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File: 950727_23400353_91r.txtIIR 2 340 0353 91/IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE (U). Filename:23400353.91r PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 21843 GENDATE: 950504 NNNN TEXT: ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX489 MCN = 91041/05180 TOR = 910411144 RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS1187 0411142- --RUEALGX. ZNY HEADER R 101142Z FEB 91 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEKCCG/USDP-CCC WASHINGTON DC RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP RHEPAAB/TAC IDHS LANGLEY AFB VA//IDHS// RUFTAKA/USA INTEL CENTER HEIDELBERG GE RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY// RUEALGX/SAFE R 231400Z JAN 91 CTG RHWISGG1888 0400709 O 090709Z FEB 91 ALL OT FM CDR 513TH MI BDE FT MONMOUTH NJ//IAM-C-OSD// HERS DISRGD TO RHHMBRA/FICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC//JCSISC// RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC RUCIPFA/CDR 5TH SFGP FT CAMPBELL KY//S-2// RUEOHNA/CDR 82ND ABN DIV FT BRAGG NC//G-2// RUEOHNA/CDR XVIII ABN CORPS FT BRAGG NC//AFZA-DS-P// RUEADWD/DA WASH DC//DAMI-ISH/DAMI-FII// RUEAIIA/CIA NC WASH DC//ECC/CC// RUCIBBA/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//IN// RHIUFAA/USCENTAF FWD HQS ELEMENT//IN// RUETIAA/NSACSS FT MEADE MD//T5151// RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC//DB8/DI/IRAQ/KUWAIT WORKING GP// RUEKJCS/JCS/DIA WASH DC//DB8/JSI// RHIIMAA/CG I MEF//G2/SCIO// RHIIMDD/CG I MEF REAR//G-2/SCIO// RUCKDDA/CG II MEF//J2// RUDHAAA/CDR INSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//IAOPS-H-F// RUEATAC/CDR USAITAC WASH DC//AIAIT-RC// ZEN/ RUEOHNA/CTOCSE XVIII ABN CORPS FT BRAGG NC RUEOAYB/FSTC INTELOPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA//AIFICB/AIFRIB// RHIVHAA/CDR XVIII ABN CORPS FWD RHIVHAA/CMO XVIII ABN CORPS DHAHRAN SA//AFZAOGB-OC// RUCLBFA/CDR III CORPS FT HOOD TX//AFZF-GS// RUCJACC/USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ2-CH// RHCGSRA/COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//G2// RUDCHAA/COMUSARCENT MAIN//G2// RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT FWD//CCJ2-CH// RUWTFHA/CDR USACAC FT LEAVENWORTH KS//ATZL-BC-C-C// RUEOPEM/CDR 201ST MI BN VHFS WARRENTON VA//(IAM-P-I// RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB-PD-CURIN/AEAGB-C-HO// RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2// RUWPFPG/FOSIC PAC PEARL HARBOR HI//OBU// RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASH DC//AIAIT-RC/AIAIT-RWO/AIAIT-SRD// RUCLBWA/COMDT USACML FT MCCLELLEN AL//ATZN-CM-CU// RUEBWJA/INS COINT HQS WASH DC RUDMNOP/NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND MD//DEPT 9 SPEAR// RHIPAAA/NAVCENT//N2// ZEN/ RUDHPCG/CDR PROJECT 2002 WASH DC//DI// RUHGOWA/CG FOURTH MEB//G2// RUHGADY/RLT TWO RUHGJPX/MAG FOUR ZERO RUHGAHM/FOURTH MEB DET ONE RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECMD// RUEORDF/DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD//AFMIC-CR// RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2/M/O// RHIHDAA/COMSOCCENT//J2// RUCLFVA/CG FOURTH MARDIV NEW ORLEANS LA//G2// RUCLFVA/CG FOURTH MAW//G2//NEW ORLEANS LA//G2// RUEDBGA/CMO ARCENT RHIHDAA/AFSOCCENT FWD//J2// RUWTAHA/CDR 1ST INF DIV FT RILEY KS//AFZN-GS// RHIGMFF/CG SECOND MARDIV//G2// RHIGDSC/CG SECOND FSSG//G2// RUCLDNA/CDRINFCTR FT BENNING GA//AZTB-1ST// RUFTFZA/USARCENTSUPCOM//CDR 7TH CORPS// RHSDMIE/ETUT VII CORPS F ZEN/ BT CONTROLS FSTC INTELOPS PASS TO [ (b)(6) ] SERIAL: (U) IIR 2 340 0353 91. COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR), SOVIET UNION (UR), INDIA (IN). SECTION 001 OF 002 /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ BODY SUBJ: IIR 2 340 0353 91/IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE (U). WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DOI: (U) 851200. REQS: (U) T-8C2-2650-01-90; T-8C1-1600-07-90; M-5AX-1620-03-90; G-AIF-1620-01-90; G-AIF-1620-02-90; G-AIF-1620-03-90; S-AIF-D6885. SOURCE: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ][ (b)(7)(D) ] SUMMARY: ONLY NERVE, MUSTARD, AND TEAR AGENTS WERE USED IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. AIRCRAFT DELIVERED NERVE AND BLISTER AGENTS, AND MORTARS DELIVERED TEAR AGENTS. PRIORITY FOR CHEMICAL TARGETTING WAS HEADQUARTERS, THE MAIN RESERVES, ARTILLERY UNITS, MANEUVER TROOPS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE. TEXT: 1. SOURCE REITERATED THAT [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] KNEW OF ON4Y THREE TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS USED IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. THESE WERE LETHAL INCAPACITATING AGENTS WHICH SOURCE FURTHER IDENTIFIED AS BEING NERVE AGENTS WHICH INCLUDED TABUN AND SARIN; BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD; AND A TEAR AGENT IDENTIFIED AS CS. (FLD CMT--SOURCE LATER SAID THE TEAR AGENT WAS CHLOROACETOPHENONE WHICH IS KNOWN AS CN IN THE U.S.) THE NERVE AGENTS USED WERE NONPERSISTENT BUT SOURCE BE4IEVED THE IRAQIS WERE WORKING TO DEVE4OP A MORE PERSISTENT NERVE AGENT. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY AGENTS DESIGNED TO PENETRATE PROTECTIVE CLOTHING OR PROTECTIVE MASKS OR ANY PSYCHOLOGICALLY ACTIVE TYPES OF AGENTS. 2. DELIVERY--AIRCRAFT WERE THE PRIMARY MEANS FOR DELIVERING NERVE AND DLISTER AGENTS WHILE MORTARS WERE USED FOR DELIVERING CN. SOURCE WAS NOT CERTAIN IF 122MM MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (MRL'S) OR OTHER MRL'S WERE USED FOR CHEMICAL DELIVERY, BUT WAS SURE THE FROG SYSTEM WAS NOT USED TO DELIVER CHEMICALS. SOURCE BELIEVED THE IRAQIS WOULD DEVELOP A CHEMICAL WARHEAD FOR SCUD-TYPE MISSILES BECAUSE OF THEIR LONGER RANGE AND MORE STRATEGIC NATURE QN THE BATTLEFIELD. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY ANTITANK WEAPONS (RECOILLESS RIFLE OR RPG) OR LAND MINES WITH CHEMICALS. NO CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH BARRIERS SUCH AS BARQED WIRE OR DITCHES; NAPALM WAS USED IN THIS CASE. (FLD COMMENT--THIS WAS INTERPRETED AS USE IN THE FLAME/FOUGASSE SENSE.) SOURCE HAD NO INFORMATION ON DESCRIPTIONS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS OR MARKINGS ON THEM. IRAQI PERSONNEL WERE NOT GIVEN THIS INFORMATIOM TO ENABLE THEM TO RECOGNIZE OR DEAL WITH DUD IRAQI CHEMICAL MUNITIONS; THEY WERE ONLY TOLD THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD USE CHEMICALS. 3. STORAGE--SOURCE HAD NO INFORMATION ON STORAGE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS OTHER THAN TO MENTION THAT SOME CHEMICAL MUNITIONS MAY HAVE BEEN STORED IN THE BASRAH //3030NO4747E// AREA. WHEN THE MUNITIONS WERE NEEDED BY THE ARTILLERY THEY WERE PROVIDED. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE DETAILS RECAUSE THIS WAS A MATTER FOR THE CHEMICAL SPECIA4ISTS. CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WERE TRANSPORTER IN REGULAR TRANSPORT TRUCKS DELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIAN OR YUGOSLAVIAN MANUFACTURE. WEAPOMS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY SPECIAL CHEMICAL PERSONNEL AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL DURING TRANSPORT. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT STORAGE OF CONVENTIONAL HIGH EXPLOSIVE MUNITIONS EXCEPT THAT THEY WERE STORED IN UNDERGROUND AND/OR EARTH-COVEREO DEPOTS WITH LOCAL DEFENSE PROVIDED BY ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL OR TROOPS IN THE AREA. SOURCE BELIEVED THAT FUSES/DETONATORS WOULD BE STORED SEPARATELY FROM THE MUNITIONS THEMSELVES. AGAIN, THIS WAS AN AREA LEFT TO THE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. 4. CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE GEAR--SOURCE DESCRIBED IRAQI PROTECTIVE MASKS AS HAVING A HOSE AND CANNISTER. COMMANDERS' MASKS WERE FITTED WITH A COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY. (FLD CMT--THESE DESCRIPTIONS FIT THOSE OF STANDARD SOVIET MASKS, THE SHLEM AND K MASKS.) PERSONNEL ALSO HAVE SOVIET-TYPE SUITS. WHEM ASKED ABOUT ANY WEAKNESSES IN THE IRAQI CW CAPABILITY SOURCE SAID THEIR ONLY WEAKNESS WAS THE LEVEL OF TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN MANEUVER UNITS. THESE PERSONNEL WERE NOT WELL-TRAINED. PERSONNEL IN CHEMICAL DEFENSE UNITS WERE WELL-TRAINED. 