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File: 950825_68320747_90.txt
Page: 90
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Filename:68320747.90
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 39621
GENDATE:         950504
NNNN
TEXT:            
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX416 MCN = 90226/11955 TOR = 902260848
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS4245 2260848---RUEALGX.
ZNY 
HEADER P 140848Z AUG 90
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEDADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
RUFTAKA/CDR USAINTELCTRE HEIDELBERG GE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKCCG/USDP-CCC WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAQ/MPCFTGEORGEGMEADEMD
[    b.2.    ]
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUCLFBA/CTOCSE 18 ABC FT BRAGG NC
RUEOHNA/CDR82ABNDIV FT BRAGG NC
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CARA//
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC//IEG//
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
RUFTAKA/USA INTEL CENTER HEIDELBERG GE
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N24//
RHFPRWO/RWO RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN/IV/SP//
RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY//
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 140836Z AUG 90
FM [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] 
[    b.2.    ]










 SECTION 01 OF 04          [    b.2.    ]



[    b.2.    ]


/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
[    b.2.    ]) IRAQ (IZ);            .

SUBJ: [    b.2.    ] VIEWS ON IRAQI CHEMICAL
WAFARE [    b.2.    ] (U)

[    b.2.    ]
-------------------------------------------------
[    b.2.    ]
-------------------------------------------------

[    b.2.    ]
[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]


[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] IRAQI
CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY. [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] 
SEVERAL
FACTORS WEIGHING IN FAVOR OF ((HUSSEIN)), SHOULD HE ELECT
TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. POSSIBLE FACTORS RESTRAINING
HUSSEIN WERE ALSO PRESENTED.

[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]
 IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE
CAPABILITY. REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION THAT SUGGESTS
THERE ARE FACTORS WEIGHING IN FAVOR OF ((HUSSEIN)) SHOULD
HE ELECT TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. TWO POSSIBLE DETRACTORS
MAY PREVENT HUSSEIN FROM USING WEAPONS. REPORT TOUCHES ON
LIKELY IRAQI OPERATIONAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE
MOST LIKELY AGENTS TO BE ENCOUNTERED. THE IRAQIS BEGAN
DEVELOPING THEIR DOMESTIC CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY IN
1975-1976. THEY HAVE CONCENTRATED ON ALL ASPECTS OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE -- FROM PRODUCTION, TO EMPLOYMENT
TECHNIQUES, TO PROTECTION.

2.  FACTORS IN HUSSEIN'S FAVOR

A. WINDS. THE PREVAILING WINDS IN THE AREA OF THE
IRAQI-SAUDI BORDER FAVOR IRAQ'S USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
ACCORDING TO SOURCE, PARTICULARLY IF THE DEFENDING TROOPS
MOVE WEST, INLAND FROM POSITIONS NEAR THE ARABIAN GULF
COAST. THE PREVAILING WINDS ARE ANTICYCLONIC IN NATURE
FROM SUDAN ACROSS THE RED SEA, TURNING EAST TO THE
EAST-SOUTHEAST ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN IRAQ AND SAUDI
ARABIA. SOURCE DISPLAYED A MAP WHICH DEPICTED THE



PREVAILING WINDS NEARLY PARALLELING THE BORDER. THESE
WINDS COUPLE WITH A PREVAILING WESTERLY WIND FROM THE
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTHWESTERLY WINDS FROM THE
SOVIET UNION. THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAN WINDS (FROM
SUDAN) ARE VERY DRY. SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE LOW
HUMIDITY OF THE AIR MAKES IT CAPABLE OF ACCEPTING/
DISPERSING MORE AGENT.

B.  GEOGRAPHY. MUCH OF THE AREA BETWEEN IRAQ AND
SAUDI ARABIA IS IN A LOWER-LYING VALLEY. THE SOIL HAS A
VERY HIGH CALCIUM CONTENT AND HAS SUCH A HIGH
CONCENTRATION OF OTHER MINERALS THAT IT IS UNUSABLE.
THUS, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE CONCERN FOR DAMAGING THE
ENVIRONMENT.

C.  TEMPERATURE. AS HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED IN THE
PRESS, THE HIGH TEMPERATURES COULD REDUCE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF SOLDIERS DONNING NBC GEAR.

3.  FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST HUSSEIN.

A.  AMERICAN RESOLVE. [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] HUSSEIN,
BY NOW, REALIZES AMERICA'S RESOLVE TO PREVAIL IN THE
SITUATION. THIS WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON HIS ARMY'S
WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT AND POSSIBLY TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL
WEAPONS.

B. [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] HUSSEIN WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO
USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IF IT MEANT POISONING HIS OWN LANDS
AND WATER. THUS, [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ], IF THE 
AMERICANS MOVED
NORTH IN A "BLITZKRIEG" FASHION, THEREBY OCCUPYING THE
RICH AREA IN AND AROUND IRAQ'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS FROM
WHICH IRAQ OBTAINS ITS WATER, HUSSEIN WOULD BE RESTRAINED
FROM USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- DESIRING NOT TO CONTAMINATE
IRAQ'S LIMITED RESOURCE.

