACT OR PROXIMITY FUSE
CONDITION: DAMAGED
NO: 5
LOCATION: MUHAMMADIYAT
AGENT: CS
MUNITION: MORTOR SHELL
QTY: 20,000
DESCRIPTION: ORDINARY BOMB; CAPACITY 440 GM (?); EQUIPPED WITH IMPACT FUSE
CONDITION: DESTROYED
NO: 6
LOCATION: KHAMISIYAH STORES
AGENT: SARIN
MUNITION: 122-MM ROCKET
QTY: 2,160
DESCRIPTION: AS IN (1) ABOVE
CONDITION: DESTROYED
NO: 7
LOCATION: CHEMICAL CORPS TRAINING CENTRE (NEAR FALLUJAH) (80 KM WEST OF BAGHDAD)
AGENT: MUSTARD GAS
MUNITION: ARTILLERY SHELL
QTY: 6,394
DESCRIPTION: 3.5-LITRE-CAPACITY SHELL EQUIPPED WITH INTERNAL BURSTER (TYPE RDX)
AND IMPACT OR PROXIMITY FUSE
CONDITION: NORMAL
NO: 8
LOCATION: AL-WALID AIRBASE
AGENT: SARIN
MUNITION: BINARY-SYSTEM R-400 SERIAL BOMB
QTY: 336
DESCRIPTION: LOCALLY PRODUCED; 90 LITRES; AGENTS MIXED
SHORTLY BEFORE UTILIZATION; EQUIPPED WITH RDX-TYPE INTERNAL BURSTER;
IMPACT FUSE AND DELAY FUSE (?)
CONDITION: NORMAL
NO: 9
LOCATION: SADDAM AND QADISIYAH AIRBASE
AGENT: MUSTARD GAS
MUNITION: AALD-500 500-GAUGE SERIAL BOMB
QTY: 140
DESCRIPTION: CAPACITY 12 LITRES; EQUIPPED WITH RDX-TYPE INTERNAL
BURSTER AN IMPACT OR PROXIMITY FUSE
CONDITION: NORMAL
NO: 10
LOCATION: SADDAM, QADISIYAH, AL-PAKR AND TAMMUZ AIRBASES AND AL-TUZ AIRFIELD
AGENT: MUSTARD GAS
MUNITION: LD-250 250-GAUGE SERIAL BOMB
QTY: 900
DESCRIPTION: CAPACITY 60 LITRES; LOCALLY PRODUCED; EQUIPPED WITH RDX-TYPE INTERNAL
BURSTER AND IMPACT OR PROXIMITY FUSE
CONDITION: NORMAL
NO: 11
LOCATION: DUJAYL (AVARAH)
AGENT: SARIN
MUNITION: AL-EUSSEIN MISSILE WARHEAD
QTY: 16
DESCRIPTION: LOCALLY-PRODUCED WARHEAD; CAPACITY 140 LITRES; EQUIPPED WITH INTERNAL
BURSTER AND IMPACT FUSE
CONDITION: NORMAL
NO: 12
LOCATION: DUJAYL (AVARAH)
AGENT: BINARY SARIN
MUNITION: AL-EUSSEIN MISSILE WARHEAD
QTY: 14
DESCRIPTION: LOCALLY-PRODUCED WARHEAD; CAPACITY 140 LITRES; AGENTS ARE MIXED
ABORTLY BEFORE UTILIZATION; EQUIPPED WITH INTERNAL BURSTER AND IMPACT FUSE
CONDITION: NORMAL
NO: 13
LOCATION: KHAMISIYAH STORES (NASIRIYAH)
AGENT: MUSTARD GAS
MUNITION: 155-MM SHELL
QTY: 4.240
DESCRIPTION: 3.5-LITRE-CAPACITY BOMB EQUIPPED WITH RDX-TYPE INTERNAL BURSTER AND
IMPACT OR PROXIMITY FUSE
CONDITION: NORMAL
1.5(c)
76864:76864
OPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
ANNEX IV
LOCATION, CONDITION, AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF MUNITIONS
NO: 1
LOCATION.: MUTHANNA ESTABLISHMENT (SAMARRA)
AGENT: SARIN
MUNITION: 122-MM ROCKET WARHEAD
QTY: 6,120
DESCRIPcia_94736_94736_04.txt 664 164 36 2016 6322663241 7246 Subject: SUBJ: ACIS ON FACILITY IDENTIFICATION AND TASKING, 15 NOVEMBER 1991
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
15 NOV 91
5 - ACIS APOLOGIZES FOR MISUNDERSTANDING ON TALL AL
LAHM STORAGE FACILITY TERMINALS WERE
DOWN MOST OF DAY ON 14 NOV AND HAD TROUBLE VERIFYING
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO FACILITIES. TASKING WILL BE
FORWARDED TO STUDY THIS FACILITY FOR ACTIVITY THAT MIGHT
INDICATE THAT THE IRAQIS BROUGHT CW MATERIAL INTO FACILITY
JUST FOR THE INSPECTION, RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED NEXT
WEEK. ALSO ACIS WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH 24TH MI DIVISION
ON THIS MATTER. ACIS HAS NO ON CW6 VISIT TO TALL AL LAHM
FACILITY. PLEASE QUERY STATUS OF REPORT FAX ACIS IF
POSSIBLE.
1.5(c)
94736:94736
-WAYS FUSE; MOUNTED ON MISSILE VEHICLE COVERED BY BINARY-SYSTEM
SOLID FUEL
CONDITION: UNDER DEBRIS IN DAMAGED STORE
NO: 3
LOCATION: MUHAMMADIYAT
AGENT: SARIN
MUNITION: DS-2 SERIAL BOMB
QTY: 200
DESCRIPTION: MADE OF LOCALLY-PRODUCED ALUMINIUM; CAPACITY 220 LITRES; EQUIPPED
WITH INTERNAL BURSTER FILLED WITH RDX AND IMPACT FUSE
CONDITION: UNDER DEBRIS; DESTROYED
NO: 4
LOCATION: MUHAMMADIYAT
AGENT: MUSTARD GAS
MUNITION: LD-250 SERIAL BOMB
QTY: 200
DESCRIPTION: LOCALLY PRODUCEDcia_94741_94741_02.txt 664 164 36 2417 6322663133 7241 Subject: SUBJ: UNSCOM MEMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT COALITION ACTIVITY, 1 APRIL 1992
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
010801Z APR 92
2.
A. A TOTAL OF 463 BINARY (GB, GF) 122MM ROCKETS WERE
EXPLOSIVELY DESTROYED DURING UNSCOM 29'S 32 DAYS IN IRAQ. NINETY
PERCENT OF THE ROCKETS ACTUALLY CONTAINED AGENT, AN ESTIMATED
TOTAL OF 3 TONS OF AGENT.
3.
A. REQUESTED THAT ADDITIONAL
BACKGROUND INFORMATION BE PROVIDED UNSCOM BEFORE FURTHER
DESTRUCTION TAKES PLACE AT KHAMISIYAH. THE IRAQIS TOLD UNSCOM
29, AS THEY HAD TOLD UNSCOM 20, THAT THE DESTRUCTION AT THE
STORAGE SITE HAD BEEN CAUSED BY COALITION FORCES WHO HAD OCCUPIED
THE AREA UNTIL 10 MAR 91. UNSCOM 20 CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS
PROBABLE THAT THE IRAQIS HAD GATHERED THE ROCKETS HERE AND
ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY THEM THEMSELVES. REQUESTED
DETAILS PERTAINING TO COALITION FORCES' ACTIVITIES AT THIS SITE:
WHO WAS THERE, WHEN WERE THEY THERE; HOW LONG DID THEY STAY' WHAT
ACTIONS WERE TAKEN; ETC. AGREED TO SUBMIT A REQUEST FOR
THE INFORMATION.
