Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search
File: 950825_68320747_90.txtFilename:68320747.90 PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 39621 GENDATE: 950504 NNNN TEXT: ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX416 MCN = 90226/11955 TOR = 902260848 PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS4245 2260848---RUEALGX. ZNY HEADER P 140848Z AUG 90 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC RUEDADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC RUFTAKA/CDR USAINTELCTRE HEIDELBERG GE RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE RUEKCCG/USDP-CCC WASHINGTON DC RUETIAQ/MPCFTGEORGEGMEADEMD [ b.2. ] RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC RUCLFBA/CTOCSE 18 ABC FT BRAGG NC RUEOHNA/CDR82ABNDIV FT BRAGG NC RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CARA// RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC//IEG// RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2// RUFTAKA/USA INTEL CENTER HEIDELBERG GE RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N24// RHFPRWO/RWO RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN/IV/SP// RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY// RUEALGX/SAFE P 140836Z AUG 90 FM [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ b.2. ] SECTION 01 OF 04 [ b.2. ] [ b.2. ] /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ [ b.2. ]) IRAQ (IZ); . SUBJ: [ b.2. ] VIEWS ON IRAQI CHEMICAL WAFARE [ b.2. ] (U) [ b.2. ] ------------------------------------------------- [ b.2. ] ------------------------------------------------- [ b.2. ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SEVERAL FACTORS WEIGHING IN FAVOR OF ((HUSSEIN)), SHOULD HE ELECT TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. POSSIBLE FACTORS RESTRAINING HUSSEIN WERE ALSO PRESENTED. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY. REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION THAT SUGGESTS THERE ARE FACTORS WEIGHING IN FAVOR OF ((HUSSEIN)) SHOULD HE ELECT TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. TWO POSSIBLE DETRACTORS MAY PREVENT HUSSEIN FROM USING WEAPONS. REPORT TOUCHES ON LIKELY IRAQI OPERATIONAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE MOST LIKELY AGENTS TO BE ENCOUNTERED. THE IRAQIS BEGAN DEVELOPING THEIR DOMESTIC CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY IN 1975-1976. THEY HAVE CONCENTRATED ON ALL ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE -- FROM PRODUCTION, TO EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES, TO PROTECTION. 2. FACTORS IN HUSSEIN'S FAVOR A. WINDS. THE PREVAILING WINDS IN THE AREA OF THE IRAQI-SAUDI BORDER FAVOR IRAQ'S USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, PARTICULARLY IF THE DEFENDING TROOPS MOVE WEST, INLAND FROM POSITIONS NEAR THE ARABIAN GULF COAST. THE PREVAILING WINDS ARE ANTICYCLONIC IN NATURE FROM SUDAN ACROSS THE RED SEA, TURNING EAST TO THE EAST-SOUTHEAST ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA. SOURCE DISPLAYED A MAP WHICH DEPICTED THE PREVAILING WINDS NEARLY PARALLELING THE BORDER. THESE WINDS COUPLE WITH A PREVAILING WESTERLY WIND FROM THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTHWESTERLY WINDS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAN WINDS (FROM SUDAN) ARE VERY DRY. SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE LOW HUMIDITY OF THE AIR MAKES IT CAPABLE OF ACCEPTING/ DISPERSING MORE AGENT. B. GEOGRAPHY. MUCH OF THE AREA BETWEEN IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA IS IN A LOWER-LYING VALLEY. THE SOIL HAS A VERY HIGH CALCIUM CONTENT AND HAS SUCH A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF OTHER MINERALS THAT IT IS UNUSABLE. THUS, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE CONCERN FOR DAMAGING THE ENVIRONMENT. C. TEMPERATURE. AS HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THE HIGH TEMPERATURES COULD REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOLDIERS DONNING NBC GEAR. 3. FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST HUSSEIN. A. AMERICAN RESOLVE. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HUSSEIN, BY NOW, REALIZES AMERICA'S RESOLVE TO PREVAIL IN THE SITUATION. THIS WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON HIS ARMY'S WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT AND POSSIBLY TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS. B. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HUSSEIN WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IF IT MEANT POISONING HIS OWN LANDS AND WATER. THUS, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], IF THE AMERICANS MOVED NORTH IN A "BLITZKRIEG" FASHION, THEREBY OCCUPYING THE RICH AREA IN AND AROUND IRAQ'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS FROM WHICH IRAQ OBTAINS ITS WATER, HUSSEIN WOULD BE RESTRAINED FROM USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- DESIRING NOT TO CONTAMINATE IRAQ'S LIMITED RESOURCE. 4. LIKELY IRAQI EMPLOYMENT TACTICS. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] DID NOT SEE HUSSEIN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AN ALL-OUT, MASSIVE, "ALL-OR-NOTHING" ATTACK AGAINST SAUDI OR U.S. TROOPS. INSTEAD, HE SAW CHEMICAL WEAPONS BEING USED TO NEUTRALIZE A CONVOY COLUMN OR POSSIBLY TO DENY THE USE OF CERTAIN AREAS. THE MOST LIKELY DELIVERY VEHICLE WOULD BE AN AIRCRAFT (GENERALLY TWO AT A TIME). [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD HAPPEN VERY QUICKLY, WITH LITTLE WARNING. 5. TYPES OF AGENT. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THREE POSSIBLE TYPES OF AGENT -- HCN, SOMAN (NERVE GAS), AND YPERITE (MUSTARD GAS). HCN WOULD BE THICKENED WITH AN ADDITIVE THAT WOULD HELP IT RESIST EVAPORATION DUE TO HIGH TEMPERATURES. SOURCE SEES HCN BEING USED AS A MEANS OF NEUTRALIZING ADVANCING TROOPS. DELIVERY WOULD MOST LIKELY BE BY AIRCRAFT IN EARLY MORNING OR LATE EVENING. SOMAN WOULD ALSO BE USED IN THE MORNING AND EVENING, AND WOULD BE USED TO DENY ACCESS TO ZONES. THE GRAVEST DANGER TO AMERICAN TROOPS IS FROM YPERITE. THE IRAQIS HAVE PERFECTED USE OF THIS AGENT. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], BECAUSE THE IRAQIS INCURRED FRIENDLY CASUALTIES DURING THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT, THE IRAQIS ARE NOW WELL TRAINED IN THE USE OF SUCH AGENTS. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THE IRAQIS DID NOT HAVE PROPER ANTIDOTES. COMMENTS: 1. [ b.2. ]. ALTHOUGH IRAQI PRECEDENT MAY INDICATE THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS PRIOR TO AN ATTACK, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION DOES NOT COMPLETELY PARALLEL PREVIOUS IRAQI TACTICAL USAGE. THIS IS NOT A COUNTERATTACK, AND ATTACKING FORCES WHO USE MUSTARD OR ANOTHER PERSISTENT AGENT WILL CREATE THEIR OWN MOPP ENVIRONMENT, WHICH THEY WILL PROBABLY DESIRE TO AVOID, SINCE THEIR OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO PENETRATE, DEFEAT FRONT LINE FORCES, AND OCCUPY SAUDI OIL FIELD FACILITIES AND PORTS. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT TARGET REAR AREA INSTALLATIONS AND POPULATIONS TO INSTILL FEAR AND INDUCE SURRENDER. 2. CHEMICAL PROTECTION -- FRENCH ARMY AVIATION. THE GAZELLE AND PUMA HELICOPTERS EMBARKED ABOARD CLEMENCEAU FROM THE FORCE D'ACTION RAPIDE HAVE ONLY VERY LIMITED CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN ANY CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT. LIKE MOST ARMY AVIATION ASSETS, THE CABINS ARE NOT PRESSURIZED, AND LIMITED OPERATIONS IN MOPP GEAR SHOULD BE ENVISAGED DUE TO LIMITATIONS ON VISION AND ESPECIALLY ON NIGHT FLYING. 3. ALAT PILOTS RARELY TRAIN IN NBC CONDITIONS. WHEN THEY DO, IT IS DONE "ON-THE-GROUND," WITH EMPHASIS ON SURVIVABILITY IN A CONTAMINATED ZONE OR FACILITY. NBC DEFENSIVE GEAR IS NEVER ISSUED IN GARRISON; TRAINING USES ONLY PORTIONS OF EQUIPMENT (MASK AND SOMETIMES COVERALLS). MOST PERSONNEL HAVE NEVER SEEN -- NEVER TRAINED WITH -- GLOVES, BOOTS, LINERS, ANTIDOTE INJECTORS, ETC. WARTIME EQUIPMENT IS MAINTAINED, AT THE LEVEL OF ONE ITEM PER SOLDIER, AT DIVISION-LEVEL STORAGE SITES. ITEMS OF DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT ARE MAINTAINED ONLY AT DIVISION, CORPS, OR ARMY STORAGE SITES. NBC EXPERTISE HAS BEEN CENTRALIZED AT THE NBC SCHOOL NEAR CAEN, WITH THE EXPECTATION OF SENDING TEAMS TO REGIMENTS AT DEPLOYMENT. //IPSP: (U) PT 1600; PG 1100; PT 1620//. //COMSOBJ: (U) 141; 111; 143//. ADMIN PROJ: (U). COLL: (U) DA; AC. INSTR: (U) US NO. PREP: (U) [ b.6. ] ACQ: (U) [ b.2. ] DISSEM: (U) [ b.2. ] WARNING: [ b.2. ] BT #4245 INFODATE: 0
Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search