4.  LIKELY IRAQI EMPLOYMENT TACTICS. [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  
  ] DID NOT
SEE HUSSEIN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AN ALL-OUT, MASSIVE,
"ALL-OR-NOTHING" ATTACK AGAINST SAUDI OR U.S. TROOPS.
INSTEAD, HE SAW CHEMICAL WEAPONS BEING USED TO NEUTRALIZE
A CONVOY COLUMN OR POSSIBLY TO DENY THE USE OF CERTAIN
AREAS. THE MOST LIKELY DELIVERY VEHICLE WOULD BE AN
AIRCRAFT (GENERALLY TWO AT A TIME). [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   
 ]
 SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD HAPPEN VERY QUICKLY,
WITH LITTLE WARNING.



5.  TYPES OF AGENT. [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] THREE 
POSSIBLE TYPES
OF AGENT -- HCN, SOMAN (NERVE GAS), AND YPERITE (MUSTARD
GAS). HCN WOULD BE THICKENED WITH AN ADDITIVE THAT WOULD
HELP IT RESIST EVAPORATION DUE TO HIGH TEMPERATURES.
SOURCE SEES HCN BEING USED AS A MEANS OF NEUTRALIZING
ADVANCING TROOPS. DELIVERY WOULD MOST LIKELY BE BY
AIRCRAFT IN EARLY MORNING OR LATE EVENING. SOMAN WOULD
ALSO BE USED IN THE MORNING AND EVENING, AND WOULD BE USED
TO DENY ACCESS TO ZONES. THE GRAVEST DANGER TO AMERICAN
TROOPS IS FROM YPERITE. THE IRAQIS HAVE PERFECTED USE OF
THIS AGENT. [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ], BECAUSE THE IRAQIS
INCURRED FRIENDLY CASUALTIES DURING THE IRAQ/IRAN
CONFLICT, THE IRAQIS ARE NOW WELL TRAINED IN THE USE OF
SUCH AGENTS. [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] THE IRAQIS DID NOT 
HAVE
PROPER ANTIDOTES.

COMMENTS: 1. [    b.2.    ]. ALTHOUGH IRAQI
PRECEDENT MAY INDICATE THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS
PRIOR TO AN ATTACK, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THE CURRENT
SITUATION DOES NOT COMPLETELY PARALLEL PREVIOUS IRAQI
TACTICAL USAGE. THIS IS NOT A COUNTERATTACK, AND
ATTACKING FORCES WHO USE MUSTARD OR ANOTHER PERSISTENT
AGENT WILL CREATE THEIR OWN MOPP ENVIRONMENT, WHICH THEY
WILL PROBABLY DESIRE TO AVOID, SINCE THEIR OBJECTIVE WILL
BE TO PENETRATE, DEFEAT FRONT LINE FORCES, AND OCCUPY
SAUDI OIL FIELD FACILITIES AND PORTS. IT IS POSSIBLE,
HOWEVER, THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT TARGET REAR AREA
INSTALLATIONS AND POPULATIONS TO INSTILL FEAR AND INDUCE
SURRENDER.

2.  CHEMICAL PROTECTION -- FRENCH ARMY AVIATION.
THE GAZELLE AND PUMA HELICOPTERS EMBARKED ABOARD
CLEMENCEAU FROM THE FORCE D'ACTION RAPIDE HAVE ONLY VERY
LIMITED CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN ANY CHEMICAL
ENVIRONMENT. LIKE MOST ARMY AVIATION ASSETS, THE CABINS
ARE NOT PRESSURIZED, AND LIMITED OPERATIONS IN MOPP GEAR
SHOULD BE ENVISAGED DUE TO LIMITATIONS ON VISION AND
ESPECIALLY ON NIGHT FLYING.

3.  ALAT PILOTS RARELY TRAIN IN NBC CONDITIONS.
WHEN THEY DO, IT IS DONE "ON-THE-GROUND," WITH EMPHASIS ON
SURVIVABILITY IN A CONTAMINATED ZONE OR FACILITY. NBC
DEFENSIVE GEAR IS NEVER ISSUED IN GARRISON; TRAINING USES
ONLY PORTIONS OF EQUIPMENT (MASK AND SOMETIMES
COVERALLS). MOST PERSONNEL HAVE NEVER SEEN -- NEVER
TRAINED WITH -- GLOVES, BOOTS, LINERS, ANTIDOTE INJECTORS,
ETC. WARTIME EQUIPMENT IS MAINTAINED, AT THE LEVEL OF ONE



ITEM PER SOLDIER, AT DIVISION-LEVEL STORAGE SITES. ITEMS
OF DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT ARE MAINTAINED ONLY AT
DIVISION, CORPS, OR ARMY STORAGE SITES. NBC EXPERTISE HAS
BEEN CENTRALIZED AT THE NBC SCHOOL NEAR CAEN, WITH THE
EXPECTATION OF SENDING TEAMS TO REGIMENTS AT DEPLOYMENT.

//IPSP: (U) PT 1600; PG 1100; PT 1620//.
//COMSOBJ: (U) 141; 111; 143//.
ADMIN PROJ: (U).
COLL: (U) DA; AC.
INSTR: (U) US NO.
PREP: (U) [    b.6.    ]


ACQ: (U) [    b.2.    ]
DISSEM: (U) [    b.2.    ]
WARNING: [    b.2.    ]



BT

#4245


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