1.5(c)
94741:94741
ACITY 220 LITRES; EQUIPPED
WITH INTERNAL BURSTER FILLED WITH RDX AND IMPACT FUSE
CONDITION: UNDER DEBRIS; DESTROYED
NO: 4
LOCATION: MUHAMMADIYAT
AGENT: MUSTARD GAS
MUNITION: LD-250 SERIAL BOMB
QTY: 200
DESCRIPTION: LOCALLY PRODUCEDcia_94742_94742_12.txt 664 164 36 1572 6322671413 7245 Subject: SUBJ: MEMORANDUM OF PHONE CALL, 15 NOVEMBER 1991
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
MEMORANDUM OF PHONE CALL 15 NOV 91
1. TALKED TO 0815L
7. CAME BACK ON THE LINE TO POINT OUT THAT PARA
OF LAST NIGHT'S SUPPORT CABLE CONTAINED A MISUNDERSTANDING
ON OUR PART. HE STATED (VERY EMPHATICALLY-YOU KNOW )
THAT TALL AL LAHM AMMUNITION STORAGE DEPOT THAT WAS VISITED
BY UNSCOM 20 IS NOT THE SAME AS THE AN NASIRIYAH STORAGE
FACILITY SW. THESE TWO INSTALLATIONS ARE ABOUT 25
KILOMETERS APART, AND THE IRAQIS TOOK THE TEAM TO THE FORMER
LOCATION, BUT NOT THE LATTER.
1.5(c)
94742:94742
UNTIL 10 MAR 91. UNSCOM 20 CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS
PROBABLE THAT THE IRAQIS HAD GATHERED THE ROCKETS HERE AND
ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY THEMcia_94748_94748_17.txt 666 164 36 1444 6322677572 7302 Subject: SUBJ: CENTCOM INFORMED OF 23 FEBRUARY 1991 CIA CABLE, 24 FEBRUARY 1991
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
2400002 FEB 91
CITE JILE/SAUDI
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: FYI
*REF: 231252ZYES91
1. FYI, CENTCOM/COLLECTIONS HAS TASKED COLLECTION ASSETS
TO INVESTICATE THE POSSIBLE CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITY
AS DESCRIBED IN REF. CENTCOM APPRECIATES PASSING THIS
INFORMATION, FOR CHEMICAL FACILITIES, AS YOU CAN IMAGINE,
CARRY HIGH TARGETTING PRIORITIES. RGDS.
END OF MESSAGE
94748:94748
1.5c
RAQIS TOOK THE TEAM TO THE FORMER
LOCATION, BUT NOT THE LATTER.
1.5(c)
94742:94742
UNTIL 10 MAR 91. UNSCOM 20 CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS
PROBABLE THAT THE IRAQIS HAD GATHERED THE ROCKETS HERE AND
ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY THEMcia_94749_94749_15.txt 664 164 36 1255 6322673045 7267 Subject: SUBJ: CIA RESPONSE TO 23 FEBRUARY 1991 CABLE, 26 FEBRUARY 1991
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
2602382 FEB 91 DIRECTOR 533647
TO: IMMEDIATE JILE/SAUDI
SUBJECT: SUSPECTED CHEMICAL STORAGE
FACILITY
1. WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC CHEMICAL STORAGE
FACILITY LOCATION. WE PASSED INFORMATION INFORMALLY
TO ANALYSTS.
2. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
END OF MESSAGE
1.5(c)
94749:94749
CHEMICAL FACILITIES, AS YOU CAN IMAGINE,
CARRY HIGH TARGETTING PRIORITIES. RGDS.
END OF MESSAGE
94748:94748
1.5c
RAQIS TOOK THE TEAM TO THE FORMER
LOCATION, BUT NOT THE LATTER.
1.5(c)
94742:94742
UNTIL 10 MAR 91. UNSCOM 20 CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS
PROBABLE THAT THE IRAQIS HAD GATHERED THE ROCKETS HERE AND
ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY THEMcia_94757_94757_16.txt 666 164 36 2217 6322677415 7274 SUBJECT: SUBJ: CIA DESERT STORM CBW ACTIVITY LOG, 25 FEBRUARY 1991
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
DESERT STORM
ACTIVITY LOG
25 FEB 91
25 FEB 91
0815 HRS:
DO SOURCE HAS IDENTIFIED A PLACE NEAR JUWARIN
(3047N/04622E) AS A CW STORAGE LOCATION. APPARENTLY IT'S
IDENTIFIED AS SOME TYPE OF STORAGE PLACE ON THE JOG I50I
NH 38-7 MAP AFTER LOOKING THROUGH DRAWERS I CAN'T
FIND IT. OH, WELL. THE COORDINATES ARE SORT OF NEAR EITHER
AN NASIRIYAH OR TALLIL.
0835 HRS:
MY PUNY BRAIN SEEMS TO REMEMBER THAT THERE WERE DECON
VEHICLES SEEN AT AN NASIRIYAH SHORTLY AFTER IT WAS BOMBED. CALL
NPIC TO CHECK
SAYS THAT ON 17 JAN TWO
DECON VEHICLES WERE PRESENT AT AN NASIRIYAH. YESTERDAY,
THERE'S INFO THAT HELICOPTERS WERE PRESENT AT THE AN NASIRIYAH
STORAGE AREA. ANALYSIS: MAYBE WE'VE FINALLY FOUND A CW
STORAGE LOCATION!
94757:94757
1.5C
G DID THEY STAY' WHAT
ACTIONS WERE TAKEN; ETC. AGREED TO SUBMIT A REQUEST FOR
THE INFORMATION.
1.5(c)
94741:94741
ACITY 220 LITRES; EQUIPPED
WITH INTERNAL BURSTER FILLED WITH RDX AND IMPACT FUSE
CONDITION: UNDER DEBRIS; DESTROYED
NO: 4
LOCATION: MUHAMMADIYAT
AGENT: MUSTARD GAS
MUNITION: LD-250 SERIAL BOMB
QTY: 200
DESCRIPTION: LOCALLY PRODUCEDcia_94768_94768_03.txt 664 164 36 1255 6322664762 7274 Subject: SUBJ: RECORD OF PHONE CALL, 20 NOVEMBER 1991
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
SPOKE WITH CAPT AT G2 OFFICE, FT STEWART, GA, HOME OF
24TH MECH INF DIV. WANTED ME TO PASS ON INFORMATION REGARDING
CW MUNITION AT TALL AL LAHM AMMO DEPOT IN SOUTHERN IRAQ. I REQUESTED
THAT ANY INFORMATION REGARDING U.S./COALITION FORCES AT THIS FACILITY DURING
OP. D-S. BE FORWARDED TO ACIS.
1.5(c)
94768:94768
ORDINATES ARE SORT OF NEAR EITHER
AN NASIRIYAH OR TALLIL.
0835 HRS:
MY PUNY BRAIN SEEMS TO REMEMBER THAT THERE WERE DECON
VEHICLES SEEN AT AN NASIRIYAH SHORTLY AFTER IT WAS BOMBED. CALL
NPIC TO CHECK
SAYS THAT ON 17 JAN TWO
DECON VEHICLES WERE PRESENT AT AN NASIRIYAH. YESTERDAY,
THERE'S INFO cia_94781_94781_19.txt 666 164 36 4723 6322700474 7265 SUBJECT: SUBJ: INTERNAL MEMORANDUM REQUESTING INFORMATION TO SUPPORT
STUDY OF POTENTIAL EXPOSURE ISSUES, 13 SEPTEMBER 1995
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
13 SEP 95
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION TO SUPPORT DESERT
STORM "FALLOUT STUDY"
MY STUDY INTO THE POTENTIAL FALLOUT FROM DAMAGED OR
DESTROYED IRAQI CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IS FOCUSING ON THE TALL
AL LAHM STORAGE DEPOT (304700N0462615E), WHICH IS THE ONLY
SITE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ AT WHICH UNSCOM FOUND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. UNFORTUNATELY, AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, SIGNIFICANT
GAPS EXIST IN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHEN THESE WEAPONS
ARRIVED AND WHEN THEY COULD HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. BECAUSE THIS
FACILITY WAS NOT IDENTIFIED AS A CW STORAGE FACILITY UNTIL
LATE 1991, LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF THIS
FACILITY AND WHAT TRANSPIRED THERE DURING OPERATION DESERT
STORM.
