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IIR 6 836 0502 94/REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE

Filename:68360502.94d

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R 161829Z JUN 94
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INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
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INFO RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2//
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5//
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAE//
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHDC//XOXXE//
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUCIAEA/NAIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH//DXIR//
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CITE:  5229.

SERIAL:  (U)  IIR 6 836 0502 94.


/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY
COUNTRY:  (U)  [   (b)(2)   ]

SUBJ:  IIR 6 836 0502 94/REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
DEFENCE COMMITTEE - IMPLEMENTATION OF LESSONS LEARNED
FROM OPERATION GRANBY (U)

WARNING:  (U)  THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.  [  (b)(2)  ]

-------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
-------------------------------------------------------

DOI:  (U)  940614.

REQS:  (U)  [  (b)(2)  ]

SOURCE:  A.  (U) OPEN.  PUBLIC DOCUMENT, "IMPLEMENTATION
OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION GRANBY", LONDON, UK,
940525 (U), IN ENGLISH.  THE FIFTH REPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS DEFENCE SELECT COMMITTEE FOR THE 1993-94 SESSION.

B.  (U) OPEN.  DAILY NEWSPAPER, "THE DAILY TELEGRAPH",
LONDON, UK, 940615 (U), IN ENGLISH.  A RESPECTED, WIDELY
CIRCULATED NATIONAL NEWSPAPER WITH RIGHT OF CENTER VIEWS.

SUMMARY:  (U)  DEFENCE COMMITTEE REPORTS ON PROCEEDINGS
OF 931020 HEARING WITH UKMOD WITNESSES ON UKMOD'S
PROGRESS TOWARDS FIXING GAPS/DEFICIENCIES LEARNED DURING
THE 1991 GULF WAR.  THE COMMITTEE IS DISTURBED BY UKMOD'S
LACK OF ADEQUATE CW PROTECTION FOR BRITISH TROOPS.
ENCLOSURE.

TEXT:

1.  (U) THE ENCLOSED REPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S HOUSE
OF COMMONS DEFENCE SELECT COMMITTEE (HCDC) SETS OUT
RESULTS FROM THE COMMITTEE'S ONGOING INQUIRY ON UKMOD'S
PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING LESSONS LEARNED DURING
OPERATION GRANBY (1991 GULF WAR).  ALTHOUGH HCDC'S PUBLIC
HEARING WITH UKMOD WITNESSES WAS CONDUCTED IN LATE 1993,
HCDC ALLEGES THAT UKMOD OFFICIALS REFUSED TO FULLY
COOPERATE WITH THE COMMITTEE DURING THE INQUIRY.  SOURCE
B NOTES THAT THE HCDC REPORT WAS "DELAYED BY WHAT
IT (HCDC) CALLED EXCESSIVE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SECRECY".
THE COMMITTEE ITSELF EXPLAINED THAT UKMOD REFUSED TO
PROVIDE A COPY OF A REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED BY AIR
CHIEF MARSHAL ((PARRY-EVANS)) "ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS
AN INTERNAL DOCUMENT AND DID NOT REPRESENT THE CONSIDERED
IEWS OF THE DEPARTMENT".  FURTHER, HCDC WRITES THAT "AT
BEST THIS DECISION DEMONSTRATES A FAILURE ON THE PART OF
MOD TO ACCEPT REASONABLE SCRUTINY BY A SELECT COMMITTEE
OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AND AT WORST IT COULD INDICATE
THAT THE MINISTRY IS CONCEALING EMBARRASSING INFORMATION".

2.  (U) IN BROAD TERMS, HCDC'S INQUIRY FOCUSED ON FIVE
AREAS FOR DETAILED EXAMINATION -

    -  READINESS FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

    -  ASPECTS OF THE LAND BATTLE

    -  AIR OPERATIONS

    -  CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

    -  CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

3.  (U) READINESS FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE -
HCDC CONCLUDES THAT IRAQ DID NOT USE EITHER CHEMICAL OR
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DURING THE WAR.

QUOTE

     "THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ USED EITHER CHEMICAL
OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.  IT WAS REPORTED THAT A CZECH
DETECTOR WAS ACTIVATED, BUT THERE IS NO COLLATERAL
EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST IT WAS A VALID DETECTION.  ALTHOUGH
DETECTORS DID REGISTER THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAD BEEN
PRESENT AT IRAQI AMMUNITION DUMPS, THE WEAPONS THEMSELVES
HAD BEEN REMOVED.  WHEN INTERROGATED, SENIOR IRAQI
OFFICERS DENIED THAT THEY PLANNED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AND EMPHASIZED THE DIFFICULTY OF USING SUCH WEAPONS IN A
MOBILE BATTLE; THEY WERE AWARE FROM THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE
IN THE WAR WITH IRAN OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF USING THIS
WEAPON AGAINST AN ENEMY WITHOUT VISITING IT ON FRIENDLY
FORCES AS WELL."

UNQUOTE

NOTWITHSTANDING, HCDC CONCLUDES THAT "THE UNITED KINGDOM
WAS NOT AS READY TO PROTECT ITS FORCES AGAINST CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, NOR AS FAR
ADVANCED IN THIS FIELD AS HAD BEEN WIDELY BELIEVED IN THE
DEFENCE COMMUNITY".  THE FOLLOWING DISCLOSED AS
SHORTCOMINGS AT THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES -

     -  UK LACKED A HAND-HELD ALARM FITTED DETECTOR THAT
COULD DETECT THE WHOLE RANGE OF AGENTS THAT IRAQ WAS
ASSESSED TO HAVE

     -  NO SATISFACTORY CHEMICAL WARFARE SURVEY AND
RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY EXISTED AT THE OUTSET

     -  NO BIOLOGICAL DETECTION SYSTEMS OR RELATED
PROPHYLAXIS AND THERAPY REGIMES AVAILABLE TO COALITION
FORCES

     -  PROTECTIVE CLOTHING WOULD HAVE BEEN A SEVERE
PHYSIOLOGICAL BURDEN UPON PERSONNEL

     -  NO IN-SERVICE MEDIUM SCALE DECONTAMINATION
EQUIPMENT WAS AVAILABLE AT THE OUTSET

     -  THE CRISIS EXPOSED SOME SIGNIFICANT SHORTCOMINGS
IN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENCE AWARENESS AND TRAINING

     -  LIMITED FAMILIARITY WITH NBC EQUIPMENT LED TO
LOSSES AND INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT THROUGHOUT THE LOGISTICS
SYSTEM

IN CONCLUSION, HCDC COMMENDS UKMOD FOR ATTEMPTING TO
RECTIFY DEFICIENCIES NOTED ABOVE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE
DEPARTMENT ESTABLISH "A FOCAL POINT OF MILITARY EXPERTISE
WITHIN THE DEFENCE STAFF CHARGED SPECIFICALLY AND
EXCLUSIVELY WITH CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
OVERSIGHT".

[  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ]



















//IPSP:  (U)  PG 2240; PG 2200; PG 2245; PG 2520; PT
1731//.
//COMSOBJ:  (U)  [  (b)(2)  ]
ADMIN
PROJ:  (U).
INSTR:  (U)  [  (b)(2)  ]
PREP:  (U)  [  (b)(2)  ]
ENCL:  (U)  TO FOLLOW - 1 ENCLOSURE.
DOCUMENT, "IMPLEMENTATION OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM
OPERATION GRANBY" (U), IN ENGLISH, 1 COPY, 102 PAGES,
940525 (U).
ACQ:  (U)  [  (b)(2)  ]
DISSEM:  (U)  FIELD:  [  (b)(2)  ]
WARNING: [  (b)(2)  ]
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