5. DECONTAMINATION SITES--IRAQI DECONTAMINATION SITES WERE SELECTED BY CHEMICAL SPECIALISTS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF COMMAND. THE PRIORITY OF PERSONNEL TO BE PROCESSED WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS (BEGINNING WITH THE HIGHEST) HEADQUARTERS, THE MAIN RESERVES (WHICH SOURCE BELIEVED ARE CRITICAL IN A BATTLE), ARTILLERY UNITS, MANEUVER TROOPS, AND FINALLY ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS. SOURCE ALSO NOTED THAT THIS COULD BE THE SAME ORDER OF PRIORITY THE IRAQIS WOULD PLACE ON TARGETS THEY WANTED TO ATTACK WITH CHEMICALS. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF DECONTAMINATION SITES INCLUDED THE ESTIMATE OF WHERE THE ENEMY MIGHT EMPLOY CHEMICALS, WEATHER CONDITIONS, AND WHERE PERSONNEL COULD BE BEST PROTECTED. DECONTAMINATION SITES INCLUDED EQUIPMENT AND SPECIALISTS FOR DECONTAMINIATION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT OF THE AFFECTED UNITS. SITES NEARER THE TROOPS (FRONT) WOULD HAVE A LESSER CAPABILITY THAN SITES FURTHER TO THE REAR. ENGINEERS PROVIDED WATER AND SOME SUPPORT IN DIGGING PROTECTIVE AND DRAINAGE TRENCHES. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW OF DECONTAMINATION SITES BEING LOCATED WITH OR NEAR ARTILLERY BATTERIES WHEN THESE UNITS FIRED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. 6. DECONTAMINATION MARKING--CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED AREAS WERE MARKED WITH YELLOW FLAGS. CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS USED R-106 RADIOS. 7. CHEMICAL WARFARE TRAINING--MANY OF THE IRAQI CHEMICAL ADVISORS HAD BEEN TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION. STAFF OFFICERS AND SENIOR COMMANDERS WHO ATTENDED THE IRAQI STAFF COLLEGE AND RECEIVED A MASTERS DEGREE IN MILITARY SCIENCE RECEIVED INSTRUCTION IN CHEMICAL WARFARE. 8. OPERATIONS ORDERS--A SECTION ON THE CHEMICAL THREAT IS NORMALLY INCLUDED IN THE BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS ORDERS. THIS SECTION WAS USUALLY OMITTED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR BECAUSE THE IRANIANS WERE NOT PERCEIVED TO HAVE A CV THREAT. SOURCE BELIEVED THAT THIS SECTION WOULD BE USED IN THE CURRENT SITUATION BECAUSE SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI COMMANDERS WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER A U.S. NUCLEAR AND CHEMICA4 THREAT. 9. CHEMICAL PRODUCTION--SOURCE HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS CAME FROM THE SOVIET UNION. WHEN QUERIED ON THIS SOURCE SAID THIS MAY HAVE BEEN THE CASE EARLY ON BUT TME IRAQIS HAD BEGUN PRODUCING THEIR OWN AGENTS BY 1985. WHILE IN INDIA IN 1986, SOURCE KNEW THAT THE IRAQI MILITARY ATTACHE HAD TALKED WITH AN INDIAN PROFESSOR ABOUT DEVELOPING CHEMICAL AGENTS. 10. IMPRISONMENT OF HEAD OF CHEMICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENT AND ACCUISITION--THE HEAD OF CHEMICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION, GENERAL NAZAR, HAD BEEN SENTENCED TO JAIL RECENTLY (SOMETIME BEFORE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT) ACCORDING TO INFORMATION SOURCE RECEIVED AFTER LEAVING IRAQ. NAZAR WAS TO HAVE SERVED A TWO YEAR SENTENCE BUT WAS RELEASED AFTER SIX MONTHS. THE REASON FOR THE JAIL SENTENCE IS NOT KNOWN. NAZAR, WHO HAD STUDIED IN BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HAD SERVED AS A CHIEF ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND TO SADDAM HUSSEIN , REPORTEDLY THEN RETIRED. THE POSITION AS HEAD OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT, I.E. THE HEAD OF CHEMICAL TROOPS, IS SEPARATE FROM THE HEAD OF DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION. COMMENTS: 1. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 2. (U) QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THIS IIR SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO CDR 513TH MI BDE FT MONMOUTH NJ//IAM-C-OSD//. POC IS [ (b)(6) ]DSN 992-6042/5680/5682/0590, COMMERCIAL (908) 532-6042/5680/5682/0590. //IPSP: PT 1600; PGW2650//. //COMSOBJ: 141; 211//. ADMIN PROJ: (U) 290700. INSTR: (U) US NO. PREP: (U) 2-60001. ACQ: (U) 910121. WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED
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