I HAVE IDENTIFIED SOME KEY QUESTIONS (PRESENTED BELOW) THAT
I BELIEVE DOD IS BEST ABLE TO ADDRESS. I REQUEST THAT YOU
IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE POINT-OF-CONTACT AT DOD AND FORWARD
THESE QUESTIONS TO THAT PERSON:
DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM, WERE COALITION AIR ATTACKS
CONDUCTED AGAINST THE TALL AL LAHM STORAGE DEPOT? IF SO,
WHAT ORDNANCE WAS DROPPED ON WHICH DAYS? WHAT DAMAGE
RESULTED FROM THESE ATTACKS?
DURING THE GROUND PHASE OF DESERT STORM, DID COALITION
GROUND FORCES FIRE ARTILLERY OR OTHER WEAPONS AT THE TALL
AL LAHM DEPOT? IF SO, WHAT ORDNANCE WAS USED? WHEN DID
THIS OCCUR, AND HOW CLOSE WERE COALITION UNITS AT THE
TIME(S) OF ATTACK? WHAT WAS THE RESULTING DAMAGE?
DID COALITION FORCES OCCUPY THE TALL AL LAHM DEPOT AT THE
CONCLUSION OF DESERT STORM? IF SO, WHEN DID TROOPS FIRST
OCCUPY THE DEPOT, AND WHEN DID THEY WITHDRAW? WHICH UNITS
OCCUPIED OR WERE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THIS DEPOT? WAS
ANY DEMOLITION OF BUILDINGS, MUNITIONS, OR OTHER MATERIEL
CONDUCTED BY COALITION TROOPS WHILE THE FACILITY WAS UNDER
THEIR CONTROL? IF SO, WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF THIS
ACTIVITY? IN WHAT CONDITION WAS THE DEPOT (SPECIFICALLY
ANY BUILDINGS, BUNKERS, AND REVETMENTS THERE) WHEN FIRST
OCCUPIED BY THE COALITION? WERE THERE ANY CREDIBLE
DETECTIONS OF CW AGENTS AT THIS FACILITY AT THE TIME IT
WAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF COALITION FORCES?
1.5(C)
94781:94781
L
NO: 9
LOCATION: SADDAM AND QADISIYAH AIcia_94784_94784_21.txt 664 164 36 5757 6322676020 7271 SUBJECT: SUBJ: INTERNAL MEMORANDUM ON PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS'
ILLNESSES, 30 MAY 1995
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE: 30-05-95 10:23:18
SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS' ILLNESSES
REF: EMPLOYEE BULLETIN 0003-95, DTD 19 MAY 1995
I. THE FOLLOWING MAY OR MAY NOT BE PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT, BUT IS
FORWARDED IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR AN AGENCY PERSON WITH INFORMATION
THAT MIGHT BEAR ON POSSIBLE CAUSES OF GULF WAR SYNDROME.
2. AN INSPECTION TEAM UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
COMMISSION (UNSCOM)--UNSCOM 29/CHEMICAL DESTRUCTION 1--VISITED IRAQ
23 FEB-22 MAR 92 TO SUPERVISE THE DESTRUCTION OF SARIN-FILLED 122 MM ROCKETS.
THE SITE AT WHICH THE ROCKETS HAD BEEN STORED IS CALLED KHAMISIYAH BY THE
IRAQIS, AND IS KNOWN TO THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS TALL AL LAHM
AMMUNITION STORAGE FACILITY. DURING THEIR PERIOD IN IRAQ, THE IRAQIS TOLD THE
INSPECTION TEAM THAT MUCH OF THE DESTRUCTION AT THE KHAMISIYAH SITE HAD
BEEN CAUSED BY COALITION FORCES WHO HAD OCCUPIED THE SITE
, BUT THE INSPECTORS THOUGHT IRAQ MIGHT SIMPLY HAVE GATHERED THE
ROCKETS HERE AND ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY THEM THEMSELVES. UNSCOM
REQUESTED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE US ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
ANY COALFILCH FORCES WHO HAD BEEN IN THAT AREA.
THE
CABLE ON THIS TEAM'S ACTIVITIES NOTED THAT THE TEAM "...REQUESTED DETAILS
PERTAINING TO COALITION FORCES' ACTIVITIES AT THIS SITE: WHO WAS THERE;
WHEN WERE THEY THERE; HOW LONG DID THEY STAY; WHAT ACTIONS WERE
TAKEN; ETC."
3. A DOD INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT-IIR 6 021 0099 92/CHEMICAL ROCKET
DESTRUCTION IN KHAMISIYAH--PROVIDED DETAILS OF THE TEAM'S DESTRUCTION
ACTIVITY AND PROVIDED COORDINATES FOR THE KHAMISIYAH FACILITY AND THE
NEARBY DESTRUCTION SITES. THE IIR ALSO FORWARDED A SKETCH MAP AND AN
ANNOTATED MAP EXTRACT DEPICTING THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE DESTRUCTION SITES.
4. IN MID-MAY, I PREPARED A REQUEST TO DOD FOR THE INFORMATION DESIRED BY
UNSCOM. DOD NEVER RESPONDED TO THE REQUEST. I HAVE SEARCHED WITHOUT SUCCESS
THROUGH MY OWN AND
THE OFFICE'S FILES FOR A COPY OF THIS REQUEST TO DOD. ·
5. PRIOR TO MAY 1991, I HAD
SERVED AS SENIOR ANALYST WITH THE CURRENT ANALYSIS BRANCH OF THE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER (JIC) IN THE PENTAGON. AS ALL ARE AWARE, THE THREAT
OF IRAQI USE OF CW OR BW WEAPONS WAS A HIGH PRIORITY DURING THE
PREPARATIONS FOR AND THE CONDUCT OF DESERT STORM. IN MY CAPACITY IN THE JIC,
I NEVER CAME ACROSS A SINGLE INSTANCE OF PROVEN CW OR BW USE OR DISCOVERY
ANYWHERE IN THE ACTIVE THEATER OF OPERATIONS.
6. I HAVE BEEN CONNECTED CONTINUOUSLY WITH THIS ACTIVITY SINCE MAY 91
COPIES OF THE TWO REPORTS CITED ABOVE ARE AVAILABLE FROM ME IF THEY
MIGHT BE OF USE TO YOU.
1.5(C)
94784:94784
NORMAL
NO: 11
cia_95224_95224_09.txt 664 164 36 37155 6322667431 7276 Subject: SUBJ: IRAN-IRAQ: CHEMICAL WARFARE CONTINUES, NOVEMBER 1986
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
IRAN-IRAQ: CHEMICAL
WARFARE CONTINUES
AN INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
NOVEMBER 1986
Iran-Iraq: Chemical Warfare CONTINUES
Key Judgments
Information available
as of October 1986
was used in this report.
Reliable reporting indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons
(CW) against Iran numerous times since its first use of the blister agent
mustard in August 1983. More recently, Iraq used CW, including nerve
agents, throughout the February-March 1986 Iranian offensives, causing
Iran to suffer about 8,000 CW-related casualties. Although CW use in
these offensives has been heavier than in previous years, it has had a less
definitive effect on the course of battle. This decrease in effectiveness has
resulted from:
- Poor tactical employment.
- Lessened element of surprise.
- Increased Iranian preparedness.
- Possible problems with munitions, agents, and delivery techniques.
Iraq has not yet mastered the tactical use of chemical weapons, and we be-
lieve its proficiency in using these weapons will improve only marginally
with increased experience. Despite the heavy usage, these chemical
weapons have neither stopped the Iranian advance nor ensured a successful
Iraqi counterattack. We doubt that their use will be a major factor in
deciding the outcome of the war.
Iraq now possesses one of the largest chemical weapons inventories in the
Middle East and has the production capacity in place to increase its
stockpile significantly over the next few years. These capabilities provide
Iraq a substantial potential to supply others with chemical warfare agents
and technology. We believe, however, that the current regime in Iraq is un-
likely to become a supplier, but the potential to do so remains.
Because the political costs of continued CW use have been so small, we
doubt that Iraq will abandon its use of chemical weapons in the foreseeable
future. Furthermore, Iraq probably has now made sufficient progress in its
chemical weapons program to render it relatively immune to the foreign
trade restrictions. US and Western nations' efforts to embargo Western
precursor chemicals have not, and probably will not, curtail Iraq's CW
progress.
Iran-Iraq: Chemical
Warfare Continues
The Forecast: Continuation of the Same
We believe Iraq will continue to wage chemical
warfare as it has in the past because Baghdad recog-
nizes that chemical weapons (CW) can create signifi-
cant numbers of casualties. The Iraqi use of these
weapons is unlikely to be a MAJOR FACTOR IN THE
outcome of the war, however.
NONETHELESS, WE EXPECT
Iraq to use INCREASINGLY Greater amounts of agent per
attack in an effort to keep Iranian losses high. Iraq's
continually growing agent production capacity, par-
ticularly of nerve agents, will support such a strategy.
Furthermore, Baghdad's increasing experience with
chemical weapons use should marginally improve its
tactical employment of chemical weapons.
Iraq intends to continue and,
in fact, to expand its CW agent production capability
The Iraqis are becoming more sophisti-
CATED AND SELF-RELIANT in their CW agent research and
production efforts. Iraq probably has now made suffi-
cient progress in its chemical weapons program to
render it relatively immune to foreign trade restric-
tions. US and Western nations' efforts to embargo
Western precursor chemicals probably slowed the
Iraqi chemical warfare program somewhat and im-
posed greater costs, but these efforts have not, and
probably will not, curtail its progress. Most produc-
tion equipment is in place, Iraq Is using numerous
front companies and friendly states to circum-
vent tHe Western embargoes on precursor chemicals.
Moreover, even if the Western embargoes were effec-
tive and IraQ's ability to procure supplies in Western
EUROPE WERE ENDED, we believe Iracl would turn to
FOR SUPPLIES of
all required chemicals
Of significant concern to us are Iraq's long-range
intentions regarding its agent production capacity.
The production units on line or undergoing installa-
tion provide Iraq a substantial potential to supply
chemical warfare agents and technology; however, we
judge it unlikely under the current regime in Iraq.
The increasing number of nations in the Middle East
and elsewhere that possess CW capabilities suggests
that chemical weapons may once again be integrated
into conventional weapons arsenals and that their use
may become viewed as politically acceptable.
Conventional Use of Chemical Warfare
Iraq's Learning Curve
Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons--primarily in
response to Iranian offensive actions--since August
1983. (Iraq had also used tear gas several times during
1982.) In August 1983 Baghdad used a limited
amount of mustard against Iranians in northern Iraq
extensive use of mus-
tard in November of that year caused several hundred
Iranian casualties and was instrumental in stopping
an Iranian attack. Iraq subsequently employed mus-
tard and the nerve agent tabun during the early 1984
Iranian offensive and again during the March 1985
offensive. The 17 March 1984 use of tabun was the
first use anywhere of nerve agents in a conventional
battle. Both mustard and tabun were used by Iraq in
the Val Fair 8 and 9 offensives, which began in
February 1986 (see inset)
Iraq's use of chemical warfare has reflected its overall
defensive strategy. It has employed chemical agents
during Iranian ofFensiVes and in support
of Iraqi counterattacks. Chemical weapons have been
used against Iran's frontline troops to disrupt attacks
during the initial stages of battle. Subsequent use
against frontline and rear-area troop concentrations
caused casualties that stressed Iranian evacuation
capabilities and generally hindered Iranian support
operations.
We have not been able to derive any indicators of
impending CW use.
The Iraqis have not always used their chemical
weapons with great effectiveness. They have used
them when the wind was blowing toward their own
units and during daylight hours when the Iranians
were more likely to be alert. Moreover, because Iran's
major offensive successes usually have occurred dur-
ing the raiNy season, Iraq invariably has had to use its
chemical weapons during unfavorable weather
conditions.
Relying On aerial bombs as its primary means of
delivery has also caused Iraq problems (see inset.) For
reasons of personal security, Iraqi pilots often have
not dropped enough chemical agent at any one time
and place to be militarily effective. In addition, in the
past Iraqi President Saddam Husayn personally dic-
tated tactics, thereby inspiring Iraqi pilots to avoid
loss of their aircraft by dropping their bombs from
high altitudes, particularly over well-defended troop
concentrations. In mid-1986, however, Iraqi pilots
began to fly lower and take more risks in their normal
bombing missions, and this approach may carry over
to chemical attacks.
Reliable information indicates that Iraq's tactics mAy
call for use of more than one agent at a time. Iranian
victims have claimed simultaneous delivery of differ-
ent sizes aND colors of chemical bombs, presumably
with different agent fills. Some Western medical
personnel believe tHe symptoms of the victims support
simultaneous exposure to two or more different
agents. The UN investigating team confirmed that
mustard agent (shown by chemical analysis to be 95
percent pure) and tabun were used in the Val Fajr 8
and 9 offensives.
Utility Assessment: A Mixed Result
Despite the success of Iraq's initial use of chemical
warfare during battles in 1983 and its gradually
increasing familiarity with using chemical weapons,
the effectiveness of its chemical attacks has been
decreasing. This decrease has resulted from:
- Poor tactical employment.
- The lessened element of surprise.
- Increased Iranian preparedness.
- Possible technical problems with munitions, agents,
and delivery techniques that the Iraqis are only now
beginning to correct.
For example, despite heavy usage during the Val Fair
offensives--we estimate 100 or more metric tons--
chemical weapons neither stopped the Iranian ad-
vance nor ensured a successful Iraqi counterattack.
Nonetheless, the use of chemical weapons has had a
major impact on the character of the war.
decontamination, by ambulance, helicopter, aircraft,
or other available meanS. A Iranian
reports that, while evacuating CW casualties from an
attack in March, the Pilots wore protective
masks but not protective suits. In this instance none of
the evacuation team were alleged to have been affect-
ed by the chemical agent, nor was any effort made to
Decontaminate the helicopters. This fact indicates a
low level of contamination or possibly the use of a
nonPersistent agent.
CW Production Capabilities: Developing Apace
Iraq: Independent and Sophisticated
Iraq probably now possesses the largest chemical
weapons capability in the Middle East and has the
capacity to increase its stockpile significantly over the
next few years. This has been accomplishED despite
Western diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions
against acquisition of requisite materials.
Analysis and modeling of
Iraq's production facility lead us to estimate that Iraq
is currently producing at least 6 tons per day of the
blister agent mustard, between 1 and 2 tons per day of
the nerve agent tabun, and limited amounts of the
nerve agent saRin. In addition, it is researching pro-
duction of the nerve agents soman, VG, and VX, AND
the psyChochemicals BZ and EA3443.
Iraq's CW production facility is near the town of
Samarra, northwest of Baghdad. Over the past year,
four new CW agent production facilities were coM-
pleted at the SamaRrA complex. These facilities prob-
ably are for the production of mustard, tabun, and
possibly saRin. However, they could also be used for
small-scale production of soman, VX, EA3443, or BZ.
We assess that Iraq is developing the capability to
produce indigenously key precursor chemicals and
equipment from raw materials that are not uniquely
associated with CW. This capability would effectively
circumvent any actions--except a total embargo--
designed to constrain the Iraqi CW production pro-
gram.
CW Depots: Growing in Capacity
Iraq has increased its CW munition storage capability
substantially over the last six years.
eight new CW storage bunkers were completed
adjacent to the Samarra' production facility during
1983. The eight bunkers have a total floorspace of
about 4,000 square meters and serve as Iraq's main
CW depot. Each bunker could store at least 200
500-kilogram bombs. In addition, a new generation of
16 bunkers will expand Iraq's capability to store CW
munitions At six airfields and at three ammunition
storage depots that are strategically located through-
out the country.
The only bunker completed to date is at Tallil airfield
in southern Iraq. Finished in early 1986,
The bunker at Tallil has over
500 square METERS OF FLOOR SPACE and could store about
200 500-kilogram bombs.
We expect that the next Iraqi chemical bunkers to be
completed--probably within the next six months--
will be two bunkers at AL Kut airfield and one bunker
each at the Ash Shu'aybah and Nasiriyah ammuni-
tion depOts. Completion estimates for the remaining
seven bunkers are difficult because of the sometimes
lengthy periods of inactivity at the sites.
Only within the last year have the
bunkers at H-3 appeared to be externally complete
and separately secured; the road network to the
bunkers is also coMPLETE.
As early as 1982 analysis indicated that
storage of chemical munitions probably was limited to
one bunker at the Karbala' ammunition depot. Subse-
quent reporting suggests the presence of an additional
one or two bunkers at the Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah
ammunition depots. While we have no confirmation
that CW munitions are stored at the southern forward
ammunition depot located at Tall al Lahm, we con-
clude that CW munitions must be stored there be-
cause of the heavy use of CW by Iraqi ground troops
in the south.
Chemical Agents and Field Employment
In general the amount of agent delivered determines
the extent of contamination and the number of casu-
alties. The persistenCy of the specific agent varies
depending on the type of munition used and the
weather conditions. In all cases, given sublethal doses
of an agent, incapacitation will occur to varying
deGrees.
Blister Agents
Blister agents are primarily used to cause medical
casualties. They may also be used to restrict use of
terrain, to slow movements, and to hamper use of
material and installations. These agents affect the
eyes and tungs and blister the skin. Sulfur mustard
and lewisite are TWo examples of blister agents. Most
blister agents are inSidious in action; there is little or
no pain at the time of exposure except with lewisite,
which causes immediate pain on contact.
Mustard is preferred over lewisite because lewisite
hydrolyzes very rapidly exposure to atmospheric
moisture to FOrm a nonvolatile solid. This conversion
lowers the vapor hazard from contaminated terrain
and decreases the effectiveness of the agent through
clothing. Lewisite is less persistent than mustard;
however, persistency of both agents becomes very
short under humid conditions.
Blood Agents
Blood agents are absorbed into the body primarily by
breathing. They prevent the normal utilization of
oxygen by the cells and cause rapid damagE to body
tissues. Blood agents such as hydrogen cyanide (AC)
and cyanogen chloride are highly volatile and in the
gaseous state dissipate rapidly in air. Because of
their high volatility, these agents are most effective
when surprise can be achieved against troops who do
not have masks or are poorly trained in mask
discipline. In addition, blood agents are ideally suit-
ed for employment on terrain that the user hopes to
occupy within a short time. Blood agents rapidly
degrade the mask filter's effectiveness. Therefore,
these agents could be used in combination with other
agents in an attempt to defeat the mask's protective
capabilities.
Nerve Agents
Nerve agents such as sarin (GB) and tabun (GA) are
members of a class of compounds that are more
Lethal and quicker acting than mustard. They are
organophosphorus compounds that inhibit action of
the enzyme cholinesterase. In suFFIcient concentra-
tion, the ultimate effect of these agents is paralysis of
the respiratory musculature and subsequeNt death.
Nerve agents are extremely rapid acting aNd may be
absorbed through the skin or through the respiratory
tract: Exposure to a lethal dose may cause death
within as LIttle as 15 minutes. These gases are used
when immediate casualties are desired and to create
a short-term respiratory hazard on the battlefield.
Bombs: The Preferred Delivery System
According to an Iraqi MIG-23 pilot, bombs are
dropped in a random pattern from an altitude of
3,000 to 4,000 meters. Examination of bomb craters
showed them to
be 4 meters in diameter and 2 to 3 meters deep, with
debris spread over a 20- to 30-meter radius. Mustard
droplets were detected at distances of I00 to 200
meters from the craters.
In addition to bombs, Baghdad has chemical artillery
shells for its 82-mm and 120-mm mortars and its
130-mm, 152-mm, and I55-mm guns. Furthermore,
Iraq probably has the capability to deliver chemicals
with 122-Mm rockets. Mustard agent has been deliv-
ered by all of these systems, while tabun has been
delivered by aerial bombs only.
1.5(c)
95224:95224
were used in the Val Fajr 8
and 9 offensives.
Utility Assessment: A Mixed Result
Despite the success of Iraq's initial use of chemical
warfare during battles in 1983 and its gradually
increasing familiarity with using chemical weapons,
the effectiveness of its chemical attacks has been
decreasing. This decrease has resulted from:
- Poor tactical employment.
- The lessened element of surprise.
- cia_95618_95618_07.txt 664 164 36 2611 6322667161 7257 Subject: SUBJ: CIA CABLE ON SUSPECTED CHEMICAL STORAGE AREA, 23 FEBRUARY 1991
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
231251Z FEB 91
TO: IMMEDIATE JILE/SAUDI, DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: WNINTEL -- SUSPECTED CHEMICAL STORAGE FACILITY
ACTION REQUIRED: PLS ADVISE IF INFORMATION SHOULD BE SUBMITTED AS INTEL.
1. RECEIVED A VERY UNUSUAL MESSAGE FROM OUR
AMBASSADOR TODAY. COM RETURNED FROM A MEETING
THIS MORNING WITH A HANDDRAWN MAP AND SOME COORDINATES
OF A LOCATION IN IRAQ THAT IS DESCRIBED AS A CHEMICAL WEAPONS
STORAGE FACILITY.
INDICATED THAT THEY HAD OBTAINED IT FROM SOMEONE IN THE IRANIAN
AIR FORCE OR AIR FORCE-RELATED INDUSTRY (IT WAS UNCLEAR TO
COM). ALTHOUGH THE CHAIN OF ACQUISITION SEEMS TENUOUS, ON THE
OFF CHANCE THAT IT IS USEFUL,
WE ARE FORWARDING IT.
2. WE PLOTTED THE COORDINATES AND MATCHED THE DRAWING ON
JOG (AIR) SERIES 1501, SHEET NH 38-7, EDITION 5. THE
COORDINATES ARE (3047N-4622E). ON THIS MAP, THOSE COORDINATES
MATCH UP TO A STORAGE AREA EAST OF JUWARIN, IRAQ. ACCORDING TO
INFORMATION THIS IS A CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORAGE AREA.
PLS ADVISE.
END OF MESSAGE
1.5(c)
95618:95618
ipline. In addition, blood agents are ideally suit-
ed for employment on terrain that the user hopes to
occupy within acia_95621_95621_20.txt 664 164 36 4061 6322675405 7237 Subject: SUBJ: INTERNAL MEMORANDUM DESCRIBING UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT
TALL AL LAHM, 6 SEPTEMBER 1995
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE: 09-06-95 10 29.50 AM
SUBJECT: GULF WAR SYNDROME
TO ACHIEVE ANY MEANINGFUL RESULTS ON THE FALLOUT HAZARD ISSUE, WE
NEED TO SETTLE THE NASLRIYAH/TALL AL LAHM ISSUE THE UN-FOUND PARTIALLY
DESTROYED GB MUNITIONS THERE; THESE POSED THE ONLY POTENTIAL (REALISTIC)
FALLOUT THREAT TO COALITION FORCES THE KEY, THEREFORE, IS IN DETERMINING
WHEN AND HOW THESE MUNITIONS WERE DESTROYED AND WHERE COALITION
TROOPS WERE AT THE TIME THERE ARE A COUPLE OF COMPLICATING ISSUES, THOUGH:
ANALYSIS COULD IDENTIFY (AT LEAST APPROXIMATELY) WHEN STORAGE
BUILDINGS WERE DESTROYED HOWEVER, WE DON'T KNOW THE EXACT LOCATIONS
OF THE DAMAGED MUNITIONS. THE UN INSPECTION TEAM THAT WENT THERE EXPECTED
TO BE TAKEN TO A DIFFERENT SITE AND DIDN'T HAVE LINE DRAWINGS AVAILABLE
WAS ON THAT TEAM BUT WAS IN THE GROUP THAT WENT TO INSPECT THE UNDAMAGED
MUSTARD MUNITIONS. RECORD OF ANY BOMBINGS AT THE PLANT WOULD BE A USEFUL
START IF ALL ATTACKS THERE TOOK PLACE ON THE SAME DAY, FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD
NARROW DOWN THE TIMEFRAME FOR POTENTIAL AGENT RELEASE
COULD HELP BY PROVIDING RECORDS OF WHEN AIR ATTACKS ON THIS FACILITY
OCCURRED AND LETTING US KNOW WHAT HAPPENED WHILE COALITION FORCES OCCUPIED
THAT AREA AT THE END OF THE WAR. THE UNSCOM TEAM THOUGHT THAT DAMAGE AT
THE CW STORAGE AREA LOOKED LIKE DEMOLITION WORK. IF TRUE, THE BIG QUESTION IS,
WHO DID IT--THE COALITION OR THE IRAQIS? I'D LIKE TO KNOW WHAT OUR TROOPS SAW
AND/OR DID IN THE SHORT TIME THEY WERE IN THE AREA.
I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE TOO DIFFICULT TO REQUEST
COULD GIVE US A REASONABLE ANSWER I'M NOT AS SURE ABOUT TASKING
FOR INFO BUT I'II LET YOU WORRY ABOUT THAT.
CC:
1.5(C)
95621:95621
ERTAINTIES ABOUT
TALL AL LAHM, 6 SEPTEMBER 1995
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE: 09-06-95 10 29.50 AM
SUBJECT: GULF WAR SYNDROME
TO ACHIEVE ANY MEANINGFUL RESULTS ON THE FALLOUT HAZARDcia_95626_95626_08.txt 664 164 36 1652 6322667264 7266 Subject: SUBJ: REPORT IRAQI CW STORAGE LOCATIONS, AUGUST 1988
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
Subject: The Following Excerpt is from a Reliable
Intelligence Report on the iraqi CW Production and
Stockpile Levels. The Information was Obtained
and Disseminated by CIA in August 1988.
As of early 1988, Iraqi artillery shells, bombs, and
rockets loaded with chemical warfare (CW) materials were
stored either at Samarra, or in a large ammunition dump near
the town of Muhammadiyat. This facility was located about
12 kilometers outside of Baghdad. Additionally, 122mm
rockets temporarily were stored at the air base in Kirkuk
for further transport to Sulaymaniyah.
1.5(c)
95626:95626
TELY) WHEN STORAGE
BUILDINGS WERE DESTROYED HOWEVER, WE DON'T KNOW THE EXACT LOCATIONcia_95627_95627_11.txt 664 164 36 1627 6322671334 7255 Subject: SUBJ: FIRST IDENTIFICATION OF TALL AT LAHM, 1976
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
NEW WORKSHEET
DATA ENTRY
0445-30
SUGGESTED SERIES NUMBER VALIDATED
NO BE NAME OF TARGET (38 SPACES) COUN
$$$0445-30 $DA0006 TALL AL LAHM AMMO DEPOT $12$
DATE
7609
$G$DES: 2.4 nm EAST OF TALL AL LAHM AND 6.5 NM SOUTH OF SUG ASH SNUYK THE
AMMO DEPOT CONSISTS OF AMMO STORAGE BUNKERS UNDER CONSTRUCTION,
CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT BUILDINGS, VEHICLE SHEDS, AND NUMEROUS PIECES
OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AROUND THE AREA.
1.5(c)
95627:95627
1.5(c)
95626:95626
TELY) WHEN STORAGE
BUILDINGS WERE DESTROYED HOWEVER, WE DON'T KNOW THE EXACT LOCATIONcia_95629_95629_10.txt 664 164 36 3204 6322670661 7253 Subject: SUBJ: REPORT MENTIONING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT KHAMISYAH, MAY 1986
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
SUBJECT:
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS FROM THE LAST PAGES OF A LENGTHY
OFFICIAL IRAQI DOCUMENT REGARDING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS'
PRODUCTION PLANTS. IT WAS WRITTEN IN LATE 1985 AND OBTAINED BY
THE CIA IN MAY 1986
ARTILLERY GRENADES
A. 3,975 155MM MUSTARD LOADED ARTILLERY GRENADES HAVE BEEN ISSUED
(FROM JUNE 1984 TO MARCH 1985) TO AL-KHAMISIYAH WAREHOUSES. WE DO NOT
HAVE OFFICIAL DATA ABOUT USING THIS QUANTITY BY THE THIRD ARMY CORPS. THE
WAREHOUSES CURRENTLY HAVE 6,293 150MM MUSTARD BOMBS, ENOUGH TO MEET
FRONT DEMANDS FOR FOUR DAYS ON A 15-MINUTE MISSION. THIS IS BASED ON 155MM
AUSTRIAN ARTILLERY BATTALIONS (FIVE BATTALIONS) ASSIGNED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
SUPPOSING THAT ALL THESE BATTALIONS ARE ASSIGNED TO A CORPS SECTOR, THEY CAN FIRE
1,620 BOMBS IN 15 MINUTES, THE TIME REQUIRED TO FIRE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
IF THE NEED TO USE 155MM SARIN BOMBS SHOULD ARISE, 857 BOMBS CAN BE
LOADED WITH END PRODUCT FROM AVAILABLE SUPPLIES (3,000 LITERS) IN THREE DAYS IN
THREE SHIFTS A DAY (EIGHT HOURS A SHIFT). IN ADDITION, 12,571 155MM SARIN
BOMBS CAN BE LOADED IN THE NEXT FIVE MONTHS (USING 44,000 LITERS OF SARIN TO
BE PRODUCED DURING THESE MONTHS) OR AN AVERAGE OF 2,514 BOMBS A MONTH.
THIS QUANTITY IS WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF THE FIVE ARTILLERY BATTALIONS AND WITHIN
THE LOADING TIME.
1.5(c)
95629:95629
HT THAT DAMAGE AT
THE CW STORAGE AREA LOOKED LIKE DEMOLITION WORK. IF TRUE, THE BIG QUESTION IS,
WHO DID IT--THE COALITION OR THE IRAQIS? I'D LIKE TO KNOW WHAT OUR TROOPS SAW
AND/OR DID IN THE SHORT TIME THEY WERE IN THE AREA.
I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE TOO DIFFICULT TO REQUEST
COULD GIVE US A REASONABLE ANSWER I'M NOT AS SURE ABOUT TASKING
FOR INFO BUT I'II LEcia_95630_95630_18.txt 666 164 36 6340 6322677746 7264 SUBJECT: SUBJ: CIA BRIEFING TO NSC ON STUDY OF POTENTIAL EXPOSURES, 26 JANUARY 1991
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
26 JAN 96
ONGOING CIA STUDY OF
POTENTIAL FOR EXPOSURE TO CBR
AGENTS DURING THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WHY STUDY CBR EXPOSURE?
RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF 2 CIA
EMPLOYEES
CONTINUING EFFORT TO PROVIDE INDEPENDENT,
COMPREHENSIVE, DEFENSIBLE REVIEW OF
INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT USG EFFORTS BY:
- REVIEWING NEW INTELLIGENCE AND
SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION
- REVISITING CIA ASSESSMENTS
STUDY INCLUDES
INFORMATION SURFACED BY CIA'S SPECIAL
SEARCH AND DECLASSIFICATION EFFORT.
LATEST UNSCOM INFO
REEVALUATION OF FALLOUT MODELS.
STUDY INCLUDES (CONT):
NON-CLASSICAL AGENTS OR USE
INTEL ON GULF WAR HAZARDS
INTELLIGENCE ON NON-US ILLNESSES
IRAQI CW INTENT
STUDY USES FOR POINTING
PURPOSES:
VETERAN MEDICAL DATA
DOD OPERATIONAL LOGS
VETERAN TESTIMONIALS
BUT, NO COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OR INVESTIGATION.
INTERIM REPORT OUTLINE
PAPER WILL COVER MAIN ASSESSMENTS ON USE,
LOCATION, INTENT, FALLOUT, NOVEL AGENTS.
EXTENSIVE COVERAGE IN APPENDICES OF CBR
PROGRAMS, MUNITIONS LOCATION, INTEL REPORT
CREDIBILITY, AND SCUD PROPELLANTS.
IF SIGNIFICANTLY DECLASSIFIED WILL AID IN
RESOLVING SOME PUBLIC CONCERNS.
PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS
NO CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF EXPOSURE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
KTO PRIOR TO AIR WAR
BUT REMOVED
FALLOUT INCAPABLE OF
REACHING TROOPS
CZECH DETECTIONS
ENIGMATIC
JAN 96 ASSESSMENTS
NO CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF EXPOSURE
NEW INTEL SOURCES: ADD'L HUMINT,
UNSCOM INFO
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
KTO BUT PULLED TO
ABOUT 31N BY AIR WAR
NEW INTEL SOURCES: ADD'L HUMINT,
UNSCOM INFO
FALLOUT INCAPABLE OF
REACHING TROOPS
NEW INTEL SOURCES: ADD'L MODELING USING
WEATHER FRONTS
CZECH DETECTIONS
ENIGMATIC
NEW INTEL SOURCES: ADD'! MODELING USING
WEATHER FRONTS
SOME ISSUES
POSSIBILITY OF EXPOSURE DUE TO EOD
KUWAIT GIRL' S SCHOOL TANK
RESIDUAL RFNA IN SCUDS
NOVEL AGENTS
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
IDENTIFICATION
UNSCOM EXPERIENCE AND HUMINT INDICATE
LACK OF CHEMICAL WEAPON MARKINGS.
IRAQ TOLD UNSCOM INSPECTORS THAT US
EOD PERSONNEL DESTROYED GB ROCKETS AT
TALL AL LAHM IN KTO.
POSSIBILITY OF LOCALIZED EXPOSURE HAZARD
FROM SUCH DESTRUCTION.
KUWAIT GIRL'S SCHOOL TANK
FOCAL POINT OF CBW EXPOSURE ADVOCATES
WE BELIEVE THAT TANK CONTAINED RFNA
SAMPLING COULD FURTHER CLARIFY ISSUE
EXPOSURE TO SCUD PROPELLANT
STRONG CORRELATION FOUND BETWEEN
TESTIMONIES OF SOME VETERANS ON SCUDS AND
KNOWN AL HUSAYN EVENTS.
IMMEDIATE VETERAN SYMPTOMS MATCH
TEXTBOOK CHARACTERISTICS OF RFNA EXPOSURE.
DOD IS INVESTIGATING FURTHER.
NOVEL CBR AGENTS
EXCEPT PCP, CW INFO COVERS CLASSIC AGENTS
BW RESEARCH INCLUDED SEVERAL NOVEL AGENTS
RADIOLOGICAL WORK RESEARCH ONLY
NO INFO ON EFFORT TO PRODUCE ILLNESSES
CONSISTENT WITH THOSE OF GW VETERANS
CONTINUING INFORMATION FLOW AND IRAQ'S
STORY INCOMPLETE
STUDY PLANS
INTERIM REPORT DUE OUT EARLY SPRING.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS DEFERRED PENDING
COMPLETION OF SEARCHES, COLLECTION, AND
ANALYSIS.
95630:95630
1.5C
N IS,
WHO DID IT--THE COALITION OR THE IRAQIS? I'D LIKE TO KNOW WHAT OUR TROOPS SAW
AND/OR DID IN THE SHORT TIME THEY WERE IN THE AREA.
I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE TOO DIFFICULT TO REQUEST
COULD GIVE US A REASONABLE ANSWER I'M NOT AS SURE ABOUT TASKING
FOR INFO BUT I'II LEcia_95631_95631_14.txt 664 164 36 3034 6322673260 7240 Subject: SUBJ: IRAQ'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687,
AUGUST 1991
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
Directorate of
Intelligence
Iraq's Noncompliance With UN
Security Council Resolution 687
An Intelligence Assessment
August 1991
We know through reporting that
chemical weapons have been stored at three
declared siteS---Samarra', Muhammadiyat, and
Khamisiyah---for several years. The latter TWO
SITES were not in Iraq's initial declaration to the UN
but were declared shortly thereafter. By 1988,
SAMARRA' and Muhammadiyat reportedly were two
of Iraq's principal CW storage sites. Chemical
weapons were stored at the KhamiSiyah site as
early as 1985. three
other storage sites declared by Iraq contained S-
shaped special storage bunkers, all but one of
which was damaged or destroyed by Coalition
AIRSTRIKES.
Khamisiyah Storage Facility
Iraq declared that chemical munitionS are stored at
the Khamisiyah storage facility, near the city of An
Nasiriyah. REPORTING indicated in
1986 THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND MUSTARD munitions were
stored at the Khamisiyah site. The Iraqi
coordinates are close to those of a storage facility
near An Nasiriyah that contains ONE S-shaped
bunker. The bunker was extensively damaged by
Coalition attacks.
1.5(C)
95631:95631
ATION FLOW AND IRAQ'S
STORY INCOMPLETE
STUDY PLANS
INTERIM REPORT DUE OUT EARLY SPRING.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS DEFERRED PENDING
COMPLETION OF SEARCHES, COLLECTION, AND
ANALYSIS.
95630:95630
1.5C
N IS,
WHO DID IT--THE COALITION OR THE IRAQIS? I'D LIKE TO KNOW WHAT OUR TROOPS SAW
AND/OR DID IN THE SHORT TIME THEY WERE IN THE AREA.
I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE TOO DIFFICULT TO REQUEST
COULD GIVE US A REASONABLE ANSWER I'M NOT AS SURE ABOUT TASKING
FOR INFO BUT I'II LEcia_95763_75711_22.txt 666 164 36 2031 6322710122 7225 SUBJECT: SUBJ: THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ
(UNSCOM) HAS MADE AVAILABLE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION DERIVED
FROM THE UNSCOM 9/CW-2 (15 TO 22 AUGUST 1991) MISSION
INSPECTION REPORT:
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
ANNEX R
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY UNSCOM 9 ON CHEMICAL AGENTS
AND SYNTHETIC PROCESSES
120
WHY WAS THE ORIGINAL DECLARATION OF 155-MM MUSTARD SHELLS
SO INCOMPLETE?
A: THE DECLARATION FOR KHAMISIYAH WAS NOT MADE UNTIL AFTER
18 APRIL BECAUSE ON 18 APRIL KHAMISIYAH WAS STILL IN THE HANDS
OF THE COALITION FORCES. WE DID NOT KNOW UNTIL AFTER THEIR
WITHDRAWAL HOW MANY MUSTARD GAS SHELLS HAD BEEN LEFT THERE, IF ANY.
(COMMENT: EVEN IF CORRECT, THIS DOESN'T, OF COURSE, ANSWER
THE QUESTION IN RELATION OF THE MUSTARD SHELLS AT FALLUJAH)
1.5(C)
95763:75711
f
which was damaged or destroyed by Coalition
AIRSTRIKES.
Khamisiyah Storage Facility
Iraq declared that chemical munitionS are stored at
the Khamisiyah storage facility, near the city of An
Nasiriyah. REPORTING indicated in
1986 THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND MUSTARD munitions were
stored at the Khamisiyah site. The Iraqi
coordinates are close to those of a storage facility
near An Nasiriyah that contains ONE S-shaped
bunker. The bunker was extensively damaged by
Coalition attacia_95968_95968_01.txt 664 164 36 7604 6322663075 7300 Subject: SUBJ: WORKING PAPER MENTIONING POSSIBLE CW EXPOSURE, 1992
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
1. REQUEST DETAILS PERTAINING TO COALITION GROUND FORCE ACTIVTIES
AT THE FOLLOWING SITES:
AN NASIRIYAH DEPOT SOUTHWEST (3057N04611E)
TALL AL LAHM STORAGE AREA (3047N04627E) (AKA KHAMISIYAH
STORAGE AREA)
KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE (3044N04625E)
PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON WHO WAS THERE (WHAT UNIT(S); WHEN
WERE THEY THERE; HOW LONG DID THEY STAY; WHAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN
(I.E., DID THEY COLLECT AND EXPLOSIVELY DESTROY ANY MUNITIONS? IF
SO, WHERE, WHEN, DETAILS? DID THEY PLACE CHARGES IN/AROUND STORAGE
BUNKERS AND DETONATE THEM?); ETC
2. JUSTIFICATION. THE IRAQIS TOLD UNSC0M 29, AS THEY HAD TOLD
UNSCOM 20, THAT THE DESTRUCTION AT KHAMISIYAH STORAGE AREA AND AT
THE KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE HAD BEEN CAUSED BY COALITION FORCES
WHO HAD OCCUPIED THE AREA UNSCOM 20
CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS PROBABLE THAT THE IRAQIS HAD GATHERED
THE ROCKETS HERE AND ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY THEM THEMSELVES
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO CONFIRM OR REFUTE THE
IRAQI CLAIM WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ASSIST THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S
EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY IRAQ'S CW STORES.
3. BACKGROUND:
A. IN ITS DECLARATION TO THE U.N. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS HOLDINGS,
IRAQ DECLARED THAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WERE STORED AT KHAMISIYAH,
NEAR AN-NASIRIYAH. THE SPECIFIC LOCATION WAS NOT GIVEN. THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IDENTIFIED AN-NASIRIYAH DEPOT SOUTHWEST AS
THE PROBABLE FACILITY TO WHICH IRAQ REFERRED.
B. UNSC0M 17 VISITED KHAMISIYAH ON 24 OCT 91 AT THE REQUEST OF
UNSCOM NEW YORK TO CHECK ON REPORTED MOVEMENT OF MUNITIONS THAT
WERE TAKING PLACE. UNSCOM 17 REPORTED THAT THE IRAQIS ADMITTED
MOVING UP TO 20 TRUCKS PER DAY OF RECOVERABLE CONVENTIONAL
MUNITIONS FROM THE DAMAGED STORAGE BUNKERS AT KHAMISIYAH.
ACCORDING TO ONE OF THE UNSCOM 17 PERSONNEL WHO VISITED KHAMISIYAH,
THE REPORT DID NOT STATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SENIOR IRAQI MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE TOLD UNSCOM 17 THAT CW MUNITIONS WERE
STORED OUTSIDE THE KHAMISIYAH STORAGE AREA PROPER. UNSCOM 17 DID
NOT INSPECT THE AREA BUT DID REPORT THAT LEAKING CHEMICAL AGENT WAS
NOTICEABLE.
C. UNSCOM 20 VISITED THE KHAMISIYAH STORAGE SITE ON 26 AND 27 OCT
91. THEY STATED THAT BINARY SARIN-FILLED 122MM ROCKETS ALONG WITH
THEIR ASSOCIATED WOODEN CRATES, APPARENTLY SALVAGED FROM WHAT THE
IRAQIS REFERRED TO AS WAREHOUSE 73 AT THE KHAMISIYAH STORAGE AREA,
HAD BEEN PLACED IN FOUR PILES IN A LARGE PIT OUTSIDE THE KHAMISIYAH
STORAGE AREA PROPER; I.E., AT KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE.
(WAREHOUSE, OR BUNKER, 73 IS LOCATED ABOUT 3 KM FROM THE
HEADQUARTERS BUILDING AT KHAMISIYAH STORAGE AREA. IT IS A STANDARD
AMMUNITION BUNKER OF SURFACE CONSTRUCTION WITH EARTHEN BLAST
PROTECTION ON THE SIDES. IT IS COMPLETELY DESTROYED.) NO MARKINGS
TO IDENTIFY THE ROCKETS AS CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WERE NOTED. THE
WOODEN BOXES APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN PILED UP WITH EXPLOSIVES
UNDERNEATH AND BLOWN TO PIECES. THERE WERE REMAINS OF VARIOUS
OTHER CONVENTIONAL ROCKETS AND OTHER MILITARY-TYPE LITTER IN THE
PIT EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH U.S.
MILITARTY DEMOLITIONS WAS DISCOVERED.
D. UNSCOM 29 SPENT THE PERIOD 23 FEB - 22 MAR 92 AT KHAMISIYAH CW
STORAGE SITE, DESTROYING THE 122MM BINARY SARIN-FILLED ROCKETS.
THEY FOUND ADDITIONAL ROCKETS STREWN AROUND THE SITE AND BURIED IN
THE SAND BANKS BETWEEN THE SITE AND THE CANAL TO ITS SOUTH.
4. COMMENTS. THERE IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT COALITION.
(U.S.) GROUND FORCES DESTROYED BUNKERS OR PILES OF MUNITIONS
CONTAINING BINARY SARIN-FILLED ROCKETS, WITHOUT KNOWING THAT THE
CHEMICAL ROUNDS WERE PRESENT. RESEARCH TO RESPOND TO UNSCOM'S
QUERY SHOULD ALSO REVEAL IF ANY SUCH EXPOSURE ACTUALLY OCCURRED.
(s)
1.5(c)
95968:95968
m guns. Furthermore,
Iraq probably has the capability to deliver chemicals
with 122-Mm rockets. Mustard agent has been deliv cks.
1.5(C)
95631:95631
ATION FLOW AND IRAQ'S
STORY INCOMPLETE
STUDY PLANS
INTERIM REPORT DUE OUT EARLY SPRING.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS DEFERRED PENDING
COMPLETION OF SEARCHES, COLLECTION, AND
ANALYSIS.
95630:95630
1.5C
N IS,
WHO DID IT--THE COALITION OR THE IRAQIS? I'D LIKE TO KNOW WHAT OUR TROOPS SAW
AND/OR DID IN THE SHORT TIME THEY WERE IN THE AREA.
I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE TOO DIFFICULT TO REQUEST
COULD GIVE US A REASONABLE ANSWER I'M NOT AS SURE ABOUT TASKING
FOR INFO BUT I'II LEcia_95763_75711_22.txt 666 164 36 2031 6322710122 7225 SUBJECT: SUBJ: THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ
(UNSCOM) HAS MADE AVAILABLE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION DERIVED
FROM THE UNSCOM 9/CW-2 (15 TO 22 AUGUST 1991) MISSION
INSPECTION REPORT:
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
ANNEX R
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY UNSCOM 9 ON CHEMICAL AGENTS
AND SYNTHETIC PROCESSES
120
WHY WAS THE ORIGINAL DECLARATION OF 155-MM MUSTARD SHELLS
SO INCOMPLETE?
A: THE DECLARATION FOR KHAMISIYAH WAS NOT MADE UNTIL AFTER
18 APRIL BECAUSE ON 18 APRIL KHAMISIYAH WAS STILL IN THE HANDS
OF THE COALITION FORCES. WE DID NOT KNOW UNTIL AFTER THEIR
WITHDRAWAL HOW MANY MUSTARD GAS SHELLS HAD BEEN LEFT THERE, IF ANY.
(COMMENT: EVEN IF CORRECT, THIS DOESN'T, OF COURSE, ANSWER
THE QUESTION IN RELATION OF THE MUSTARD SHELLS AT FALLUJAH)
1.5(C)
95763:75711
f
which was damaged or destroyed by Coalition
AIRSTRIKES.
Khamisiyah Storage Facility
Iraq declared that chemical munitionS are stored at
the Khamisiyah storage facility, near the city of An
Nasiriyah. REPORTING indicated in
1986 THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND MUSTARD munitions were
stored at the Khamisiyah site. The Iraqi
coordinates are close to those of a storage facility
near An Nasiriyah that contains ONE S-shaped
bunker. The bunker was extensively damaged by
Coalition attacia_95968_95968_01.txt 664 164 36 7604 6322663075 7300 Subject: SUBJ: WORKING PAPER MENTIONING POSSIBLE CW EXPOSURE, 1992
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
1. REQUEST DETAILS PERTAINING TO COALITION GROUND FORCE ACTIVTIES
AT THE FOLLOWING SITES:
AN NASIRIYAH DEPOT SOUTHWEST (3057N04611E)
TALL AL LAHM STORAGE AREA (3047N04627E) (AKA KHAMISIYAH
STORAGE AREA)
KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE (3044N04625E)
PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON WHO WAS THERE (WHAT UNIT(S); WHEN
WERE THEY THERE; HOW LONG DID THEY STAY; WHAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN
(I.E., DID THEY COLLECT AND EXPLOSIVELY DESTROY ANY MUNITIONS? IF
SO, WHERE, WHEN, DETAILS? DID THEY PLACE CHARGES IN/AROUND STORAGE
BUNKERS AND DETONATE THEM?); ETC
2. JUSTIFICATION. THE IRAQIS TOLD UNSC0M 29, AS THEY HAD TOLD
UNSCOM 20, THAT THE DESTRUCTION AT KHAMISIYAH STORAGE AREA AND AT
TH
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